Alexander Yakovlev Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley

| Photo by S. Beth Atkin |
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What, in the light of your experience, do you see as the special responsibilities of a reformer? It's so easy to say that the system must be overturned or must be changed and so on, but what is the special responsibility in linking ideas and a vision of what the world should be like to actual reality?
If I am asked how do I evaluate my own activity, or what is my judgment of the reform movement, I will always be proud that we were able, finally, to achieve the goal of freedom of expression in the press and in social relations. The other achievement that I will continue to be proud of is in the sphere of international relations. I was in charge of that, both as a former ambassador and as Director of the Institute of International Relations and World Economy, and so Gorbachev would always take me with him to international summit meetings, and so on. And I believe that our greatest real accomplishment was the end of the Cold War. Why was glasnost such a crucial point? It's quite banal in the West. The reason is that in Russia this was the precondition for the collapse of the totalitarian regime. Once we figured out who we were and could see who we actually were, then the totalitarian regime collapsed. It is like giving sight to a blind society. For a long time you walk around as a blind man and then suddenly you have sight.
And you have to adapt to circumstances as you're part of this process of changing a whole order, do you not?
You're absolutely right. Very often we are judged by the criteria of today and people completely forget the context in which we were operating then. And when we are asked "Why didn't you do this?" or "Why didn't you do that?" my argument usually is as follows: Imagine it is 1985, 1986. Imagine myself, Gorbachev. Imagine the plenary session of the Central Committee. We walk out onto the podium and say, "Listen folks, let's introduce freedom of expression tomorrow. Let's have an election tomorrow, what do you think. Let's have a multi-party system. Let's give the land to the peasants. Let's get rid of the centralized economy. And let's create a market economy." I am not sure where we would be after such a plenary session, but I can tell you for certain that we would have been expelled from the party right there and then -- thrown out.
What is your assessment of how things have proceeded, beyond this period when you were in the government? Land reform still has not happened in Russia.
Up till now, no.
Do you think that the conditions now exist to actually address these issues over time?
The present regime that took power in 1991 has been trying, and it's trying today to complete the reform process that was started before 1991. In the political sphere, of course, our successes are greater than in the economic sphere. In the economic sphere, this regime is encountering great problems. And if we don't complete the reforms in the next four years, what we will wind up with is a mixture of criminality, dictatorship, corruption. A criminal dictatorship, the dictatorship of a criminal element. Or a lumpen ideology.
In such circumstances, the Weimar analogy would be very relevant. How great
a danger is that, that the situation could unravel in Russia and that Western
policies could contribute to that situation and create circumstances that are
similar to what happened in Weimar Germany before World War II?
When people draw comparisons between the Weimar Republic and the consequences that led to fascism, I don't see the parallel between that and Russia. Here's why. When people say that what's happening in Russia may lead to fascism, my response is "What do you mean lead to fascism? We've already had fascism. All we can argue about is whether our fascism started in 1917 or 1929." So I don't really see a parallel between the Weimar Republic and Russia. You just have to understand that Russia, in its thousand-year history, has had a tradition of dependency on the leader, on the state, the myth of the state, the worship of the state, the tradition of general utter dependency on the boss, on somebody. You've got to understand that, keep that in mind. And the ideology of intolerance. So there's a danger that we may develop a kind of statehood that's based on all those principles: dependency, intolerance, worship of the state. The intellectuals are now running around saying we must find our national ideal. Even the president has published some kind of an appeal: "We've got to find the national idea." It's really ludicrous. You can't just look for an idea under a mattress or under a bed. Those ideas come out of life. Secondly, I'm really worried by this turn of events. Why am I worried? It seems that the society, either they don't notice it or they reject it, that we already have such an idea -- the idea of freedom. Because if you are free, the rest falls into place. If you are interested in a strong state or if you are interested in human rights, as long as freedom is the foundation, then things fall into place. Freedom, if you will, is the new religion and the new ideology. That's what it is. We already have freedom yet we begin to look for something else, this idea, or yet another idea, and so on.
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