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**Shaping Global Order: The Role of Small States and Multilateral Processes in a Hegemonic World:
The US and Europe - a Scandinavian Perspective**

1) The starting point for this discussion must be that the US and Europe share a basic identity. The American dream is originally a European dream. Enterprising Europeans left the old continent for a promised land across the sea in order to fulfill their dreams.

This was particularly obvious in Scandinavia from the mid 19th century to the first third of the 20th century. More than one million Swedes emigrated, proportionally more than from any other European country except for Ireland. The major social and economic transformation of Scandinavia in the 19th century created both the labor movement and emigration, both the welfare state and a basic social cultural kinship with America.

The labor movement was the collective response to the new times, emigration the individual. But there were basic similarities in anti-traditionalism and egalitarianism. The cultural kinship between America and Scandinavia prevails. It has stronger roots than the global post world war II globalized Americanization of popular culture. There is little of the French cultural, aristocratic condescendence towards the US in northern Europe. The Anglo-Saxon orientation in Scandinavia is much stronger than the continental European which is also seen in the rather lukewarm attitude towards the EU in Scandinavia.

2) Demography could challenge the traditional closeness between the US and Europe. The US is still an immigrant country. But the new influx of people is primarily from Latin America and Asia. California is today the largest US state but also since the beginning of this millennium the first state with a "non-European" ethnic majority.

We know less of the basic political attitudes and interests of the Latino and Asian populations. Some say that Asians on the whole are less political in their interests, more family and professional oriented than social and political. Maybe they are less "universalist" - for good or for worse - in their way of thinking compared to Europeans and Americans of European descent? This could quickly be seen in public policy. Remember the narrow interpretation of the US national interest and the rather isolationist agenda of George W Bush in the 2000 campaign and pre 911. This was also a campaign when Bush openly catered to the Latino vote.

Simultaneously Europe could become less global. Old colonial orientations slowly fade away. In the EU there are simultaneous, paradoxical trends at the moment. On the one hand, the enlargement of the Union to 25 members will probably make the organization quite inward-looking in the coming years, confirming a US concern that post cold war Europe has lost a global commitment. On the other hand the EU is trying to formulate a common foreign and security policy, In December 2003 even a common security strategy was adopted by the EU. With enlargement the EU has new members with a strong pro-US orientation since the cold war. The new security threats from state failure and terrorism are physically getting closer to Europe. In 10 years time, with Turkey as an EU member, the EU will share borders with Syria and Iraq!

3) With all their quarrels and policy differences the US and Europe are still seen by the rest of the world as the rich "West" with universalistic values that they want to project on the rest of the world. They constitute that "Western civilization" which is both envied and hated by others. There are obvious "structural" differences in military, economic and political power and striking differences in the experience of social turmoil and terrorism the last decades, but still the US and Europe are in it together and have to find ways to reconcile and cope with their common challenges.

4) If terrorism and the war like dimension it took on 9/11 constitute the new security threat to the West, we share it. I would even argue and make the dramatic point that the real hate object of terrorist groups is the globalized world of the 1990's with the US and Europe in quite close cooperation, i.e. Clinton's America more than the US of George W Bush. "Anti western" terrorists realize that this is the world that is attractive for many, a world order with universal appeal - the US as the benign hegemon exercising soft power with Europe at its side. There is one unpleasant consequence to draw from this, of course: The need for multilateralism and the involvement of the UN in Iraq, i.e., is self-evident. But - like we have seen in the attacks on the UN and independent aid workers in Iraq - such a new order may be even more harshly attacked by terrorists who see the need to undermine a more benign western order that constitutes the most attractive alternative to ordinary citizens.

5) The real conflict today between the US and Europe, between the Bush administration and most European citizens, is how the terrorist threat should be perceived and how it should be dealt with.

For the European majority view the "war on terrorism" as defined and exercised by the Bush administration is wrong because

a) War against non-statal actors with obscure tactics cannot be fought only, or even primarily, by military means; maybe more so than most Europeans have realized yet, but definitely not as much as the US has tried.

b) A campaign against terrorism requires checks on "over stretch" and a viable exit strategy. Since 9/11 President Bush has said that the war on terror basically is an endless endeavor and thus cannot be evaluated. (In his context, it has been amazing to see the last few months that the most dominant military power ever has not even the troops enough to wage an efficient military war against terrorism.)

c) Terrorism is a means/a tactic, not an ideological or defined physical enemy like the Soviet Union during the cold war.

d) A war on terrorism must not be confused with an old agenda and encompass everything you want to deal with in international relations. The single most striking and strongest difference between American and European public opinion on Iraq is that a European majority does not accept the assertion of the Bush administration that the war in Iraq is an integral part of the war on terrorism and that the invasion of March 2003 to topple Saddam Hussein's regime could be justified for this reason. The claim that there exists links between Saddam and al-Qaida has not been proven correct. It can not be argued that Saddam was involved with the attacks on the US in September 2001. Iraq was an abusive state with an abhorrent regime. But it was contained during the 1990's up to March 2003. Now it has been turned into a failed state by the US and UK action.

6)The current conflict between Europe and America maybe the deepest and most bitter in modern times. The differences in structural strength and dispositions remain. But primarily this is a political conflict with the present US administration. A renewed US-Europe relationship requires a new US administration - a new president after the November elections or at least a new cabinet with the present president.

The big issue in the spring of 2004 is to broaden the occupation of Iraq to encompass a UN or at least Nato "trustee" presence in Baghdad. But it is hard to persuade Europeans and other UN members to come into Iraq to take care of or be party to defeat when they were not invited in to the victory last spring. To overcome their resentment to do this Europeans and other UN members need to see the responsible perpetrator for the present chaos go. (It could be argued that some European leaders also should go - and this is not an oblique reference to Tony Blair - but this is secondary)

At the same time Europe is under tremendous pressure to get into Iraq regardless of the prestige and the risk. Chaos in Iraq is not acceptable to European security. As noted, Iraq might be an EU neighbor in ten years time.

(Here, it is worth remembering that the EU may offer the best instrument for imposing or introducing regime change and democratization from above, i.e. enlargement providing both sticks and the carrot of co membership to incite change in a country.)

7)When US-European relations are to be re-established in the near future, northern Europe and the Baltic region can offer a new interesting gateway for the transatlantic link. The Nordics may not have a recent military experience and capability to offer - although this is probably underestimated - but otherwise there is

- a natural, historic Atlanticist orientation already mentioned

- an interesting mix of nations; old and new Nato allies, non-aligned with the aligned etc

- a lingering concern with the possible territorial threat from Russia based on historic experiences; this causes a particular interest in visible US presence in the region

- closeness to Germany and Poland who in the long run must establish themselves as the driving force for future European integration after EU enlargement

- a successful precedent of their own of peaceful conflict resolution and prevention; Nordic involvement in efforts to promote Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltics in the mid 90's and consistent support in enlargement preparations.

- a historic commitment to a broad security agenda (free trade, development aid and cooperation, multilateralism, mediation and good offices) and a pool of competence and initiatives in this area.

Swedes pride themselves of this immensely. But Norwegians have the strongest track record from the last 10-15 years; A recognition by a Swede worth doing as his final point of an introduction at a Peder Sather symposium 2004.