The Making of Concessions: Traditional Authorities, Transnational Capital, and Territorialized Identities in Africa

By Rebecca Hardin
Paper presented to the Environmental Politics Seminar
UC Berkeley, April 27 2007

Draft: please do not cite, nor reproduce

Note: This paper presents a framework I am developing for a book project tentatively entitled “Concessionary Cultures.” I am currently revising the project for the University of California Press series “Colonialisms.” The opportunity to benefit from the EP seminar discussion is very welcome. In developing this to date I have incurred intellectual debts to the following readers: Arun Agrawal, Susan E. Cook, Jane Guyer, Alain Karsenty, Damani Partridge, John Galaty, Nahomi Ichino, Eduardo Kohn, Nadine Naber, Devra Meuller, Abena Osseo-Assare, Lorraine Paterson, Beth Povinelli, Hugh Raffles, Jesse Ribot, Mary Steedly, Miriam Ticktin, Diana Wylie, and an anonymous reviewer for the University of California Press. The research support of McGill University, the University of Michigan, and the Harvard Academy of International and Area Studies has been crucial,
Nestled within the Dzanga Sangha Dense Forest Reserve and Dzanga Ndoki National Park, the small town of Bayanga is the largest settlement in that southernmost triangle of the Central African Republic (CAR) that borders Cameroon and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). The establishment (1988) and subsequent legislation (1991) of the Park and Reserve (which I’ll refer to at the RDS) created one of the last protected areas established in the CAR, and one of only two sizeable forest reserves in that country. Conducting research on the role of tourism and trophy hunting in the management of this protected area found me sitting one evening with a pair of professional trophy hunters over the cocktails they call “sundowners.” During their hunts with clients that week, they complained, they had found abundant evidence of poaching, and they feared that too many of the animal trophies they sought might be marred by scars from wire snares. The technical advisor, or expatriate Director for the Reserve, was also around the table. She knew the hunt operators fairly well, since the Safari hunting operations were short staffed during their seasonal operations, and were obliged to appeal occasionally to the Reserve administration for basic infrastructural and logistical support.

There was a sense in which their criticism of wildlife conservation efforts was intended to appeal to a set of strategies and objectives they could share with the technical advisor and her staff from conservation NGOs active in the area. In so doing, however, they also appealed to logics of rivalry for prestige and territorial control as old as the feudal manors, royal hunts, and murdered poachers of E.P. Thompson’s (1974) accounts of 18th and 19th century England.
The technical advisor became animated as she assumed the role of master of her domain. She retorted proudly: “my men are patrolling the northern sector for poachers and miners; I have them rotate unpredictably to cover the complete perimeter of our territory.” She added: “we can’t be everywhere at once.” The moment presented an interesting contradiction. I knew this person to be trained in ecology, skilled at administration, knowledgeable about the regions culture and political economy, motivated professionally by a sense of global environmental crisis, and currently employed as a European through a U.S.-based NGO to collaborate with the government of the CAR in the complex tasks of protecting wildlife within its southern forests. She was most often engaged on a day to day basis in balancing budgets, supervising the allocation of material supplies, writing assessments, reports and grants, collecting and analyzing data, and drafting prospective wildlife related legislation in multiple languages, including French and English. Yet those exquisitely complex technical, scientific, managerial, and political tasks paled, over cocktails, in comparison with the pride and power of commanding and patrolling the perimeters of this particular protected area.

Later that evening, walking back down the hill from the comfortable expatriate villas with their ceiling fans, screened porches, and cold, smooth, concrete floors I relished the quiet sounds and smells of the trail where fields and forest encounter the river bank as it leads back to the center of town. I knew I had timed my descent perfectly to pluck an invitation to supper from the evening air, where family groups were gathering around their fires. Stews of game meat and shredded forest greens simmered over fires,
and young children clambered onto their mothers’ laps for warmth after their evening baths.

Dark had fallen, revealing a new moon. Suddenly I changed my mind about my supper plans. Instead, I switched off my flashlight and moved unnoticed among the rattan-roofed homes. “The Germans are going to bring in more workers…” male voices were gossiping about the very expatriates with whom I had sat earlier. “But the conservation project is not a good patron. They have no coupons for fuel; no ammunition; no alcohol.” I was familiar with these refrains; in these afternoon and evening discussions arose the demands and expectations expatriates would meet the following day—and day after day, in their interactions with African collaborators, employees, and constituents (for NGOs do, in important ways, govern…).

Around their fires, and in the several palm wine stands that dotted the village landscape, I had seen and heard people howl with laughter as they performed elaborate parodies of the anti-poaching patrols. It was widely known that an imaginary “Reserve” area existed, staffed by local drunks who bragged and joked about their own pretend maneuvers. “Hey you!” they would say, slapping their thighs and splashing the sweet fermented liquid from the jagged plastic cooking oil bottles from which they drank, “you are number 63 and I am number 8. You follow MY orders!” Their send up can only make sense if one realizes how subject the aspirations of poaching control can be to social process in this particular corner of the equatorial African forest. In fact, many of those thus entertained had either recently served the “project” as employees—even as guards—or had recently encountered the project’s restrictions on their exploitation of forest resources.
In this and many other interactions during my time in CAR I recognized the contours of concessionary culture, a powerfully seductive and deeply historically rooted set of logics linking processes of valuation, delimitation, and negotiation of natural resources and their uses. Forged through intersecting culturally specific modes of territorial management since the 18th century, “concessions” signify for me a complex of social practices that demarcate, spatially, relations of territorial control for the purposes of either extracting—or protecting—natural resources. The underlying logics of these practices appeal to interpersonal and inter-group dynamics of rivalry, as well as to systems of kinship—fictive or real—and mutual interests that create understandings among elites, but also between elites and other actors over time. Such understandings bind contemporary actors to one another, and to the past, even as they transform the present. Not imposed by one “people” on another, concessionary culture seems spontaneously to emerge from circumstances of contact and contest. Its enduring nature and its variation result from imperialism’s transformation and exploitation (or, now, protection) of natural resources (Cronon 1983; Crosby 1986). Weiskel 1987; Grove 1995).

Conceptualizing Concessions

This paper defines and develops the concept of concessionary culture. Further, I argue for the urgency of studying concessions as a modular concept that enables thinking across historical epochs, and across conventions in scholarly research. Concessions of many
kinds, from logging to mining to conservation, are made through a series of common processes, or phases.

The first phase, or *prospecting*, is often linked to the inflated estimation of the value of resources in question (be they mineral, wildlife, or other) and in this way also relates to recent work by Anna Tsing (2004) on the remarkable wealth generated merely through speculative politics of potential and real investment practices. Rivalries, at this stage, may be expressed primarily through contests of speed (by those mounting actual expeditions or more virtual assessments) and science (by those claiming to have better technologies of detection or measurement, or better links to local informants and forms of knowledge). A contemporary example of prospecting in the western Congo basin is the wildlife census practices of doctoral students at the Yale School of Forestry in the late 1980s (see Carroll 1987), which became the baseline for the creation of the Dzanga-Sangha Reserve.

The second phase, *delimitation*, is often where territorial rivalries are expressed most directly, and where conflicts play out involving political influence or even force (as in the military struggles between French and German in the western Congo basin, or between British and Boer in today’s South Africa, described in subsequent chapters of the book project). A contemporary example of delimitation includes the gazetting of transborder protected areas in the Sangha River region, which occurred during the late 1990s and pitted German and U.S. based conservation organizations against one another, even as it ushered in a new era of collaboration and integration among them.

Finally, during the *making of concessions*, many of the intimacies discovered and creating during prospecting processes mature, as new ones are formed. This fosters fine-
grained local rivalries and alliances among groups and individuals, who wrangle with one another about the various dimensions of life, work, and wealth at the concession level while each also working within constraining connections to wider worlds.

In the book to which this will serve as an introduction, I hone in on the history of concessions in the Western Congo Basin site described above, and using the establishment of the RDS as an example of contemporary concessionary politics where these processes unfold concomitantly in the interest of logging and of biodiversity conservation. Then I take a dramatically different site: a highly autonomous and wealthy group of traditionally governed Tswana speakers from South Africa, who have forged innovative relationships for the control of mining concessions on their lands. Thinking with two such different contexts helps to illustrate the modular nature of the concept, as it reveals the historical trajectories of new forms for environmental governance. Three common elements exist in these respective histories illustrate key features of concessionary politics:

- regional and local level negotiations of services and rights (often concerning working conditions, health, and environmental issues) that have been formally ceded at a national or supra-national level;

- intimate patron-client relationships and understandings among elites (often extended to others and expressed through collective cultural performances that are highly ritualized and local in idiom, yet truly international in audience) that mediate, or even replace governance by the nation state;

- fields of interpenetrating identity politics that, through rivalry, reconfigure notions of core and periphery in the politics and geopolitics of resource use (but remained anchored in the contests for control over specific territories or resources/rights).
These three aspects (local level negotiation, political and material mediation, and reconfigured access through rivalries) are embedded in long histories of exploitation. Together these aspects do not create a coherent system, but rather a powerful complex of expectations, exchanges, and even infrastructures. This complex emerges from encounters and ongoing relationships that link members of commercial and political elite at national and international levels, with local populations and their “patrons” at local and regional levels. In sum the phrase “concessionary politics” refers both to historical realities, and to a set of social relations involving patronage, property, and power that are constantly being re-invented through intimate arrangements at various levels.

The world is witnessing a turning point in the history of territorialized polities, when large-scale planning processes are largely carried out by extra-state regimes, but through particular place-based negotiations within existing nation states. Concessionary politics thus merit close examination as they reconfigure the role of the nation state in the management of species rich areas. Intimacy between patrons and residents of a concession both displaces the roles played by state actors and agencies in local and regional politics, and reinforces the relevance of the national government in granting concessions.

That is to say, while national governments retain the power to frame or define the parties to be involved in these provincial politics of patronage, they are not in complete control of outcomes about which of these actors will effectively occupy patron roles and which will effect premature departures; about what services they will provide, to whom and under what circumstances. International relations are thus reflected and refashioned
in the microcosm that is the forest town, with its particular history and its particular set of natural resources ever shifting social contracts for their use and value.

Yet, labor comes from beyond such concessions; runoffs and contaminations circulate far beyond the limits of such concessions; and marginalized communities within such concessions may not benefit, in terms of their own development, from the sorts of “understandings” between elites that characterize these regimes. Conservationists should be wary of these precedents, and aware of their own tendencies to be invited, by either other expatriate competitors, by national officials, or by forest residents themselves, into the reproduction of concessionary politics. Unless conservationists embrace such strategies on a provisional basis, then they risk reproducing aspects of an unjust and exploitative past in the present and future of Africa’s biologically and culturally rich forests that remain, educationally and economically, so desperately impoverished. While not so chaotic and cruel as the cartels and militias that exploit diamonds in much of west and central Africa, concessionary politics can be argued as a close cousin to such systems.

Reno (1998) argues that the existence within a central state of patronage networks, however weak and partial, enables distinctions between warlordism and other forms of governance. Concessionary politics, then, are a crucial point on the continuum from warlords ruling in a state that has been dismantled, to centralized states exercising

1 Loftus and McDonald (2001), in fact, describe the process by which a particular company obtains a concession for water in Buenos Aires, promising reduced rates and expanded service. When neither comes to pass, the government defends the concessionaire against regulators and consumers, in a classic case of concession making that is anathema to efficient, effective, market-driven development of a particular area or commodity (see “Of liquid dreams: a political ecology of water privatization in Buenos Aires” in Environment and Urbanization 13 (2): 179-199).

2 For an account of such violence in the context of Sierra Leone, see Paul Richards’s Fighting for the Rainforest (1996), and the recent Human Rights Watch Report (2001b).
effective control over resource use and revenue use across their territorial purview.

Several factors may all interpenetrate to determine where on this continuum a given state may be located at a given point in time. These include: the nature and wealth of the resource base,\(^3\) processes of privatization and/or decentralization,\(^4\) and political and cultural legacies in the longue durée.

For the purposes of this paper and discussion, I will sketch some contributions I think this concept might make to the interdisciplinary fields of colonial and postcolonial studies, as well as to the specific field of African Studies, wherein scholars are struggling to articulate African roles in the creation of the modern, against that continent’s popular images as both dangerously conflict ridden and sadly victimized by historical actors and forces from elsewhere. Finally, I explore the concepts relevance for better ethnographies of multinational corporations, in their interactions with complex communities in rural African landscapes where concessionary cultures that date from the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century are constantly reinvented in the face of new commodities and actors.

It is thus that the puzzle of protection as well as extraction can be explained: the staff of international environmental NGOs with the best intentions of transparency, good environmental governance, and ecologically sound management can become caught up

\(^3\) In the Sangha basin case shifts in market values of particular commodities, and in regional boundaries over time, make the idea of a resource rich state less compelling than that of resource rich regions within (and between) states. Because my field site in South Africa is also a border zone (between RSA and Botswana) I do not consider in detail here the research on what has been called the “resource curse.” See, for example, Luong and Weinthal’s recent review of this literature with respect to Russia and Kazakhstan, in *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (4): 367-399.

\(^4\) Bayart, Hibou and Ellis (1998) describe the privatization of the state itself in African contexts. For more comparative consideration of decentralization with respect to environmental management and access to land see also Ribot (1999) and Peters (2000).
not only in the making of concessions in territorial senses, but in conceding ideological
ground, engaging in practices that correspond to range of African and hybrid modes of
governance with their own logics of legitimacy and balance, but that are important to
distinguish from formally representative politics. Indeed, in an era where scholars of
conservation and development are actively contemplating paradigms such as
participatory process (Mosse 2001) for redressing the ills of over-use of force in the
protection and management of natural resources (Peluso 1998; Neumann 1993), such
shades of grey may prove broadly analytically useful.

Historicizing Concessions

The origins of “concessionary cultures” which shape much of the highly contested
use and management of natural resources such as mineral deposits or forests in Africa
today can be traced to both pre-colonial and colonial practices. However, there is limited
scholarly interrogation of concessions as a cultural and social category. This is surprising,
given maturing traditions in scholarly work in multiple disciplines that takes a wide range
of elements of colonialism as a topic. In the two contexts studied here, African and
European families of elites have long engaged in intimate contests and alliances for the
control of economic, ecological, and political forms of wealth and power. These rivalries
have long created concessions as complicated social spaces, constantly remade through
interactions among elites, and between elites and other groups.

---

5 On the cycles of scholarly engagement with colonialism see Cooper (2002b). Osterhammel’s
recent work on the topic of colonialism has synthesized an enormous literature in order to remedy the
concept’s “colossal vagueness” (1997:4). He begins his analytical task by arguing that the basis of varied
aspects of colonialism is the notion of “expansion of a society beyond its original habitat” (ibid).
Used from the eighteenth century to consolidate central government control over internal and outlying geographical areas, the notion of the concession worked to reinforce the totalizing nature of sovereign power, and then to extend that power through various mediating actors and codes or norms, across varied geographical and social contexts. The construction of nearly totalizing power, as in a fiefdom, was crucial. Take, for example, the following text about the Palais de Luxembourg and surrounding lands (France 1779):

Kings Patent Letters: conferring concession to Monsieur, as allegiance title, of all lands and sites belonging to the Palace of Luxembourg, reserved by edict of last December by the King to be enjoyed by Monsieur as a titled fiefdom, with all faculties to enjoy the totality of the fiefdom, through all alienations and accessions that he deems necessary for these lands and sites (rendered at Versailles, the 25 March 1779: registered in Parliament the 23 April, 1779—my translation).

Once established, this totalizing control was extended, and relied increasingly upon forms of mediation by figures of particular authority at regional and local levels in the management of land and labor across a ruler’s empire. That is, the concession both formalized power as territorially and materially totalizing, and enjoyable “with all faculties,” and made it transposable within the limits of existing territorial control and sovereignty.

The decree cited below placed four barons in control of roadside plantings in the region of Flandres. Through the conferral of royal rights or powers on a subset of actors at more local levels, the concession could either compel or constrain local practices:
...who makes concession to the high magistrates of four barons, high lords of justice of Flandres Walonne, of the right to plant belonging to His majesty on all the grand planted roads...to enjoy them as an incommutable property and, in perpetuity, with the faculty to cede all or part of this right, either to the communities or to private actors.... (France 1777; my translation).

More or less absolute, this transposable power was forged not only through the actions of mediating elites, but also through legal and administrative norms that traveled from the inner cities of Europe to the vast expanses of North America, Africa, and elsewhere. The meaning of “concession,” ever further from the verb that connected it to a given sovereign, morphed into a noun whose transferability and durability became of crucial importance to all sorts of economic actors. Even where the status of concession no longer forms the basis of such transposable power, the idea of the concession constitutes the historically acknowledged base of such continued power. This extensible meaning of concession works despite geographical distance from the original locus of power, as the below example from Canada suggests:

Treaty of the Law of Fiefs: that was always followed in Canada since its establishment drawn from that contained in the custom of the prevoté and viscount of Paris, to whom all fiefs and lordships of this province are subject, by virtue of their original title of concession (Cugnet 1775; my translation).

Not only dictating access rights and practices in zones of established-sovereign control, the construct of the concession could confer even the right to explore unknown areas, establishing guidelines for future development. Consider the decree pertaining to rivers and waterways, promulgated by Santa Anna to give General Francisco Garay an exclusive twenty-five year “concession” to use steamboats on the Rio Grande/Bravo and to colonize lands along its tributaries (Mexico 1842).
Contextualizing Concessions

Hardly new, the breaking of African lands into mosaics of territorial control has occurred since the early days of European expansion. Protected areas were, in many cases, an extension of the concession system for the use and management of natural resources. Conservation of natural resources has thus long benefited from, and contributed to, concessionary logics for the use of valued natural resources. I take two specific sites or contexts where concessionary politics calls out for analysis: in these two areas colonialism is ascribed by some to be in the distant past, was experienced by all in the recent past, and remains remarkably relevant to most today. It is a powerful complex of memories, expectations, and desires. I thus draw as well from recent work on the more symbolic and processual aspects of colonialism as it inscribed in particular social worlds “a new conception of space, new forms of personhood, and a new means of manufacturing the experience of the real” (Mitchell 1988; see also Stoler 1995).

Notions of co-authorship are by no means new, nor ideologically un-laden. Amselle’s assertion (1998:xv) that there was a "hardening of identities" by colonial policy rather than their “invention,” begins to develop a more accurate perspective in which today’s "Africa is the joint invention of Africans and Europeans."6 Such invention gives rise to hybrid cultural forms that can enable some actors to enrich themselves fabulously at the expense of many others. The title of a recent work reflects this resultant hybridity on a

6 Apter’s use of Amselle (1999:582) nuances Ranger’s less notion of “invention of tradition”: The most far-reaching inventions of tradition in colonial Africa took place when the Europeans believed themselves to be respecting age-old African custom. What was called customary law, customary land-rights, customary political structure, and so on, were in fact all invented by colonial codification (1983:250).
massive scale, relevant to our study site: “La Françafrique” (Verschave 1999). In several books on the topic, Verschave excavates the details of co-constructed systems for the accumulation of wealth by a few at the expense of so many.

Former Emperor of CAR Jean Bedel Bokassa, for example, saw his own father killed because he participated in the liberation of captive workers for the Concession Company Compagnie Forestiere Sangha-Oubangui (or CFSO). Bokassa’s mother died shortly thereafter. An Aunt entrusted with his care, was in turn, beaten to death by CFSO personnel. CFSO was the subsidiary of a colonial company, the SFFC, directed by Edmond Giscard D’Estaing, the father of later president of France, Valery. After the orphaned Bokassa joined the French military and served with distinction in Indochina, he too became president, and then Emporer, of the CAR. Valery and Jean Bedel became close friends and hunting partners, spending much leisure time in and around the protected areas of CAR.

Bokassa’s properties in France were, indeed, ample compensation for the extent to which the CAR became the very nearly private hunting ground (and source of diamonds) for France’s first family. These relationships of privileged access to the natural wealth of an African territory spanned generations, and continue to hinder broader policy efforts today.

At the same time, the many different kinds of encounters that colonialism brought to the forests of the Congo basin enhanced the fabulous diversity of economic practices there. Multiple modes of exchange exist alongside one another, as a sort of safety net for those who may find themselves on the wrong side of power, deprived of clear property.

---

7 See Verschave, 2000: 223, as well as the English language reporting of Howard French (1996 a and b)
rights and democratic political processes under such co-authored systems.\textsuperscript{9} Formal, collective resistance to the concentration of power in the hands of international concessionaires and their national allies within African settings is thus limited by the very complexity of local economies and political traditions, enabling flexible responses by local populations to the exploitation brought by cross-cultural encounters for over a century. It is worth noting, however, that such resilience and diversity is predicated in large part upon the health of the natural environment within which such social systems have evolved. As such, the imperative to conserve the natural resources of the area is imbued with even further urgency.

To do justice to such interactions and their implications for Africa’s environmental and social future, much more must be understood about the private sector in Africa. The literature describing business dealings generally in Africa is remarkably scarce. My literature search at Yale University’s libraries under “corporate culture” turned up three hundred references. Of these, only 4 were relevant to Africa: 2 on South Africa, 1 on Tunisia, and 1 on Nigeria. Business anthropology revealed only 29 references total, none of which were about Africa.\textsuperscript{9} Martin (1997) reviews the paltry anthropological literature on joint ventures worldwide (mostly unpublished dissertations) and offers a convincing lament of the discursive separation between business studies and

\textsuperscript{8} See Dupré (1995) on barter-based exchange relations in the upper Sangha region; for an example from Amazonia see Raffles (2002). For a theoretical overview of overlapping economic systems including cash, gift and barter, see the introduction to Humphrey and Hugh Jones (1992).

\textsuperscript{9} Francois, Information Specialist with Overseas Private Investment Corporation, notes in her review of Major Companies of Africa South of the Sahara 1996 (ed. By D. Franlin, London: Graham and Whiteside, 1996): “Since so much of the world’s attention in investing overseas is focused on the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the African continent has often been neglected.”
development studies whereby the latter has generated much work by anthropologists, while the former has been largely neglected.

Reports pertain to international policy for concession revenues, and their allocation for national and local development needs in equatorial Africa. In addition, the move in Cameroon toward community based forest management, in tandem with intensified competition by external actors for access to forest concessions, has begun to produce a significant social science literature that considers the political economy of such policies, and their consequences for villages, regions, and for the nation state. Little, however, has been documented at the level of the company town, or the rural village (see, however, Gaventa 1980). In the Congo basin, it is in such towns and villages that access to education, basic services, and employment, has long been, and is increasingly, mediated by concessionaires. Such interactions, in turn, shape the wider policy climate in surprising ways. There is thus a clear role for ethnographic research, to complement such policy documents, offering detailed empirical description and interpretation. This moves toward the development of solid theoretical and methodological frameworks for understanding the new concessionary regimes, their connections to colonial era concessions, and their implications for emerging management options.

Working Across Concessionary Contexts

---

10 Recent documents recommending revised concessionary policies for the logging sector focus on international agreements, tax and revenue redistribution policies, longer duration for concessionary agreements, and reliable neutral monitoring of off-take practices (Grut et. al 1991; Walker and Smith 1993; Karsenty 2000; Boscolo and Vincent 2000, Bartley 2003).

11 See, for example, Karsenty 1999, Auzel and Hardin 2000, and Auzel et. al 2001.
The Sangha Sangha of the Republique Centrafricaine (RCA) and the Bafokeng of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) are entirely different peoples, living in almost diametrically opposed ecological and cultural zones. However, both are situated in border zones, sites of intense historical conflict among Africans and Europeans due to the presence of valuable natural resources. Both also occupy interestingly peripheral positions within the nation states that would claim to contain them and are actively and deeply engaged with international industries or organizations in forging economic and environmental development strategies.

Sangha Sangha is an ethnonym used to name those residents of the Dzanga Sangha Dense Forest Reserve Area in RCA who are among the Sangha River basin’s longest-term residents, and are the most directly linked for their subsistence and identity to that river. Some Sangha Sangha migrated out to the river’s edge from inner swamps of the Congo River basin throughout the 1800s, while others came from the river basins and forested plains of eastern Cameroon. As such, the group reflects the importance of the river, a major tributary to the Congo, as a border between ecotones (there is species endemism on either side of the river) and among three nations (RCA, Cameroon, and Congo-Brazzaville). The group contains speakers of several different Bantu languages who have created complex alliances through intermarriage and trade. They claim a privileged relationship to the land along these borders; land that is now contested by logging and biodiversity conservation projects. Over the past four decades, as the RCA state has expanded into this area along with international interests, their elders have been systematically jailed and persecuted as murderous sorcerers: crocodile people.
In part in response to these sorcery-suffused political struggles at local and regional levels, logging companies active in the area most often hire migrant labor from outside the region, fueling bitter struggles and new alliances among distinct African groups for control over land and forest products. This study has combined archival sources with research among a particular extended family of key informants to reveal that the term Sangha Sangha was created as an umbrella term for historically distinct groups who shared unique abilities to use the river system as an economic and cultural resource during the colonial era. Despite its perception by current loggers, conservationists, and tourists as a primordial and coherent category, the term emerged as a salient ethnic marker through the interaction of African and European groups during colonial practices of exploration and trade.

More specifically, Sangha Sangha identity has taken shape through decades of intense rivalry between German and French colonial forces who sought to control the region, and its resources. Today that identity corresponds to governance challenges for both the RCA state and those to whom it concedes the right to exploit or protect its forests. The Sangha Sangha are widely acknowledged as being difficult to employ or control. Their economies take them up and down the Sangha River fishing, trading, and hunting, apparently impervious to the increasingly heavily monitored international and concessionary boundaries of that region.

The Royal Bafokeng Nation (or RBN) exists within the Republic of South Africa (or RSA) as a unique blend of traditional leadership and corporate governance structures. The company, Royal Bafokeng Finance, is listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange and is currently exploring the possibility of patenting their unique blend of consensus
based governance through headmen and a Kgosi, or King, along with an assembly of elected officials. Referring to themselves as people of the dew, the Bafokeng are also Bantu language speakers, who historically mixed pastoralism with agriculture. They migrated out of the more arid regions to the northwest and into their current territory within the RSA near Botswana. As Tswana, they are culturally and linguistically connected to the major Tswana polities of contemporary Botswana, and central northern RSA.

They have long represented a challenge to the sovereignty and integration of the RSA; today this is especially true. During the era of the homeland regime they were persecuted, and their leadership was exiled to Botswana, where they had connections to the royal family. This may help to explain why the RBN flag, designed by the deceased father of the current King, conveys their cultural identity, economic identity, and appurtenance within South Africa, all in clear and conciliatory ways. As illustrated below, the flag features their totem animal, a crocodile, poised to slide peacefully into the water below a pick and shovel, which reflect close ties to the mining industry. This occurs above the South African flag, which is placed in a subordinate position to the motifs that encapsulate the Bafokeng.

Figure 2: The Royal Bafokeng Flag, reflecting their totem animal (the crocodile) the economy they rely upon (mining) and the nation-state within which their nation is situated (RSA). From http://flagspot.net/flags/za-bafok.html
Their capacity for striking strategic political and economic alliances is not new. During the colonial era of European rivalry over South Africa, their formal neutrality in wars between British and Boer, and their strong alliance with German missionaries helped them gain formal rights to pasture and farm land. This land was, unbeknownst to any of them, positioned above the second largest platinum vein in the world, part of the Merensky reef. In recent decades, the Bafokeng have seen their lands’ utility for grazing and farming transformed by mining, a process that has merely exacerbated their alienation from cattle economies and from their proud pastoralist past. They have themselves become largely dependent upon platinum mining for their revenues—not as laborers, who are largely in-migrants from other regions, but as owners of the land. They are at once seen as symbols of the traditional and colonial ideals of pastoralists as fiercely independent, and of the contemporary idea of black empowerment so central to the success of the “New” South Africa.12

In exploring these two cases, this book examines the remarkably intricate (and often surprisingly intimate) connections between elite families such as those described above for Jean Bedel Bokassa, former Emperor of RCA, and Valerie Giscard D’Estaing, former President of France (or, in South Africa, for the Bafokeng royal family and the Oppenheimer family of the DeBeers diamond cartel). It is through such genealogies of

12 The phrase “the new South Africa” is so variously deployed these days as to merit some consideration. Most obviously it refers to the post-apartheid South African state. John and Jean Comaroff’s (2004) work on crime and violence there, however, claims that the hopes for a “new” South Africa have been hijacked by the realities of a “neo” liberal South Africa, in which certain forms of privatized surveillance and security, among other importations primarily from the U.S. and the U.K., are impediments to the sort of governance that anti-apartheid activists and leaders may have originally envisioned for the country.
interconnection, as they emerge from and shape particular resource bases, that we can perceive broader structural effects of intersecting and mutually reinforcing kinship, class, and political economic patronage systems, as they inform collective memory and notions of landscape in these two contexts (Thompson 1974; Jewsiewicki 1986).

Contributions of a Concessionary Analytic

In what follows I will outline several key areas into which this ethnography may shed some broader conceptual light: violence and extractivism; territorialized identities; empires (both political and economic); and the ethnography of corporate actors, seen through the lens of those communities they engage in concessionary cultural encounters.

Violence

Much of the recent scholarship on Africa chronicles the “economies of pillage” (Bahuchet 1984:129, translation mine) that characterized its colonial history, emphasizing the experiences of violence and exploitation that Africans underwent (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1998; Harms 1981; Giles-Vernick 2000). Even recent fictional bestsellers, and popular journalistic sources increasingly contemplate the litany of evils done to Africans, even by those (such as missionaries and many colonial administrators) with an ostensibly altruistic agenda oriented toward “salvation” or “civilization” (Hochschild 1998; Campbell 2002; Kingsolver 1998).

13 Unfortunately, the fields of critical inquiry into elite family histories (Marcus 1992) and the role of the family more broadly in reproducing and transmitting highly asymmetrical relationships of wealth formation and identity (Rapp et al. 1979; Stone 1981) have been somewhat limited to single-society studies, often of Europe and North America.
The deep and indeed debilitating ironies of such historical campaigns are only beginning to be brought to light in a flush of historical works published, marketed, and consumed as “crossover” work that is read by both academic and wider audiences (Elkins 2005; Verschave 2000). In this sense, they capture audiences in an expose tradition that dates back to the colonial era itself.14 These contemporary studies expose rich veins of buried information about the extensive scale and secret cultures of violence done to colonial subjects during the consolidation of European holds on the natural resources and labor of the African continent.

A handful of key ethnographic studies also explore the particular violence of extractive industry within colonial contexts (Dupre 1987; Taussig 1987; Crush 1992; Ferguson 1999). Such work suggests continuities that contradict any notion of the violence of expanding world trade as merely a chilling relic of an imperial past, appropriate now to exhume and exclaim over from the comfort of our contemporary “lessons learned.”

Africa, as an imagined integral entity, is interpellated in such debates by what Mbembe (2000) calls a “global imaginary” in which Africa still figures most prominently as a place of suffering: disease, poverty, civil conflict and poor governance. At the same time, contemporary dismay over the intertwined phenomena of Empire (at formal political levels) and empire (as in formal or informal market networks) has coalesced around U.S. interventions in Iraq, and to a lesser degree in South East Asia and Latin America. Disaggregating Africa is a first dilemma, which then produces others. Mamdani (1996) explores the legacy of late colonialism in Africa and simultaneously calls for

---

14 André Gide’s oeuvre comes to mind; on the specific matter of concessions see, for example, Bouteillier 1903, or Burrows 1903, or the work of Conrad, cited elsewhere in this paper.
movement beyond “South African exceptionalism,” whereby apartheid appears to be a unique effect of South Africa’s colonial legacy. He writes that racialized relations of deeply asymmetrical participation in regional and global economies occurred quite differently in the areas of Africa where extractivism (and particularly mining) was present, versus areas where white settlers alienated land through agricultural use.

He describes the origins and modalities of a bifurcated society whose starkly split nature—whether explicitly racialized as in South African apartheid policies or not—is produced (and reproduced) through regionally specific resource bases where specific strategies—administrative, commercial, and religious—arise and can travel across such contexts and into global economies of terror, of power, of aid, and of changing conditions of citizenship. Mamdani’s analysis, in its own ways over-schematized, relies heavily upon analysis of formal legal and political process rather than historically and ethnographically rich analysis of practice. However, it does much to banish at last the claims of colonial powers themselves to unique normatively distinct approaches.  

Doing the archeology of colonial violence, perhaps particularly in areas outside contemporary hotspots for the struggles over reveals not only hitherto concealed human tragedies, but also some of the mechanisms by which the domains of morality and

\[15\] The contrast between British and French colonial rule, for instance, has long been said to embody the distinctions between direct and indirect rule; between centralized and less centralized modes of administration as it in turn shaped transformations in African political categories. Thus, I was taught as an undergraduate student of Africa, in French colonies an African administrator could rise quickly “if …capable of assimilating French education, and will be received as an equal by French society” while the British "actively discouraged the formation of a class of Europeanized Africans, particularly at the level of the central colonial administration"(Crowder 1970: 43). Such distinctions between national approaches and styles of colonial governance have proven useful, and in many ways accurate. They can also assist us in understanding broader institutional, cultural, and economic blocks of influence and alliance (Mazrui 1967). However, they cannot capture the transformations in colonial practices that occur within a given colonial territory, and how those transform themselves through the independence era to today’s societies.
universal ideals became increasingly contiguous with the boundaries of formal nation-states, rather than with the intertwined and profoundly international commercial and religious ones that were beginning to be woven across the globe well before formal colonialism. Anna Tsing (2004), following Helleiner (1993) reminds us that an “earlier free flowing internationalization of finance” was cut off by the creation in the wake of World War II of financial institutions that gave control of resources for welfare states to nations themselves—a phenomenon that seems, to Tsing, surprisingly recent and ephemeral.

Concessionary politics are not contained within a particular era, though they do reveal diverse colonial precedents in the desires and expectations of all involved in present day politics of natural resource management and use. But current interactions also reflect the ways that Africans shaped colonial concession systems according to locally meaningful political and economic notions. Thus they merit a fairly deep historical perspective that builds on recent ideas about African groups’ resilient responses to colonial trade (Harms 1987; Guillaume 2001); and the overarching notion of co-authorship of popular cultural forms that emerge from and transcend colonial contexts (Apter 1999).

This notion of colonialism as “a long conversation” across distinct but intimately interacting communities is reflected in the historical ethnography of Tswana speakers’ relationships with British Missionaries (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). Building on that notion, the Comaroffs noted, now over a decade ago (1992:183), that “colonialism, as an object of historical anthropology, has reached a moment of new reckoning.” This, they continued, enables the “close analysis of the making of both colonizers and colonized in
order to understand better the forces that, over time, have drawn them into an extraordinarily intricate web of relations.” The workings of power at the level of subject formation constitute a crucial piece of the perplexing continued power of colonial idioms and practices.

Other contributions include the notion of mutable and multiple meanings of “traditions” in a colonial state (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Vail 1989). Nash (1979:31), for example, describes the arrival of waves of laborers to Bolivian tin mines; the government had allocated these people’s labor (and, due to silicosis and other diseases, all too often their very lives) to companies by “concession.” And yet her work also describes elements of loyalty, and even of mutual desire across social categories for the familiar, if uneven, patron-client relations that inhere in such arrangements.

Such critical consideration is crucial, given the advent of a whole new generation of practitioners of “corporate social responsibility” (or CSR), with their attendant practices of monitoring, mediatizing, and money-giving, which are indelibly shaping practices of economic development and environmental governance in Africa, and elsewhere. The roots of today’s CSR movement lie in the late colonial era as well, and are enmeshed in the very moment where scales of extractive exploitation enabled—indeed, encouraged—new scales of philanthropic and humanitarian giving (Wheatercroft 1985; Bell 2000). Not always a mere element of colonial administrative arsenals, commerce within colonial territories often deployed practices and actors in conflict with colonial states’ governance objectives (Dupré 1995). Such tensions have never been entirely resolved and they currently continue to unfold, although against a dramatically altered backdrop.
Territorialized Identity

A central puzzle that underlies this work concerns how it is that the “free flowing” formation of transnational capital’s social networks has and does depend on particular notions of place, territory, and bounded identity. Povinelli (2002:6) hones in on the ambivalent relationship between this puzzle and the workings of the liberal state in Australia, to whom she attributes “the cunning of recognition” in her work on aboriginals. That cunning operates “by inspiring subaltern and minority subjects to identify with their colonizers .... indigenous subjects are called on to perform an authentic difference in exchange for the good feeling of the nation and the reparative legislation of the state.”

The concept of concessionary politics enables us to conceive of the colonial era differently than as an anchoring point for binary models of power and identity (colonizer/colonized, black/white) that, according Ho (2003), inhabit but also impoverish postcolonial theory. Ho conjures diasporic traders and travelers as a counter force to empire, and in so doing flirts perhaps overmuch with a new iteration of grand narratives about empire, and its contemporary foil, terror. However his emphasis on the fluidity of trade and travel echoes my own concerns that we capture, in our analyses the various geometries of possible power relations that created important variations in institutional landscapes not just between colonial powers, but within them. Such geometries remain pertinent in the sites described here despite the shift, since the 1960s, away from formal European colonialism(s) and militant African nationalism(s).
But all is not, at present, the ubiquitous effects of empire as they spread across the

globe, shifting the shapes of state, capital, and community over vast transnational spaces.

A new generation of ethnographers are documented the processes of environmental
governance, including various sites of struggle, suffering, and specialist knowledge as
they produce geographies of power. Such work pushes us toward an elaboration of
what these relations have to do with contemporary “contests of conscience” in an era
marked by a crucial contradiction. On the one hand, there is an ongoing process of
extending universals such as human and animal rights; at the same time are emerging
ever more fragmentary and partial approaches to ethical practice in particular sites of
“scramble” for control over valuable natural resources.

Political Economic Empires

The lens of concessionary politics, then, allows us to better understand the roles
of businesses and non-governmental organizations relative to colonial and postcolonial
states in resource use outcomes and related governance challenges. As a concept and an
intellectual project, it engages the pervasive and powerful nature of idioms, ideas, and
expectations that are indebted to formal colonialisms, yet circulate widely beyond them
in space and time.17

Within Africa, far more has been written about the role of administrators,
missionaries, and even traditional leaders of African communities with respect to the

---

16 See, for example, Raffles 2002; Tsing 2002; Hayden 2003; Walley 2004; West 2004; Nadasdy 2004;
Lowe 2005; Moore 2005; Kosek 2006; this rich vein of monographic work is indebted to political ecology
but draws as well on critical human geography, social theory, and cultural studies.

17 Several works that move beyond statis analyses of colonialisms and their aftermaths have been useful to
me (see for example Mitchell 1991; see also Bendix et al. 1992
creation of colonial legacies than has been written about commercial actors.\textsuperscript{18} Beyond Africa, the historical and ethnographic investigation of concessionary politics points to a gap in social science literature about environmental conservation and natural resource use; little has been written about the role of capital—not merely state and community—in power-suffused social relations of resource use within and around protected areas.\textsuperscript{19}

Bayart et al argue that, at least in Africa, even the state is increasingly privatized (1997). MacGaffey (1991) explores the limits of statistical and bureaucratically organized information and intervention for understanding—let alone controlling—the range of activities that contribute to a national economy under such circumstances (see also Coronil 1997). The term “concessionary,” thus refers both to historical realities, and to a set of social relations involving patronage, property, and power that are constantly being re-invented. These relations connect local families to international financiers or forest ecology experts in ways that are astonishingly direct, and often quite intimate. This intimacy both displaces the role of the state in local and regional politics, and reinforces the initial relevance of the national government in framing the parties to be involved in these provincial politics of patronage. International relations are thus reflected and refashioned in the microcosm that is the logging or mining town, with its particular history and its particular set of social contracts.

Relevant questions about the role of particular industries today include not only their abilities to compete with or complement aspects of the nation-state, but also their

\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, in their essay “Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience”, the Comaroffs (1992) devote much attention to the anatomy of diverse and competing “colonialisms” within South Africa, but in the end these resolve into three major categories of colonialists: state, settler, and mission.

\textsuperscript{19} See, however, Escobar (1997); I thank Arun Agrawal for this insight about the idea of concessionary politics.
potential to supplant the state under certain circumstances (Cobbe 1979). A reconsideration of the production of colonial discourse and identities enables us to explore the notion that idioms of corporate social responsibility have, in today’s world of economic enclaves, replaced the colonial state’s rhetorical linchpin of a “civilizing mission” (Miller 1985). Their operations on the ground appear at once vast enough in scale and specific enough in character to constitute a colony where capital (rather than a capitol) becomes the locus for decisions that dictate the circumstances of medical care, pollution control, and politics (Cramer 2003).

While there is an expanding literature on these issues, it is for the most part unfortunately polarized. There are works that rail against corporate abuses (BBC 2003; Singer 2003; Bakan 2004;) while others trumpet corporate generosity (Daily HIV/AIDS report 2003); anthropological work that documents the roles of specific business interests within specific communities is far too scarce (see, however, Apter 1996 and Kapelus 2002). Only through nuanced historical and ethnographic work on such involvement can we sketch the new frontiers in corporate-community relations, as those in turn relate to major realignments in governance and global power relations (Alvesson 1993; Aguilera 1996; Aaronson 2002). 20

Notions of self, progress, and struggle that are anachronistic, yet still symbolically powerful suffuse contemporary business arenas (Schoenberger 2001). Nowhere has the highly ritualized competitive rivalry of access to natural resources and social networks

---

20 Frynas (1998) argues that companies functioning in politically unstable states such as those in equatorial Africa enjoy unrivalled dominance and interconnectedness with state structures. He notes that more study is needed of planning in these companies, as it is in opaque planning processes that they limit possible challenges to their powerful positions in precarious states. And yet, in reviewing literature on Norway, I found similar concerns about that more stable European context (Kresl 1976).
seemed more primitive and been more playfully depicted than in the struggle between oil companies (see French 1998)/ Journalistic coverage illustrates well enough the cultures of rivalry internal to the business world of “hostile takeovers” and “all out raids” suggesting the fertile connections between anthropologies of violence and those of commerce (see Figure 4).

Figure 3: Elf/Total graphic of feudal knighthood, from Gallois, D. 1999. Les Destins Croisés d'Elf et de Total. Le Monde. October 29 :14
Oil, while increasingly crucial to the fundamental political challenges and opportunities on the African continent (and, indeed, elsewhere) is more recent than metals or wood as a commodity charged with powerful roles in international political process, both formal and informal. It is thus less suited to the particular ethnographic and
historical lens I have chosen for this project, although recent work by Jim Ferguson sketches what he deems a troublingly “thin” model for engagement with African social worlds by the oil industry in Angola (as well as that of Soares d’Oliviera, and Apter 1996). The contrast with relative “thicker” interfaces implicit in his description of Zambian mining economies raises the prospect that concessionary cultures unfold in varying ways depending on relationships between resource bases and social structures, and may capture middle ground between the “thick” and the “thin.” Closer to Ong’s (2000) formulation of graduated sovereignty, where it is not about “light and dark” nor about state/private but rather the shades of grey, and the role that African idioms, practices and expectations play in creating points along that spectrum.

Colitt (1998) characterizes the inspection of oil drilling in developing countries as ultimately reliant on the companies’ goodwill, and “on the vigilance of the natives.” Much of the hope for sustainability and transparency lies in this inscrutable intimacy of the patron/population relationship. This relationship, in turn, depends for its texture on a wide range of political, economic, ecological, and interpersonal factors. Today, as in the time of the trading companies described in Conrad’s (1938) Heart of Darkness, the collision of high capitalism and dynamic, regional leadership traditions can produce perverse effects. Imagine a town where televisions are available in company housing and centrally controlled, such that the sawmill supervisor can, by switching satellite dish reception, control the viewing experiences of hundreds of employees.21

To engage such politics, scholars must explore histories both within and beyond the archives of colonial companies. As Watts (1989:25) reminds us, "capital may not

---

21 Personal observation, during field visit to northern Congo Brazzaville, July 1995.
exercise untrammeled power in Africa" and "precapitalist structures may be durable."

Such work could complement the grand narratives of the rise or decline of empires (the "west" or the "east") with an analytics of emergent forms that can capture the ways in which power works. For power is not merely wielded, extended, engaged and ultimately withdrawn, but is produced through human interactions. These exchanges remain surprisingly animated by logics of kinship or fictive kinship and tradition, and they are suffused with ritual practice, even as they attempt to demolish or transcend formal colonial and imperial legacies.

These paradoxes, and the practices to which they have given rise, have been obscured by highly mediatized and politicized debates about whether and how U.S. actions in Iraq constitute those of an “empire.” Such debates seem, at least initially, to reproduce the precise centering on dynamics of military force that they may seek to critique.  

Worse, as can be seen from Niall Ferguson’s recent explanation to Charlie Rose (and his television viewing public), they evoke or even explicitly name the discipline and modernity of military force as an unfortunate but effective container for more “primitive” or “primordial” human tendencies toward violence in the face of alterity.

The reconfigurations of capital and community along the frontiers of the Congo basin or the Kalahari offer us a way to interrogate ideas about identity, violence, wealth extraction, and governance in a context where these issues are all too often pathologized,

---

22 See, for instance, the cover of the recent American Ethnologist, with photographs of Philippino soldiers holding weapons, from Lutz’s 2007 work “Empire is in the Details.”

23 It is worth noting that Niall Ferguson’s recent work on empire represents a departure from his early scholarship on the social networks and political connections of the Rothschilds (as well as other characters in ensuing histories of expanding capitalism under colonial rule, such as the Oppenheisers) in 18th and 19th century Europe (see Ferguson 1999 and 2000). Chibber, too, moves from early work on particular patronage relations in the context of south Asia (1998) to much broader work on Imperialism in the social sciences (2004). It is precisely a return to the question of overlapping relations of family, finance, and kin (both fictive and real) over time that we suggest as fruitful in African contexts, and only begin to do here.
and not often enough actually analyzed. In a multilited effort at close examination, I show how capital and certain community institutions interact with regional scale histories and social structures, mimicking management systems from the colonial era, even as they make way for new management modes.

Conclusion
Concessionary cultures are deeply socially embedded, yet remarkably flexible. They thus contain elements of both hope and caution regarding the future of “business as usual” in Africa’s enclave economies (as elsewhere). They perpetuate themselves remarkably successfully based on combinations of patronage, polarized identity politics, and intimate, incremental, but irrevocable processes of negotiated alienation for certain groups, and privilege for others. Arjun Appadurai (2006) has claimed that recent events that characterize globalization on international and geopolitical scales entail not a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 2000) but rather of vertebrate and cellular orders—that is to say, encounters between the nation state and its “other.”

If even those thinking most carefully and creatively about how alternatives to formal political power shape today’s global integration lack a language that does not relegate such forms to a sort of lower order, then what sort of analytics are we lacking? Concessionary politics is indeed an example of a cellular order—but one that both constitutes and can be a cancer within larger organisms: the vibrant, ever expanding and maturing matrices of accreted power, wealth, and knowledge that are global systems. Concessionary politics continues to rely on intensely local negotiations, within increasingly global management frameworks where competition and rivalry are
economically lucrative and interpersonally seductive modes of interaction. It thus undermines any progress toward the sort of unified policy initiatives currently called for in formulas for sustainable development, rational use of natural resources, effective environmental protection or real political reform at national or regional levels. It discourages local efforts at truly representative political process, while encouraging social conflict and over-exploitation of the resource base.

It need not be imposed, for it seems spontaneously to emerge—even as new actors such as non-governmental organizations appear who are, initially, opposed to such apparently anachronistic precedents. Soon they are seduced by the collectively created and historically rooted power of concessionary politics. They bolster its power to become contemporary. In so doing, I argue, they pull the past into the present, perpetuating kinship- and charisma- based relations of privilege that become progressively entrenched and yet also subject, perpetually, to new challenges. They engage in the all too human penchant for personal and political performances of power that have long been best expressed in theaters more intimate than those of national politics, but also more elastic in their reach across national boundaries. Truly deft “concessionaires” are also, often, inveterate border-crossers. They are capable of building up and tearing down, or transforming with breathtaking rapidity their edifices of economic interaction.

The Western Congo River basin and the southern Kalahari Desert appear as hinterlands within the African nation states that contain them, and within the wider travel literatures and scientific literatures that describe them. Yet they are sites for cutting edge forms of political identity and corporate governance: crucibles for the contemporary yet deeply historically rooted practice of “concessions” for the management of natural
resources from the African continent today. The term "concession," as I have developed it here, refers to the territorial units allocated by states to non-state actors for the extraction of wealth in the form of raw materials. More broadly, it refers to the social interaction through which a state can allocate territories or resources and social rights of exploitation for purposes such as tourism, or even conservation, and perhaps increasingly the highly territorialized provision of humanitarian aid to refugees. It is my hope that it may be a useful lens for linking analyses of interventions, and attending to the elements of them that are in fact inventions of those they target.

References Cited

Aaronson, Susan A., James T. Reeves, and National Policy Association

Aguilera, Francisco E.

Alvesson, Mats

Appadurai, A.

Apter, A.


Bakan, Joel
Bartley, Tim

Bayart, Jean-François, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou

BBC

Bell, Morag

Bendix, John, Bartholomew Sparrow, Bertell Ollman, and Timothy Mitchell

Bernstein, Henry.

Baldo, S. A.

Bamber, D.

Barr, C.
2001 Structural Adjustment and Forestry Reform in post-Suharo Indonesia. CIFOR Presentation.

Bayart, J.-F., S. Ellis, and B. Hibou.

Boscolo M., and J.R. Vincent

Bouteillier, G.
1903 Les Concessions et le Congo Français. Albi: Imprimerie Pezous.

Burrows, Cpt. G.
Campbell, Greg

Casson, A.

Chibber, Vivek.


Cobbe, James
1979 Governments and Mining Companies in Developing Countries. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Colitt, R.

Comaroff, John L. and Jean Comaroff


Cooper, F.


— and Ann Laura Stoler

Coquery-Vidrovitch, C.

Coronil, Fernando

Cramer, Jacqueline

Cronon, William

Crosby, Alfred W.

Crowder, Michael

Crush, Jonathan

Cugnet, F. J.
1775 Traité de la Loi des Fiefs. Quebec.


Dupré, G.

Elkins, Caroline.

Escobar, Arturo

Ferguson, J.
— 2006 Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order

Ferguson, Niall.


French, H. R.

France

---


Frynas, J.G.

Francois, M. P.

Gallois, D.

Gaventa, J.

Giles-Vernick, Tamara

Grove, Richard

Grut, M., with J. A. Gray, and N. Egli

Guillaume, Henri

Guyer, J.I.
Harms, Robert W.


Harms, Robert


Hobsbawm, E. J., and T. O. Ranger

Hochschild, Adam


Human Rights Watch


Humphrey, C. and S. Hugh-Jones.

Jewsiewicki, Bogumil

Jonas, H.

Kapelus, Paul
Karsenty, A.
2000 Economic Instruments for Tropical Forests. Montpellier, France: CIRAD-CIFOR.

—

Kingsolver, Barbara

Kresl, P. K.

Mamdani, Mahmood

Martin, M.

Mbembe, A.

MacGaffey, Janet

Marcus, George E., and Peter Dobkin Hall

Martin, Maximilian

Mazrui, Ali Al Amin

Mexico
1842 Decree Promulgated by Santa Anna, Presidente Provisionel, Mexico, on October 15 New Haven: Beinecke Library.

Miller, Christopher L.

Mitchell, Timothy

Moore, D.

Mosse, David
2005.

Nash, J.

Neumann, R.P.

Ong, A,

Osterhammel, Jürgen

Peluso, N.

Peters, Pauline.

Raffles, H.
Rapp, Rayna, Ellen Ross, and Renate Bridenthal

Reno, W.

Ribot, J.C.

Richards, P.

Schoenberger, Erica.

Singer, Peter W.

Stoler, Ann L.

Stone, Lawrence

Taussig, M.

Thompson, E. P.

Vail, Leroy

Verschave, François-Xavier
Watts, M. J.

Walker R. and T.E. Smith

Werhane, Patricia

Weiskel, Timothy C.

Wheatcroft, Geoffrey