Foreign Policy News Clips: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Editor's Note | I. Regional Conflict | II. Why Are We There? | III. Are We Ready to be There? | IV. Who Should Decide if We Should be There? | V. Allies and Arms Merchants | [VI. The Soviet Union] | VII. Regional Politics | VIII. Update
"The continuity of the Soviet state's foreign-policy line is incontestable, of course. All the same, today's qualitatively new conditions, as the general secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev has repeatedly pointed out, have made for the necessity -- perhaps for the first time such an urgent one -- to take an innovative look at a whole series of key international problems."
Yevgeny Primakov, Sun, 7/15/87, p. 13A
"We live in a world -- an by no means only because of the existence of horrible rockets and such weapons -- in which the vital interests of the United States and of the Soviet Union conflict at few points, if at all. It is a world in which one important change has occurred: the emergence of the inchoate, undisciplined and frequently fanatic peoples of the so-called Third World that, in different ways and in different places, threaten the United States and the Soviet Union."
John Lukacas, Los Angeles Times, 10/2/87, p. 7
"On balance, though, the era of Soviet decline and American ascendance appears over. We can anticipate a correlation of forces far more balanced than it has been for a decade. What it all adds up to is a challenging inheritance to Reagan's successor."
Richard N. Haass, Los Angeles Times, 8/23/87, p. 5
"The key changes in Soviet perspectives on international affairs have been identified by a bipartisan task force on Soviet foreign policy convened under the auspices of the Institute for East-West Security Studies. The group's report highlights five areas in which the Soviets have reevaluated orthodox positions:
Michael Forrestal and Allen Lynch, Christian Science Monitor, 10/13/87, p. 15
"The new Soviet diplomatic offensive seems to include at least four elements:
David D. Newsom, Christian Science Monitor, 9/9/87, p. 14
"Thanks to aggressive diplomacy, the Soviet Union is emerging as a potential mediator and power broker in the Gulf War and the Arab - Israel conflict. The Soviets haven't yet supplanted the United States in the role of Middle East peacemaker, but they have made some important gains. The key to Moscow's diplomatic strategy is that, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union maintains contact with all sides -- talking to both Iran and Iraq, to both Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization."
Robert G. Neumann, Washington Post, 10/25/87, p. C1
"The Soviet Union has significantly scaled back its plans for a 'blue water' navy that can project power in Third World conflicts, intelligence and private analysts here say.
"Instead, the analysts say, the Soviet navy appears to be stressing defensive operations close to home."
Robert C. Toth, Los Angeles Times, 10/22/87, p. 7
"The challenge for the Reagan administration is to play its diplomatic and military cards in a manner that effectively protects U.S. interests in the Gulf without driving Iran into Moscow's embrace. This is a tall order, especially for an administration given to Rambo-like theatrics and an act-first, think-later approach to both military action and policy formulation. The administration's calamitous military misadventure in Lebanon in 1982-1984 and the more recent arms-for-the-ayatollah affair, from which both the Reagan presidency and American policy in the Middle East have yet to recover, are not encouraging precedents."
Jeffrey Record, Sun, 9/28/87, p. 11Ak
"Recent flirting between Moscow and Teheran is stirring up worry in Washington and among pro-Western countries bordering the Soviet Union.
"As one senior Reagan administration expert says, there is more opportunism than love behind the 'goo-goo eyes' Iran and the Soviet Union are making at each other. United States officials agree the situation deserves close watching but argue it does not presage a strategic realignment."
E.A. Wayne, Christian Science Monitor, 8/24/87, p. 6
"[The Soviets] worry about the danger of an explosion as an unintended consequence of such a concentration of forces by the rival superpower in a highly volatile region close to their own borders. Regarding the Iranian regime as unpredictable and uncontrollable, and the Reagan Administration as bellicose and incompetent, they fear a clash between the two which, though it would no doubt offer opportunities to Soviet policy, would also be fraught with danger. The Middle East is the region, and within it Iran is the country, where it is easiest to imagine the third world war beginning: both superpowers consider themselves to have strong and legitimate interests there, but neither can control the local political forces and there are no mutually agreed ground rules or spheres of influence."
Edward Mortimer, Financial Times, 9/29/87, p. 25
"Iran and the Soviet Union are forging close trade and strategic links -- and the United States drove them to it.
"On Aug. 26, Iran announced it would sign an agreement to construct two dams on the Aras River near its border with the Soviet Union. The project was at the center of talks in Teheran between Soviet ambassador to Iran Vil Boldyrev and Iranian Deputy Energy Minister for International Affairs Mohammad Reza Adeli."
Martin Sieff, Washington Times, 9/4/87, p. E3
"Few observers doubt Iran's genuine commitment to its 'neither East nor West' foreign policy, or its intense antipathy to atheistic Marxism. But such are the pressures of geography, recent history and the current state of Iran's economy and its war with Iraq that Iran is finding it hard to avoid a tilt toward Moscow."
Dilip Hiro, Los Angeles Times, 10/26/86, p. 5
"Theoretically, the objectives of a Soviet thrust southward would be the well developed Iranian port of Chah Bahar, or, perhaps more likely, the Pakistani port at Gwadar.... Within 180 meters (600 feet) of the shoreline, the ocean bed drops dramatically to a depth of almost 180 meters. Construction of a mole from the shore to these deep waters would convert these ports into major naval bases, offering a sheltered anchorage and support complex for even the largest warships. It is no surprise, then, that Soviet strategists are aware of Baluchistan's importance and vulnerability. It is believed to be defended by only two Pakistani infantry divisions..... What happens on the Baluchi coast in the next five years could well shape the future of much of Africa and Asia. The Soviets are obviously strengthening their role in this area and establishing options for themselves. There is no evidence that the united States is making similar preparations."
Arthur Ross and Eric Margolis, International Herald Tribune, 8/27/87, p. 4
Editor's Note | I. Regional Conflict | II. Why Are We There? | III. Are We Ready to be There? | IV. Who Should Decide if We Should be There? | V. Allies and Arms Merchants | [VI. The Soviet Union] | VII. Regional Politics | VIII. Update
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