News Clips: Into the Gulf (1988)

Foreign Policy News Clips: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Foreign Policy News Clips: 1979-1990, edited by Harry Kreisler

1/29/88: Into the Gulf

The Clips:

Editor's Note

Coincident with protecting its national interest, a hegemon like the United States uses its military power to perform a policeman's role for the broader international environment. In the post World War II world, the unquestioned military and economic power of the United States provided the foundation for undertaking this role.

In understanding this policeman's role, the analogy with a neighborhood community is suggestive. Because the entire police force cannot be everywhere in the community at all times, the cop on the beat is deployed. His presence is symbolically and strategically important. In an emergency, back up can be rushed to the scene. In a world of limited resources and unlimited uncertainties, maintenance of order at both local and international levels depends on skillfully managing force and its symbols.

The situation changes for a great power in decline. In such a state, the economic and political costs of police action are met with greater difficulty. Its authority to undertake police action erodes both on the scene and at home. In the Gulf, for example, the question of the U.S. being even-handed in dealing with the belligerents is starkly posed. Within the U.S., the debate concerning the reasons for involvement intensifies.

Adaptation to a changing environment is also less easily undertaken. Thus, if the nature of the adversary changes (say for example, from international communism to Islamic fundamentalism) along with the means of waging war (from conventional conflict to terrorism), the difficulties increase. Symbolic action -- the presence of the fleet -- becomes less effective. What worked for the hegemon at minimum cost in the past now has the opposite effect. The commitment to a military presence increases the likelihood that the lack of underlying economic and military power will be demonstrated.

Thus far the intervention by the United States in the Gulf has not gone as badly as the above scenario suggests. Events in the Gulf suggest that no country or countries can or will assume the mantle of leadership in place of the United States. However, allies have, reluctantly and in a limited way, assisted the United States by performing a back up role. In this way they have alleviated the burdens on the U.S. and refurbished the authoritativeness of the U.S. action.

The scenario of decline stated above is but one of many factors contributing to the problematic presence of the U.S. in the Gulf. The state of decline only exacerbates major flaws in U.S. policy in the region. The United States intervened precipitously at a time of Presidential weakness (the Administration was reeling from the domestic and international repercussions of the Irangate controversy). The limits and purposes of its intervention were never clarified; rather, the administration hastily responded to an ally's request because of concerns about possible Soviet successes in the region. In addition, the United States continues to confront the dilemma of how such policies as the intervention in the Gulf are to be conducted given the post Vietnam/War Powers assertiveness of Congress. U.S. policy in the Iran-Iraq war must also confront uncertainly about U.S. military capability after the Reagan buildup -- a time when the right hardware may or may not be in place but the bills are due.

Finally, policymakers continue to grapple with the meaning of Gorbachev's reforms for Soviet foreign policy. The apparent new Soviet emphasis on domestic economic reform and pragmatic disengagement abroad has important implications for a U.S. policy which emphasizes military engagement and exclusion of Soviet involvement as its primary operating principles. A Soviet commitment to pragmatism and disengagement invites their inclusion in the broader settlement of regional conflict. If the changes on the Soviet side are real and the U.S. remains inflexible, Western hopes for a Soviet-American consensus on limiting Third World conflict will not be realized.

Harry Kreisler

The Clips: