Foreign Policy News Clips: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Foreign Policy News Clips: 1979-1990, edited by Harry Kreisler

4/5/90: The End of the Cold War and Europe's Search for a New Identity

The Clips

I. Back to the Future | II. Germany between Past and Future | III. Shaping Europe's Future

Editor's Note

The revolutionary events of 1989 sounded the death knell of the Cold War. Suddenly the division of Europe was ended. New possibilities now present themselves for the transformation of failed communist systems and for the realization of national aspirations long suppressed by communist regimes. Drastic reductions of the superpower forces are realizable, and a halt to the nuclear arms race is now conceivable.

Because of these sudden and unexpected changes in the strategic environment, Europe is confronted with a new set of challenges. It must define a new European order legitimated by Europeans.

In September 1989, in a speech tinged with nostalgia for the Cold War era that was passing, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger noted that "For all its risks and uncertainties, the Cold War was characterized by a remarkably stable and predictable set of relations among the great powers."

Although Eagleburger mistakenly implied that the only possible stable outcome was superpower dictated, his statement contained a kernel of truth. Some examples:

  1. During the Cold War, the Soviet threat provided cohesion for the Western alliance. Protection from the Soviet Union gave political/military concerns the highest priority. This was important for creating an environment in which European states could find their common interest in collective actions such as the creation of the European Economic Community. In Western Europe the path to common interest wherein national rivalries were subdued was facilitated by the challenge of the Soviet empire. In Eastern Europe, the suppression of national and individual aspirations was ironically accompanied by the suppression of the extreme nationalism and ethnic strife that had characterized Europe for most of the century.

  2. During the Cold War, the presence of the threat was also an important foundation for the relationship between Europe and the United States. Because of the Soviet Union, U.S. leadership made sense on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States supported the building of the European economic community even when its own long term economic interests diverged from those of the Europeans. Emphasis was placed on the military dimension of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance through the presence of a substantial commitment of U.S. soldiers and the guarantee of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

  3. During the Cold War, all the principal European actors except the Germans were reconciled with the division of Germany. This contradiction between the Germans and the rest of Europe was obscured by a verbal commitment to the long term goal of German reunification and a real commitment to the gradual evolution of détente in Europe. Germany's Ostpolitik evolved in tandem with the processes of European reunification and the German commitment to the NATO alliance. In this way Germany was contained, and the German problem was put on the back burner.

The first few months of 1990 have demonstrated that none of these cornerstones of the Cold War are secure. The new agenda is a formidable one, and the search for a new architecture for Europe is on. The transition to a post Cold War world will test Europe's imagination and the adaptability of its institutions.

This issue of the Clips focuses on Europe's search for a new identity. Organizing the selection of clippings are the following specific questions:

  1. Will the old Europe of ethnic rivalries and national contention reassert itself? Will the boundaries of "Europe" be the same for economic, political, and military issues? Who will be members of the new Europe? Through what institutions will the new Europe forge its identity? Are the United States and the Soviet Union to be included? If the superpowers are no longer the decisive players to what European state or group of states will leadership pass? With regard to the European political house, what all-European institution will play the key role? The European Community? The Council of Europe? With regard to he European economic house, will the European Community be the foundation? If so, who will be entitled to membership in the European Community? Are the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to be part of the community? When, under what terms and in what order are the newly liberated Eastern European countries to become members?

  2. What are Europe's primary security concerns? What is the institution and process through which Europe will define its mutual security? A new Nato? the Western European Union? the Conference on Security and Co-operation? What is the role of nuclear weapons in insuring Europe's security once the Cold War ends? Will Britain and France remain the only nuclear powers? Who will intra-European conflicts whether between ethnic groups or between states be contained and resolved?

  3. What will be Germany's role in the new Europe? Will the process of German unification be Germany's primary focus to the detriment of its focus and concern with the process of European economic integration? Will German decisions about German unification pre-empty European decisions about European unification? Will German monetary unification increase interests rates throughout Europe without European participation in the decision process? In order to obtain Soviet acquiescence in rapid unification and the removal of Soviet troops from East German soil will Germany favor drastic military cuts in Europe? What will be the size and nature of the German military? Will Germany acquire nuclear weapons? Who will decide these military questions and with what guarantees? Will Germany be the dominant political and economic power in Central Europe? Which actor or group of actors will balance German power in Europe?

  4. What will be the U.S. role in shaping the future of the new Europe? Will it play the traditional role of external balance in the European power game? Will a U.S. reliance on Cold War institutions in Europe help or hinder its position in Europe? Will the U.S. be ale to broaden its links in non-military institutions? Will the United States be able to build a domestic consensus within the United States for the continuation of its military presence in Europe or for whatever role it establishes in Europe? Do the European want such a continued presence? Does the Soviet Union want such a presence? Is a limited U.S. military commitment the sole remaining card to insure that the U.S. remains a "player" in the European game. How will U.S. economic interests in Europe be secured?

  5. What will be the relation of the Soviet Union (whatever its future form) to Europe? Will a German-Soviet partnership be the defining element in East-West relations? Will Germany's eastern policy determine the terms on which the West will aid perestroika? Will German economic and technological aid to the Soviet Union now break the limits set by the Western alliance.

Harry Kreisler

I. Back to the Future | II. Germany between Past and Future | III. Shaping Europe's Future

[This is Part II of a three-part series. Part I, The End of the Cold War and the Search for a U.S. Strategy, appeared on January 1, 1990. Part III, The End of the Cold War, the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, and the Shaping of a Western Response, appeared in June, 1990.]

© Copyright 1990/1999, Regents of the University of California

Of related interest at this website: Speech by Timothy Garton Ash, Is Europe Becoming Europe? (1996 Sanford S. Elberg Lecture in International Studies) and 1996 interview with Garton Ash.