Foreign Policy News Clips: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley
The Clips
I. Marxism-Leninism, R.I.P. | II. The Dilemmas of Eastern Europe | III. The Role of External Actors | IV. The U.S. Role
The collapse of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989 ended the Cold War where it had begun. The strategic landscape was irreversibly altered. As its empire crumbled, the Soviet Union confirmed its intention to focus on domestic problems and to turn inward. The reunification of Germany became inevitable. The Warsaw Pact ceased functioning as an effective military alliance threatening the West.
In the first stages of this era, the security agenda has several features. First, high priority is placed on reducing armaments and withdrawing Soviet troops while insuring Soviet security concerns. The second priority is establishing a common security system for Europe which takes account of the containment of Germany and the possible instability arising from intra regional conflict due to disputed boundaries or ethnic hatreds. Most importantly, in this post Cold War world, the "gain" of Eastern Europe by the West appears not to be perceived in the Soviet Union as a strategic "loss" so long as a non-threatening European security system is put in place.
With this dramatically changed environment, focus now shifts to efforts to transform Eastern Europe politically, economically, and culturally by linking it to the West. In the economic realm, the preferred outcome is rapid transition to a market economy. In working toward this goal Eastern Europeans confront a set of problems -- economic, political and cultural -- which will severely test the legitimacy of their fragile democracies. The emphasis is on distinctive national efforts, and there is no movement toward a regional grouping focusing on common solutions to common problems and a unified approach to the West. Such a coalescing, especially of elite perception, was a not unimportant element of the initial stages of the Marshall Plan. The East Europeans do agree on the need to break links to the ailing Soviet economy. They want, however, to proceed at a measured pace because domestic adjustments must occur and new linkages with the West must be in place before linkages to the ailing Soviet economy are broken. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready for its former clients to pay their own way in hard currency.
These enormous tasks of transformation will require outside assistance. The primary source will be Western Europe with Germany assuming the key role. Increasing and deepening linkages to Western Europe are seen as central by all the actors in Eastern Europe. For the European Community, the challenge is to not sacrifice the achievements of unity by overextention in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Europe has a stake in stability in these recently liberated areas. Moreover, whichever Western European country assumes a greater share of the responsibility for reconstruction and development will lay claim to future greater influence in the region.
Finally, the United States role is worth noting. Several features stand out. In this important period of transition, the United States is constrained by two factors. First, the Soviet threat no longer serves as an ideological justification for involvement. What remains as an ideological foundation for U.S. engagement is the self conception of American uniqueness, "the shining city on the hill," that serves as an example to the world. This image shared by U.S. elites is not inconsequential in shaping U.S. policy. Second, the United States lacks the resources to finance a new Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe. Moreover, without the pressure of a "Soviet threat" American altruism, an important factor in winning support for the Marshall Plan, is not resulting in an effective bipartisan policy toward Eastern Europe. In addition, it is by no means clear that substantial aid will achieve the desired result. For these reasons, the United States has assumed a secondary role as a concerned bystander cheerleading for democratization and free enterprise. There has been a prudent delight in the U.S. victory in the Cold War. There have been efforts to consolidate the U.S. position in a post Cold War Europe not by emphasizing the design of new institutions but by seeking to salvage Cold War structures such as NATO and COCOM. In response to the pressure of events, U.S. policymakers have tabled proposals for modest reform of these Cold War entities. Not unmindful of Soviet concerns, the U.S. has self consciously assumed the role of facilitator of a new order which takes account of German power and of Soviet insecurities while groping for a formula to insure an influential position for itself in the new scheme of things. Unfortunately, the United States confronts a world in which the capacity to design, produce and deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles counts for less than the capacity to design, produce and market Toyotas.
This issue of the Clips focuses on the following questions:
I. Marxism-Leninism, R.I.P. | II. The Dilemmas of Eastern Europe | III. The Role of External Actors | IV. The U.S. Role
© Copyright 1990/1999, Regents of the University of California
[This is Part III of a three-part series. Part I, The End of the Cold War and the Search for a U.S. Strategy, appeared in January, 1990. Part II, The End of the Cold War and Europe's Search for a New Identity, appeared in April, 1990.]