Yegor Gaidar Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
Page 6 of 9
So the challenge was systemic -- you had to act across the board in the whole economy. Now as an economist, a person who has been trained in theory, how do you change when you take on a role like this? You obviously are still informed by the theory, but you're really making up things, in part, as you go along -- right?
Yes. What is important in this type of situation? Well, usually deep economic training is not necessary for decision makers; there is no danger. Usually they have economic advisors or deputy ministers of finance who read economically, but it is not the job of a prime minister to know the economic details because usually the changes are slow, not very radical, everything is very natural, and it's just unnecessary. In this situation of very rapid changes, when common sense does not give you answers because the advice of common sense could be terribly harmful, as we have seen during this transition, of course you need to have a clear picture of what works, what should be done, what are the problems, which are the most dangerous points, etc. But also when you are starting to do this you are confronted with day-to-day urgent political problems in different fields. You cannot just concentrate on making reforms. You have to deal with national problems, with the relationship with a dozen other republics, problems with the CIS (Russian minorities and Baltic States), conflict between Ingushetia and North Osetia, war in Moldova, etc. Inevitably you have to deal with all of these problems.
What sort of a political leader do you need in a situation like this? Did Yeltsin meet that test?
Well, generally yes.
First of all you need a political leader who has
a general feeling about what should be done, not in technical details but the
direction. Second, you need a leader who has a feeling for the popular mood
because it is not a technocratic solution. We as technocrats would advise, we
know what to do. But it's very difficult for us to have a feeling about what
could be done, not just what could not be done.
So you might say to cut the subsidies on bread, but Yeltsin has to have a feeling....
...whether it is possible or impossible. And if it's possible, he has the possibility to tell the people that it is necessary to do which I, of course, never have. And then, of course, you need to be a decisive person, a person who can make a decision and stick with that decision. And generally Yeltsin, I think, had all of these facets.
What lesson do you draw from this experience for your colleagues as economists about what it's like to be, I guess, in the frying pan? or in the cockpit of the plane after the crew has just left, to follow up on your metaphor?
Well, generally my advice would be not to make too complicated
schemes.
I do remember participating in long discussions about the sequencing
of measures in the reform process. A major part of these were nonsense. You
cannot influence life in such a detailed way. You usually have very crude
weapons, very imprecise. Don't try fine-tuning, especially in a situation like
this.
As you look back at what you did and these enormous constraints that you were under, the obstacles you faced, what sort of a grade do you give yourself? What would you have done differently in this period?
Probably a lot technically. I'd make the system of international trade and hard currency relations from the third of January '92 simpler than it was done. I would distribute licenses in a little bit different way. So, a lot of the technical details I probably would do another way if I were to have that chance. But in general directions, keeping in mind the political possibilities, not if I was the God almighty but in this concrete situation, I think that generally I would do exactly what I have done.
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