Yegor Gaidar Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley

Page 9 of 9

Russia's Future, the Weimar Analogy, and Lessons Learned

Why was there not more violence? Why, with the breakdown caused by the pain that was being inflicted, did all of the dire predictions not come true?

I think it was mostly because the difference between the Russian Revolutions in 1917 and 1991 - 1993 was that now we were still dealing with an industrialized society, a literate society, a well-educated society, a society which survived a very difficult experience during the 20th century, a society which was prepared to understand how dangerous it is to put all of your stakes on force. And we practically had a short-term civil war in Russia on the third and the fourth of October 1993. But the fact that we were able to prevent large-scale civil war, I think, is first of all connected to the fact that during the century Russian society became much more material. Now we do understand how terribly dangerous it is to start a full scale civil war.

What is next on the agenda for the Soviet economy? What, if things stabilize somewhat, is the next major set of reforms that have to be undertaken?

A few are very important. I will just mention them. A reform of the system of social protection, which is terribly inefficient at the present stage. The reform of the system of the interrelationship between the federal budget and the regional budget, which is terribly inefficient. Tax reform, because the tax structure is very much distorted. Land reform, agricultural reform, private property should be implemented in these fields. Further reforms connected with the regulation of the national monopolies, which are still poorly regulated, etc., etc., etc. So of course we have a lot to do to make this economy more efficient, more stable, more socially just.

But is Russia over the hump now, in the sense that addressing these problems is much more manageable than it was?

Well, we were really passing through a period of revolution. The period of revolution is the period when your chance to plan anything and implement it is very much constrained. All the time you have big government in revolutions, you have to deal with very, very strong problems and pressures. Now I think that we're past this period. Now I think that the whole history of communism in Russia is really over. Now we are confronted with a lot of problems, not dissimilar to many problems with which other market economies have been confronted. And it is the time for a serious, maybe difficult, technically complicated, but manageable reform.

One problem that we haven't addressed is that in all of this Russia has lost its empire. One thinks of the Weimar Period in Germany and the dislocation, the disillusionment that is caused when a great power becomes less of a great power. Does that remain a problem for Russia? What are the possibilities of a kind of right-wing nationalist response that would be dangerous for the world?

If I am not mistaken, I think that I was the first to mention the parallel between the situation in post-Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany. It was, I think, in the summer of '92. And, of course, I still do think that it is a very, very dangerous parallel because it's very easy. The easiest policy making is to play on hurt national feelings. "It was all a Jewish-American plot, we were never beaten in battle, we were betrayed from the back, now we have to recover it, we have to be a new power once again, we will reconquer it," etc. So all of this rhetoric is very, very familiar from the German thirties. And for instance, when you read a lot of the writings, including the writings of influential politicians of the opposition, you will see the evident analogies with Hitler's writings. So of course the danger is there, and from my point of view it is probably the most serious danger for my country, and maybe for the world.

What is the way of tackling these problems and solving them?

Of course fascism and National Socialism in Germany first of all triumphed because of these pains, but also because of the Great Depression. So the earlier we start the Russian economy moving, the earlier we will be in a position to create the preconditions for stable economic growth, the earlier we will be in a position to implement the reforms I mentioned, which will make this market economy more efficient and more socially stable, the less will be the chances for radical nationalists to use all these problems to grab power in Moscow.

And what is the role of the West in all of this? The European Community and the United States? How can they be of help without being seen as an intruder or someone who's trying to overly impact what should be Russian solutions?

I never overestimate the possibilities of the West to influence the situation in Russia. They are limited, but of course the West could do something. For instance, any serious step connected with opening of the markets, especially opening of markets to Russian manufacturing industries, would be an enormous help because it shows that you can be part of the world economy. It creates a stimulant for those who are able to adapt. So any step in this direction is very important. Try not to ignore the Russian national interests which do exist. Try to keep them in mind when you are planning your international policy. Try not to make you international policy dependent on purely domestic issues. It will be important because otherwise everybody will have to pay for it. Try not to look at the world from the position of winners and losers, because everybody is the winner because Russian communism disappears. So the problem is how we structure our future in the 21st century.

Dr. Gaidar, what thought would you like to leave us with, with regard to what you tried to achieve and what you achieved in transforming the Russian economy?

We were confronted, not with a splendid stable situation which was in need of a small improvement. We were called to the government after the complete collapse of the previous regime. And that is a fact that is ignored by many of those who are trying to write about what happened in Russia during those few years. Our possibilities of implementing comprehensive reforms were very limited because we had always to deal with a crisis situation. Now I think that with all of the problems which still do exist in Russia, the major problems of the stabilization of the markets and democracy probably are solved. Now a lot depends on the ability of Russia to adjust to the new realities, to move farther, to create the bases for sustainable economic growth. And a lot depends of the ability of the world, leading nations first of all, to accept Russia as an equal in the family of industrial democracies.

Dr. Gaidar, thank you very much for coming in here today and explaining, describing, and helping us understand this very exciting period when you changed the course of the Russian economy. Thank you very much.

Thank you.

And thank YOU very much for joining us for this "Conversation on International Affairs."

© Copyright 1997, Regents of the University of California

See also: Weimar and Russia: Is there an Analogy? (April 1994 forum with Gerald Feldman, Harold James, Andrei Melville, and George Breslauer), and Alexander Yakovlev's views on the Weimar analogy.

To the Conversations page.