Philip C. Habib Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
Page 3 of 6
In Washington, when we're talking about that part of America's foreign policy apparatus, there is a criticism we hear that there's too much fragmentation. There's been a sense, both from abroad (our allies commenting on the situation), and of course from the media in this country, that administrations in recent years -- and I'm not singling out one or the other -- have spoken with too many voices, and that this leads to confusion. Would you like to comment on that?
Well, there's a certain diversity of opinion, that's very true, there's no question. It would be very surprising in the American context if there weren't. After all, we're a wide-open, pluralistic, free-speaking, free-thinking society, and it's reflected in government. As a matter of fact, the contrast of ideas is well worthwhile. I think the conflict of views is well worthwhile. The problem in diplomacy, of course, is: when does conflict and diversity of view confuse, or when does it simply serve better to provide for the people who have to make decisions with the widest possible range of information? Now I would argue that once the decision is made, then there should not be a diversity of views, that's the way it should be. There have been times when the diversity of views has confused, there's no question about that. But that, frankly, is not so much a problem with respect to administrations, although it has occurred.
The foreign policy process, and foreign affairs now, are dealt with on a much wider scale. That is, many more quarters have an input than in the not-too-distant past. For example, you can't conduct an effective foreign policy without, in some way or another, taking into account the Congress, if for no other reason than that you have to go to Congress to get the money to conduct a policy. But in addition, there has been developed in this country a congressional interest in the process, so that government officials come up and testify, they are queried. The oversight of the Congress in the affairs of our nation is very pervasive. And that's as it should be, I don't find any trouble with that. I have appeared before congressional committees a thousand times if I've appeared once. And I never found that it was something that it was necessary to avoid. They have also a responsibility. In addition, foreign affairs today are subject to public opinion in a way which, in the past, also was not common. That is to say, public opinion expressed either through their elected representatives in Congress, or through the media, or through special interest groups, or through the normal organizations that exist in a society like ours -- whether they are trade unions, academic associations, what have you. So that the examination of the process of formulation as well as the implementation of foreign policy is constant. This examination is constant and therefore, given its wide range, it produces almost any possible circumstance that you'd like to look for.
Is there a difference in this later period of your career than in an earlier period?
There is to a certain extent, yes. When I came into the service over 30 years ago -- 33, 34 years ago -- the traditional authority of the Executive was not as thoroughly examined as it is today. But, then again, I'm not so sure that that is so bad. Some people argue that particularly in foreign affairs and security affairs, democracy is something less than perfect. But, you know, you can go back to Winston Churchill's dictum that "It's the worst of system except that it's better than everything else." (I don't know whether I've paraphrased him accurately.)
That's a point that's often made. I'd like to explore it -- that our foreign service and our diplomats are at a disadvantage when they deal with the communist states.
That's nonsense. I've seen the diplomatic services of a good cross-section of nations of the world. I don't have any question at all that ours is recognizably the finest diplomatic service in the world. Even the traditionally lauded British foreign service will agree with me, I'm sure, if you really put them to the test. The evidence of it is when you're abroad, how often the diplomats of other countries come to us for an understanding of what's going on. In addition, I never found it difficult to deal with authoritarian regimes while representing a democratic regime. On the contrary, I found it much easier. I felt much more at ease that what I was representing was generally not the views of a tight, small clique, but was more broadly based. Because there's no question in my mind that American foreign policy has a very broad base because it represents a democratic society. That's one of the strengths of it. It's not difficult, in this nation of ours, to assess what we stand for as a nation, and that's something we translate into our foreign policy.
There have been some changes in recent years which are not all to the good, I might say. For example, I don't think there's any question that, to a certain degree, there's a lack of confidence that the government knows what it's doing. It's not so much that there's a lack of consensus about some of the things that are done, but this is a more recent development, this lack of confidence that the government knows what it's doing, the wider-spread questioning that it knows what it's doing. Not what it's doing but that it knows, there's a difference. I'm not talking about consensus with regard to a subject, I'm talking about consensus with respect to a process, to the function, to the role. I think we can come out of that. I think we have to come out of that. I don't see any reason why we have to suffer through that kind of situation.
What are the causes? Is it the media? Our experiences in Vietnam?
No, no; this is still a heritage of the '60s, of the events of the '60s, the early '70s. I don't think there's any question of that. That was the beginning of it, that's the hangover. But, we'll come out of it. The mass, you know, the United States in the mass, Americans in the mass, generally do the right thing.
One of the criticisms or comments on U.S. foreign policy relating to this subject is this lack of a consensus. Is this just a romantic view, that sometime in the past we were in total agreement about everything that we did, and we no longer have that?
I think there's a certain romanticism about it. But there's no question that for brief periods in our past, we have had great bipartisan foreign policy, or nonpartisan foreign policy -- general agreement about overall methods and approaches and a willingness, as I said earlier, to accept that the government knew how to do it. I think, by and large, in terms of substantial issues, consensus is still widely achieved and achievable. There is, for example, no doubt that a consensus exists in this country at this moment that we face the fundamental foreign policy issue of our time, namely, how do we manage competition, confrontation, whatever you want to call it, with the Soviet Union. This is an overriding element. Equally true, I think, is that there is no doubt that a consensus exists in this country that the fundamental objective of United States foreign policy must be peace and security.
I think at the present time there is a mood in this country which one could characterize, to a certain extent, as defense-oriented internationalism. When the [Reagan] administration came in, it came in on a crest of a feeling that somehow or another we had to devote a little more attention to the defense side of our governmental machinery. Now, I'm not saying that there is consensus on exactly how to do it. On the contrary, there's a diversity of opinion, whether you go this far or that far, but the general mood was, and probably still is, that. What the debate is over is how you achieve these broader objectives. For example, there's debate going on right now with respect to the nuclear question. There's debate going on right now with respect to the priorities between different activities of government. But generally speaking, in the field of foreign affairs, the people in the United States expect that
Next page: Formulating Foreign Policy
© Copyright 1996, Regents of the University of California