Adm. Leighton Smith Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley

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[Barnes]
How good is the coordination with respect to these plannings? You were
involved directly on the naval side. We know that the army had developed its
own plans in this situation. The air force, of course, has an onward-looking
strategy also. How good is the integration? When you speak of the littoral, of
course, you're really talking about combined operations. Where do these plans
actually gel, if at all?
When we developed From the Sea we did not coordinate with the air force and the army. We did not work hand-in-glove with them. Part of the process was understanding the army and the air force, and how we fit together. I must tell you that the navy, up until about the late 1980s to early 1991 or '92, very, very seldom worked with other services, other than the marine corps. The army and the air force were the central front force. It was the air - land doctrine, it was going to be the battle of the central front. We were going to fight a war in the Norwegian Sea, or rather in the GI - UK gap. We were going to be up there fighting the Russians as they came pouring out of the North Sea fleet. There was no continuity there whatsoever -- we were going to be in Norway, they were going to be on the central front. We saw a very major shift in this, and we knew we had to bring these things together. We saw that in Desert Storm. Most of the work that was done in Desert Storm was almost ad hoc'ed. The JFACC, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, was used for the first time, obviously, in real operations. It had been practiced a bit, but Buster Glossen was the JFACC. The navy had a hard time fitting into that mold -- well, those of us who were putting together this new-think piece knew we had to fit into that mold a hell of a lot better or we weren't going to be a player. The air force, on the other hand, had to understand that the world didn't stop at the shoreline. And so there is a definite acknowledgment of coexistence here, that we had to work together. They were developed separately, but with a full understanding of how they fit together.
Looking at declining budget figures, would it be better for the military to force this coordination?
We're going down fast. I mean I don't think this country fully understands how fast our defense forces are being brought down. The navy went from well over 500,000 to under 400,000 in just the few years that I was in the Pentagon. And that's a tremendous drop; I mean you talk about laying off people, that's a big draw-down. We had a 600-ship navy -- we're now looking at something around 300 or maybe fewer. We went from fifteen aircraft carriers to now what we call "eleven plus one." So the draw-down has been substantial. That doesn't mean to say that there's not a lot of money still going to defense. All that says is that if you're going to be effective in warfare, you'd better learn how to operate together. Now again, I go back to the previous stage, we didn't have to operate together. The marines were in Norway, the navy was in the GI - UK gap fighting the long-range threat, and the army and the air force were on the central front. That was the plan. We didn't have to operate together. Now we do, and we are pulling together. And I must tell you, I commanded joint forces in Bosnia, I commanded joint forces in JTM province. I watched joint forces working together and it was a joy to behold. People are working together. Are we getting better at it? Absolutely. Are there improvements on the horizon? Yes siree, there are. Are there still differences about how we ought to operate? Exactly.
[Barnes]
How about cross-fertilization through the war colleges?
More navy lieutenants at army and air force colleges, more army and air force lieutenants at navy war college. There's joint PME (Professional Military Education) that's a requirement. We've got Capstone for the new flag officers. When I got to be a flight officer, that was not a requirement, it was a nice-to-have thing. And the navy, frankly, was not interested. This was somebody else's idea. I enjoyed Capstone. I went to Capstone with guys like Barry McCaffery, who is now the drug czar. Barry and I have been friends ever since. And other people. Capstone was a very important part of my professional military education and gave me the expertise that you mentioned earlier -- to go about commanding NATO's first-ever land operation commanded by an admiral, being conducted in a country that's got no navy.
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