John McCone Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley

Page 2 of 6
How did your career in government begin?
I had not served in government at all when President Truman, in 1947, appointed a five-man Air Policy Commission. What the president wanted, and his staff certainly wanted, was that all of the new rewards of research and development that took place during the war -- not only in the U.S. but world-wide -- were properly absorbed by our military and also our commercial aviation.
This was a very wise, intelligent judgment on the part of Truman. So he appointed a five-man commission called the Air Policy Commission to examine the whole area. Through the recommendations of the Air Force, with whom I had worked very closely, I was asked to come down to serve as a counselor to that commission. I went there and had a meeting with the chairman, a man named Thomas K. Finletter [secretary of the Air Force], and I could see that what he really wanted was a staff man. I wasn't very much interested in taking time off from my business career to become a staff man for any commission, despite the fact that I was highly complimented by being asked.
So I said no. The next day, Henry Ford, who was the fifth member, was asked to withdraw by his board of directors, who correctly thought this policy commission was bound to recommend some activities that would involve the board enterprise and would be a conflict of interest. So he withdrew, and the president asked me to take that fifth position on the commission, which I did, and that was really my start. I took it on the condition that I devote time to the military aspects and that others could devote their time to civil aviation.
So I wrote the part of the report dealing with the military myself. I took that part of the report, before it was released, over to [Secretary of Defense James V.] Forrestal, and he read it and said: "Well, it's one thing to write a report, and it's another thing to do something about it. I do not have a deputy. The National Defense Act of 1947 created the office of secretary of defense but did not create an office of deputy, so why don't you come in and act as acting deputy?" And he said: "I'll empower you with whatever is necessary for you to perform. I'll have a meeting with the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Chief of Staff and get them on board." So the next day, we had a luncheon, with six people including the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and it was agreed that they would respect me as a deputy by statute. That's the day that changed my life because it got me into government.
Was that a hard decision for you to make? To essentially put aside your business?
I carried my business interests at the same time. If you have examined my record, you will note that I served in government intermittently over a period of fifteen years, I guess two or three years here, two or three years there. The reason for that was that I was never committed exclusively to serving government as many men are. I preserved a two-track existence for a number of years.
What drew you to government?
Throughout my business career, building ships in the aircraft plant, I was in close touch with military activities.
Do you think you would have enjoyed being a military man?
No.
You just had an interest in the mechanics of it?
Yes, and a respect for some of the officers and civilians that were involved in it. I had great respect for Forrestal, great respect for [World Bank President John J.] McCloy and [Secretary of Defense Robert A.] Lovett. But, there was a period there where we had a flat spot in our business. Our war work was pretty well wound up, and while we had a lot of refinery work in the United States and in the Persian Gulf and a power plant or two in Alaska, the real heavy burden of high engineering, which is the operation of Cal Ship and the Birmingham plant, had been relieved and was in a flat spot from 1945-47.
One of your first big jobs was preparing the first defense budget. Tell me about that process.
It is a very interesting one. If you recall, prior to 1947, there was no Air Force. There was the Army and the Navy, and the Air Corps was part of the Army. In 1947 they created an Air Force with a secretary and a chief of staff as an independent division. So how to take the money that was appropriated for the military, that had been divided between the Army and the Navy, and carve out enough for the Air Force was quite a problem. And this is the job that Forrestal gave to me. There was a lot of blood on the floor, but we finally got it done. And I remember very well the arguments, the long hours, sleepless nights I had working with a senior staff of the Army and senior staff of the Navy to create this Air Force component.
What was the key to making the bargain work?
Pounding the table.
Had Truman set a limit on the amount?
Yes. I submitted to Forrestal the best that we could agree upon. He reported that the president would not accept a budget above $14.5 billion, and after some discussion he and I went to the White House and he asked me to present the situation to the president, which I did. After listening intently to the discussions back and forth, the president said, "Well, I tell you John, I'll give a little, and you get the boys over in the Pentagon to give a little, and we will settle on $14.75 billion." And I said, "All right, we'll do that," and that is how the budget was settled.
Do you think that it is a good idea in government when the president draws a line and says "only so far?"
I think it's absolutely necessary with all the parties. Let me tell you another story. When I became director of Central Intelligence, I was given a briefing on the intelligence budget, which nobody ever sees. However, since I was going to be the director, they had to give me the briefing. This is very, very secret to this day. So they gave me the briefing, and of course I was familiar with government accounting and the way they put up the numbers and all the rest of it, and here they had the gross for each year for five years.
I noticed that the fifth year was just a little over double of the first year. So I said: "Now gentlemen, I'd like another briefing a week from now, and I would like to see the fifth year the same as this year. We will have a flat line across, and we won't have this growth. I expect to be here five years, and I am not going to see this budget doubled in five years." Their chins dropped down, and so they wondered what kind of a character was going to run the CIA. They had never had that kind of command before.
So they went to work on a budget and brought it in to show that the fifth year was about as flat as the current year. And five years later when I left, the budget was $20 million less than when I took over. And in those years there was never a person who came to me and said that he couldn't do anything because he didn't have the money. That just shows what you can take out of a government bureaucracy of any kind if you put a ceiling that you have to work against.
Next page: The Eisenhower Years
© Copyright 2000, Regents of the University of California