John McCone Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
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What should be the nature of that relationship between the president and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency?
Well, the president should be accessible to the director of Central Intelligence to get the current intelligence readings and the analysis of what they mean.
Is there any similarity between the role of the CIA and the role of the university in the broader society?
No, I don't think there's any comparison. The role of the intelligence community is to gather raw intelligence from human resources or other means, often technical resources, analyze it, and report to the policymakers on what it means. Then it's up to the policymakers to decide what to do about it.
Do you have any comments on recent events in our history with regard to Mr. Casey's management of the Central Intelligence Agency?
I feel that a serious mistake was made when the operation in Nicaragua, which started out to be a covert operation, was turned over to the CIA, because it was public at that point, and it destroyed the capability of the CIA to function covertly.
As a result of the post-Watergate period and the revelations of the Church Committee, we have gone through a lot of dialogue asking how democracies can successfully undertake this business of intelligence. Would you share with us your views on intelligence in democracies?
It's very difficult for a democracy to function in secrecy, and you know so well that there is a desire and a right to know, and this cuts across the need for secrecy in a covert intelligence operation. That raises a question in my mind as to whether an intelligence operator can have a department that is covert and functions covertly. That's only a very small part of the overall national intelligence operation.
Are you suggesting that a democracy shouldn't be in the business of covert operations or just that it's hard to handle?
It's hard to handle.
What sorts of analysis go into the overall assessment of the Soviet threat?
The knowledge of their military capabilities. We had very specific knowledge as to the size of their army, the amount of equipment their army had, their missile capability -- both short-range and long-range -- and those are all components of measuring the threat, together with their political differences from the United States.
Were the addition of satellites and technical means really very important?
Extremely important.
Can technology ensure that we really knew what they are doing?
Well, you can't ensure anything, but you can find out a great deal through technical means. The development of technical resources to gather intelligence -- particularly satellite photography -- didn't replace, or didn't totally replace, but overshadowed the human resource intelligence.
If President Reagan had you as an advisor in his administration, is there any advice you would give him in order to secure America's national security interests?
You could write a book on that. I think that President Reagan has given too much authority, too much latitude, to his National Security staff to the exclusion of his statutory advisors and secretary of defense and secretary of state. I think in doing that he made the National Security Council, which is an advisory group council, into an operating organization, which is a great mistake.
There is a big difference between the responsibility and authority of a person that's been appointed and confirmed by the Senate and a person who has just been appointed, because the one that is confirmed by the Senate is subject to call and testify almost at any time. The individual that is appointed by the president, and not confirmed by the Senate, not even submitted to the Senate, is not subject to testifying before the committees of Congress.
Would you have any advice for President Reagan or the next president about the future of U.S. - Soviet relations?
I think the greatest danger, in this dangerous world, is to have two superpowers that are not in conference with each other. That, in my opinion, is very dangerous. When they are in conference, it gives an opportunity to develop understanding.
Do you think that their system is changing today or does Gorbachev remind you of Khrushchev?
Well, you asked two questions. I think that the climate for discussion is improving. I think Reagan himself is more inclined to discussions than he was when he was treating the Soviet Union as the "evil empire." I think that there is not much parallel between Khrushchev and Gorbachev at this time. Khrushchev was a superficial individual with not a great deal of clout within his own country. He had no control over the Politburo, except to the extent that he won their favor by going along with their philosophy. He was an outgoing personality to be sure. There was very little of a constructive nature that came out of him.
Gorbachev, on the other hand, is moved to secure backing in the Politburo by putting some of his own people in there, and therefore starting to mold a political philosophy somewhat different than that which has prevailed for so many years. Now whether he succeeds or not, time will only tell. But that is the way he is working. I saw no such effort on the part of Khrushchev.
What is the prognosis for reaching a satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union?
As long as they hold as their objective the destruction of our freedom and our enterprise system, our capitalistic system, and wish to impose their communist philosophy on the world, it is hard to figure out just how you are going to sit at the table with them and reach an understanding.
Tell us about the men who made U.S. foreign policy in the heyday of U.S. power.
Well, you had an extraordinary group of men who served in government during the war. Men like Mr. Lovett, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Forrestal, just to name a few. They served during the war with great devotion, great ability. And many of those men extended their service into the postwar period. Averell Harriman, for instance, served the government until the time of his death.... Forrestal did the same thing. McCloy, while practicing law in New York, was available on call for years. So a great many of the most able never were totally released from government responsibility.
Were these men key to the foreign policy successes of that period?
Yes, most certainly.
What made these men so extraordinary?
I think they were a substantial group of very bright men from various disciplines in private life that had a devotion and a dedication to their country and wished to help and did help. I can't answer your question on a group basis. I'd have to analyze each one of them that I knew.
Can you train people to succeed in this way?
I don't think so. They have to be motivated from within. You can't teach them as a textbook exercise in a classroom. They get it from their own minds. That motivation comes in different ways, depending on the conditions at the time. The country was at war when these particular men that I mentioned were in government service. They were motivated by an extreme desire or passion to help, and everything else in their lives -- their business, their law practice, their families, the whole works -- was set aside because of that motivation. In other periods it is personal association that draws people into public service. There were many that entered government service because they were inspired to do so by President Eisenhower when he became president. And an equal, or maybe greater number, were encouraged into government service because of their attachment to President Kennedy. There isn't one pattern that's followed all the time.
Did these men, like John McCone, have a very good sense of judgment that made all the difference when they made decisions?
Oh yes ... yes. They were men who had the strength to make a decision, and the wisdom to make a correct decision.
Is this a way of conducting affairs that one can train future generations to emulate?
That's a hard question to answer. But I think men develop that judgment factor by association with others of equal responsibility, and contact gives them a feeling of proper decision, proper courses to pursue.
If you could give the next president a piece of advice about running our foreign policy, what would it be?
I think he would have to be very careful, extremely careful, in the judgments that he would exercise.
Looking over your whole career in government, you served every president from Truman through Johnson. Is that correct?
Under Truman I was undersecretary of the Air Force, and acting deputy secretary of defense. Eisenhower asked me to be secretary of the Air Force but I couldn't do it because of private affairs. I just couldn't separate myself at that particular moment from my business obligations. I turned that down and I served Eisenhower in a consulting capacity right along until I finally accepted the post as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
And also President Nixon and President Ford -- in an advisory capacity?
Yes. I did serve Nixon, but not in any official capacity. I served on many committees that he set up and advisory groups and so forth. And I served President Ford in an advisory capacity.
You served on a number of commissions over and above the official roles as head of major agencies. There was the Airpower Commission, the Wriston Commission -- any others we should make mention of?
Yes, a commission on the supersonic transport under Johnson and one on selective service formed by Kennedy and carried over into Johnson.
You also served as Chairman of the McCone Commission [on Civil Disturbances]?
That's correct. That was a very important episode. The Watts riots took place in 1965, they broke out in August, I believe. I was flying to New York at the time, and as I flew out of Los Angeles, I could see these fires starting. And when I got to New York, I got a phone call from Governor Edmund Brown. He wanted to see me. I just turned around and came right back because it was such a critical matter. He asked me to chair this commission, and I said that I would providing that I would have a voice in who was on the commission.
We worked out that detail satisfactorily. He nominated Warren Christopher as vice-chairman of the commission, who is a very able man -- a man who has been my friend ever since. I picked two or three, and the governor picked two or three, and we had this commission. We worked very hard on it. The acceptance of the report has been a source of great gratification for me and to the other members of the commission.
Your service on all these commissions ... it seems that you have a very good record of getting society to listen to you.
It took a lot of time.
Could you tell me about the occasion of your leaving Washington? I understand you got a call from Walter Lippmann....
During the years that I was director of the CIA, I kept my distance from the Washington press corps -- maybe too far, I don't know, but in any event, that was my policy, and I saw very few of them. If I would see one, I would see him alone. I wouldn't have others in my organization or have him have others in his organization. This is different from my predecessors, who met with members of the Washington press corps and in groups. I wouldn't do that. So they gave this luncheon for me and were very insistent that I be there. I attended, and here were members of the Washington press corps around the table. Fifteen or more people there, and they gave me a silver bowl which said, "To John McCone, who served his country with dignity and in silence." I was always very proud of that.
You were recently honored by President Reagan.
The Medal of Freedom. Yes, I was deeply touched and highly honored to receive that medal. It is a very rare award and is the highest award that a civilian or anyone can receive. The military have their Medal of Honor, but the Medal of Freedom includes military and civilians and is awarded not only for services to the government but services to the people.
How does one man run an empire, run a bureaucracy, an agency, be on a number of boards, do civic and charitable work, have a home, and stay sane?
Maybe you don't stay sane.
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