Civil Wars

Is there a distinction between situations where you're injected into an internal struggle, like the Congo for example, between factions over control of the nation-state, versus conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or conflicts specifically between Egypt and Israel where you have two nations? Do those two different situations pose different sets of problems?

Oh yes. When you have an internal situation, it's far more complicated. Our first experience with that was in the Congo. To a degree, the United Nations Peace Force, or Security Force as it was called in West Illian, had responsibilities for the maintenance of law and order inside West Illian. There was a transfer of power, the Dutch had withdrawn, and there was a temporary administration by the United Nations and, at the end of that period, the state had to be handed over to Indonesian authorities. So for six months, the UN Security Force, with troops and police, assumed all responsibility for law and order.

Our next major problem dealing with civil disorder, an internal situation, was in Cyprus, where the negotiations eventually failed, and instead of the United Nations being able to keep the two sides divided, the Turkish army intervened and has virtually divided the country. And so the UN role, therefore, had to be changed. Instead of providing assistance to the Turkish and Greek communities, where they were living together and attempting to go for each other's throats, now the country has been divided and the UN is providing the buffer between the two.

The Dominican Republic was a case in point where the Organization of the American States had to carry out a very large-scale operation in a civil war situation. Chad is an example of an operation by the Organization of African Unity in a civil war situation, and you see how complex it has been, and that they've not been able to cope with it.

Now, in the Middle East, for the first time, the Lebanese situation has injected a civil war in the Arab-Israeli context, which has only further aggravated the situation, which makes it even more difficult to resolve, because we clearly have a civil war between the Muslims and the Christians, in which was added the PLO factor, who were allowed to operate in Southern Lebanon with the agreement of the Arab League, with the consent of Lebanon. And when more of them were thrown out of Jordan after the Black September in 1970, under the agreement they were moved to southern Lebanon and were allowed to operate by the Arab League, with the consent of Lebanon, against Israel. So we therefore have two situations. There is the PLO factor which concerns the security of Israel on the one side, and concerns the future of the Palestinians on the other. And, you have a civil war situation. Extremely complex.

Let's look at that situation. In the context of the Lebanese civil war, how do you maintain your neutrality? In a civil war, it would seem to be very easy to move toward a situation where one side or the other says, "You're aligning yourself with my opponents," which would lead to the unraveling of the legitimacy of your mission. How does that problem work itself out?

In the case of the United Nations in Lebanon, the problem has been simple, because there has been an elected Lebanese government. It has not been able to exercise authority over hardly any part of its country -- perhaps very nominally in parts of Beirut. Therefore, the task of the United Nations troops, which were deployed south of the River Litani, was to provide such assistance as requested by the representatives of the duly elected government of Lebanon. On a human rights basis, it will provide assistance to anyone regardless of what their politics is. If somebody was being attacked, or they required food or emergency medical evacuation, that would be provided if the UN had resources there. But anything which would smell of restoration of authority would have to be the representatives of the duly elected government.

Now in the Congo, it was a very difficult situation, because after Patrice Lumumba had been removed by the president, President Kasavubu, which in itself is an unconstitutional coup and was so declared at that time, our direction from the United Nations Security Council was to then take our instructions and advice from the president. In fact, the General Assembly passed a resolution accepting the president as the only remaining constitutional authority in the Congo. So we got our instructions very clear, that anyone who represented President Kasavubu was considered as a new authority by us. We could no longer, therefore, take any instructions from Patrice Lumumba. But when Colonel Joseph Mobutu carried out his military coup, in which he said he had neutralized President Kasavubu as well as Patrice Lumumba, this was never accepted by any organ of the United Nations. Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly accepted Joseph Mobutu as the authority.

So now, what do you do on the spot? On the spot, where you have to deal with a civil war situation, where people are being killed, houses are being burned, women are being raped, you have to act. Therefore, you look to cooperate with whoever is in authority without duly recognizing them being really in authority. The legal term is, you deal with the "de facto" authority without giving them any conception, or any idea, or any semblance that they really represent the government. Of course, people don't like it, but the point is that wherever there is a United Nations presence, they are required to protect human life and property, not only of the United Nations, but of anyone else who is within easy reach and it is possible for the United Nations to make its resources available. They must act. That, therefore, then becomes a valid reason that you take care of anyone under those particular circumstances.

When you get a civil war situation like in Lebanon, the only way is to deal with all the de facto authority, wherever it is exercised. Because if you fight or, let's say, you create an environment where you are going to help one side to win the war, then that's become very difficult. Now, that did eventually happen in the Congo, because the seceded province of Katango, in spite of all the negotiations, failed to return, and Mr. Lumumba's followers created another dissident group in Stanleyville, and yet another splinter group took place in Bakwanga, where the diamond mines are located. A Mr. Kolongi became the king of the diamond mines, and so you had four splinter groups.

Now here the Security Council, by special resolution, authorized the United Nations command to help in the reunification. There was, at the same time, a special committee, a commission, to mediate and bring the parties together. So the UN command in the field worked in support of this political actions. An agreement was arrived at in which it was accepted that there would be a new government elected by a meeting of the members of the Parliament who had been elected in the first instance. And so the United Nations then took pains to organize a meeting at Lovanium University, outside Leopoldville, so that the people who were rioting and creating lawlessness would not be able to influence such a meeting. It was easy for us to secure the area because it was somewhat isolated. We were able to fly, or move, under our protection, all the members of the Parliament to this area, encircle them, provide them food, facilities, and everything inside the Parliamentary area where they could meet and decide and elect their own government, which they did.

That only left Katango, because Katanganese representatives still remained outside this particular area. Another UN resolution authorized the United Nations to reunify, to end the secession of Katango, and permitted us the use of force only in the last resort, and that, too, in self-defense. Finally, when the United Nations had to act against Katango, it was simply done because they were fighting us all the time, but we were not allowed to react. As a matter of fact, they surrounded the UN troops in the city of Elizabeth and they wouldn't allow them to move anywhere for several months. Finally, this special authorization came. The permanent members of the Council, particularly President Kennedy, decided that this must come to an end, and so he agreed to support the UN action and said we could give notice to Mr. Tschombe and his troops that we intend to move out of our surrounded areas and take over responsibilities of protection of the vulnerable points, the key points of the city, move out to the mining installations, provide protection to the mines.

Well, in that process, again, they fired at the United Nations troops, so we were able to act in self-defense. It might be a slight stretching of the point to self-defense, but it was self-defense, as opposed to the clear use of force or enforcement action, which was carried out in Korea under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter.

Peacekeeping is not enforcement action. It is a diplomatic process where, instead of using a group of unarmed personnel, armed personnel are used because they are able to carry out certain security responsibilities. But still, those troops are not intended to fight.

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