Writing about History

Do you feel that grappling with the history is the key to getting people to understand a particular place, whether it is Haiti, Bosnia, or El Salvador?

That's a very good and very big question. History is destiny without a doubt when it comes to a lot of these violent situations. I am drawn to these places, I think.

That's a very good and a very large question. Without a doubt when it comes to a lot of these violent situations, history is destiny -- at least in some sense.

I can quote a Haitian political scientist and one-time president -- he was president for a few months before he was overthrown in a military coup -- named Leslie Maningat, who spoke of violence as "a force that strips the society nude, strips it naked, the better to listen and hear the heartbeat beneath." So I think during violent situations -- quasi-revolutions, coups d'états -- you start to understand how a society works. So that is one dimension, the present. But to then actually follow those bits of information about how this place works -- how the different parts fit together, who has what interests, why people are acting in a certain way that may seem illogical to you -- it's usually very necessary to go back somehow and try to understand where the society came from. Haiti is a particularly good case just because its history is so fascinating, unusual, heavy on its present. Haitians really walk in history and though the country is three-quarters illiterate, they all know the history of their country much more certainly than Americans know the history of theirs.

I like to quote Leslie Maningat, a well-known Haitian political scientist and one-time president he served as president for a few months in 1988 before he was overthrown in a military coup who describes political violence as "a force that strips the society nude, strips it naked, the better to place the stethoscope and listen to the heartbeat beneath." I certainly agree that during many violent political events coups d'états, quasi-revolutions the workings of a society are cast in sharp relief. So that is one dimension, the present. But then to follow those bits of information about how this place works how the different parts fit together, who has what interests, why people are acting in a certain way that may seem illogical at the time it's often necessary to "go back" somehow, to try to understand how the society was built, where it came from. Haiti is a particularly good case just because its history is so fascinating, and weighs so heavily on its present. Haitians, as Maningat once told me, "walk in history," and though three Haitians in four can't read or write, they all know the history of their country more intimately, certainly, than Americans know the history of theirs.

To me, one of the great challenges writing these stories is trying to implicate the history in the present narrative of events. There is a tendency to place like a big glob the back story -- history -- in the middle of the piece. And this is a classic, what is it called in Washington? -- MEGO, "my eyes glaze over" -- tactic. Because people say: "Haiti was born in 1492 as ... " It's an awful signal! The key, it seems to me, is to try always to break it into small pieces and try to connect it very much to what the present is, almost to atomize history and to try to analyze it according to the present much more.

To me, one of the great challenges writing these stories is trying to implicate the history in the present narrative of events. There is a tendency to place like a big glob in the middle of the piece the so-called "back story" history. And this is a classic what do they call it in Washington? MEGO, "my eyes glaze over" tactic. When people read: "Haiti was born in 1492 as Columbus... " it's an awful signal! The key, it seems to me, is to try always to break it into small pieces and try to link it to the present, almost to atomize history and analyze it much more according to the present.

I think you are right in implying that this comes obviously from my own interest in history. But I do feel very strongly that if you are trying to understand ... Haiti, for example, is a perplexing place. The dictator was overthrown in 1986 -- that's twelve years ago. People thought then that there would be democracy , a transition to democracy. It's been a dozen years. There have been five military coups. The U.S. actually invaded this country -- the U.S. is a hundred times or a thousand times more powerful! Still they are in horrible shape and the government is blocked. And the question is why, why, why is this so? How do we understand that?

I think you are right to imply that this comes from my own interest in history. But I do feel very strongly that if you are trying to understand ... Haiti, for example, is a deeply mysterious place. The dictator was overthrown in 1986 thirteen years ago. People thought then that there would be democracy: "a transition to democracy." Instead, during those thirteen years, Haiti has endured five military coups. Finally, the United States sent its military to invade the country the U.S., a hundred, a thousand times more powerful! And yet the Haitians are still in horrible shape and the government is completely blocked. And the question is why? why is this so? How do we come to understand this?

As Americans, aren't we often guilty of not looking at the history and hence our policy often fails in these places?

I would certainly say that is true. The point is very well taken. I think I would divide it into two parts. The great body of Americans -- their interest in or lack of interest in the world, and this isn't necessarily meant to criticize -- they have their own lives. You can't learn the history of a place through the newspaper. You can't learn everything about Central America by newspaper accounts. You have to read books and you have to go to other sources.

The point is very well taken. I think, though, I would divide my answer into two parts. First are the great body of Americans, who may or my not have a strong interest in the world. This isn't necessarily meant to criticize, mind you; they have their own lives. The simplest fact is, though, that you can't learn the history of a place, the complications and intricacies through the newspaper. You can't learn everything about Central America or Haiti by reading newspaper accounts. You have to read books and you have to go to other sources.

The other part of the question is, of course, the elites who run foreign policy. I think [what you've said] is true, though they very much have history available to them. They have area specialists, people in the State Department and in the Pentagon; the National Security Council staff -- all the organs of government; the CIA of course -- who are very well informed on historical backgrounds of places. The question is, what is the reason they make policies, and how much do they include history in those reasons?

The other part of the question refers to the so-called elites who run foreign policy. I think what you've said -- that they often ignore history is true, though they certainly have history available to them. Policymakers have "area specialists" people in the State Department and in the Pentagon, on the National Security Council staff, in the CIA, and all the organs of government who are very well informed on the histories and politics of various countries and regions. The question is, why do the leading figures in the government -- the President and his immediate advisors make the policies they do, and how much do they take account of history when making those decisions?

Certainly during the period of the Cold War, the metro pensee, the overwhelming thinking, had nothing to do with history. It had to do with a larger view of the world in which these other places were simply prizes in a large game. So the historical attributes of these places were interesting only insofar as they started to cause us -- the United States -- problems. For example, Vietnam. There was no lack of awareness of the history of this country in different parts of the government. It is simply that when it came to decision making, the historical details that might have been taken more into account , might have caused different decisions to have been made, were simply not important to policymakers. There were other things that were more important.

Certainly during the Cold War, the maitre pensee, the "master strategy," had little to do with history. It had to do with a larger view of the world in which these countries were merely prizes to be contested in a great game. So the historical attributes of these places held interest and importance only insofar as they started to cause the United States threats or problems. For example, Vietnam: although the understanding of this country was certainly relatively weak in the American government, the real problem was that when it came to making decisions, the historical details that might have caused different decisions to have been made were simply not important to policymakers. There were other things -- namely, the Communist threat that were more important.

Some of those reasons were on the one hand ideological, their notion of how the world was divided; was it also their vision of their domestic political vulnerabilities?

Oh certainly. I think so. You mean Vietnam specifically?

You mean Vietnam specifically?

Vietnam specifically, but also these other cases you have looked at. Intervention in Haiti, for example.

Certainly. Those are two very good examples.

Well, I think those are two very good examples.

Vietnam: of course, you did have this history with the Democratic party of losing China, and it was very difficult to back up in Vietnam when it came to domestic policy, particularly when Johnson took office and had very strong domestic goals that depended on the support of the so-called Southern Bourbon senators -- Democrats, Richard Russell, a number of other people who had great power and great seniority, who were against his programs, but whom he could cajole. But certainly if he had backed up on Vietnam he would have lost them, and he knew that.

In the case of Vietnam, of course, the Democratic Party had only a decade before "lost" China, and that made it especially difficult for any Democrat to back out of Vietnam. When Lyndon Johnson took office, he had very strong domestic goals particularly in civil rights, that depended on the support of the so-called Southern Bourbon senators Richard Russell and a number of others who had great power and great seniority and who were against his programs. Now Johnson knew he could cajole then, but he knew he certainly would have lost them if he had backed out of Vietnam.

Haiti is another question, and a more interesting one, because we are in a different era, and I think you are right in the implication that the invasion probably wouldn't have happened. For example, if there had been a Republican president during that time, there would have been no invasion.

Haiti is another question, because we are in a different era, and I think you are right in your implication that the invasion probably wouldn't have happened, for example, under a Republican president.

We are talking about the Clinton invasion.

1994.

Yes, in 1994.

One of the main reasons for the invasion was the interest of and the power of the Congressional Black Caucus. They were very strong supporters of Clinton. They had stayed with him right along the way, including for healthcare and various things he was most alone on. I am not saying he did it simply for them, but certainly they had strong political weight, I think

One of the main reasons for the American invasion of Haiti was the interest and the power of the Congressional Black Caucus. These Congressmen and women were very strong supporters of Clinton, and they had stayed with him all the way, including on healthcare and other issues he found himself isolated on. I am not saying Clinton launched an invasion of Haiti simply for the Congressional Black Caucus, but certainly they carried strong political weight.