The European Left

Did you have to define a set of discrete tasks to lead the party to its new identity?

In a way, the party's new identity worked well with our history. One could say that we liberated the content of our policies from an ideological cage. This is why the transformation of a political party always has roots. The party transformed itself on the basis of its real historical experience, which was already something quite different from the more orthodox communist tradition. Certainly, this was a difficult process, especially considering that its new identity moved it in the direction of the European socialist movement, which at the time was experiencing its own crisis.

That crisis, in particular in Italy, related to the deadlock, the gridlock, the sclerosis, and the corruption of the Christian Democratic Party that had dominated the country.

Yes, yes, without a doubt. There has been a general crisis in Italy's political system. For one reason or another, none of the parties that had shaped the history of our republic up until 1990 exist any longer. The Christian Democrats no longer exist. The Socialist Party no longer exists. And the Communist Party no longer exists. Everything was transformed under a wave of dramatic internal crisis, that is, the corruption and sclerosis of the governing parties, and internationally, the fall of the communist movement. And here I am referring to the fact that European socialism was facing new problems and challenges, not only in Italy. There was a basic crisis of the social democratic model. And so this was a phenomenon that involved all of Europe, not just Italy.

And that is a problem, in a way, that we are still dealing with, because the Left in the present period seems to be suffering from a malaise -- an inability to define a vision for the future, and to act on that vision. Is that interpretation correct?

It is politics in general, not only the Left, that is currently lacking a vision of the future. This is a political problem, because over the last few years the conviction that the economy is driving politics and that the role of politics is merely to implement economic imperatives has become widespread. There has really been a loss of political vision in general. It is clear that the Left has suffered more as a result, because it, in particular, needs a vision of the future. And so although the Left has managed this economic adjustment in Europe, it has not been successful in making its project appealing. It has not been capable of generating an attractive political project oriented toward the future. It is in this way that the cycle of the Left has exhausted itself, and I think that it is necessary for us to reconstruct the project of the European left. There is a very strong need for this.

You are suggesting two things: one, that to solve some of the contemporary problems, one has to move to a different arena, move to the European Union; and that has become a very important part of any political agenda that hopes to be successful for the future. Why is that so?

I think that single national states, even powerful states like the united states of Europe, are not able to confront the challenges of the contemporary world. As a result, Europe risks decline. It risks not carrying enough clout in the world arena. It risks seeing its social model called into question and losing the diverse cultural identities of which it is comprised. If we want to avoid a decline in Europe, we have to give birth to a supranational political power that is capable of giving Europeans pride, a sense that they count in today's world. This includes a vision of Europe as a global actor on the world scene, one capable of being an influential partner of the United States, able to promote European values. These are the values of democracy, of peace, and of individual liberty, but also those of social justice and solidarity in the construction of a new world order.

Before, you were suggesting that the Left's particular failure was [the failure] to mobilize public opinion to understand that reality -- the reality of the opportunities that lie in Europe. Why that failure, do you think?

Because the Left has remained too much of a prisoner of its traditional vision -- a vision that was the national experience of the welfare state. As a national experience, the welfare state strongly influenced different leftist currents in Europe, and the Left has remained a prisoner of this very noble, very important vision. Yet, it is a vision of the past. The Left has not had the strength to free itself from these nationalist ties. We have been left standing in mid-road. We have created a monetary union, but we are not able to create the conditions for stronger political unity.

If national parties are to be successful in broadening the vision of their constituents at home, who are the groups that they have to lead to this European vision? Where will the Left find votes in the future?

I believe, above all, that the Left needs to gain the approval of the younger generations. If we look today at the electoral structure in Europe, the Left appears to be having difficulty with the younger generations. Addressing the youth, in my opinion, is even more important than social aspects, even if we clearly need to think about a kind of social representation that is able to embrace part of the new European middle class. But I would stress the generational issue. The youngest generations, at this moment, are predominantly oriented to the Right. This is the biggest concern that we should have because it serves as evidence of a lack of vision today in the politics of the Left.

Do the young people vote for the Right because they perceive [the Left] as protecting the interests of the social groups that the Left used to draw on, which are incompatible with their own?

In part, this is true. In part, we can say that young people have the impression that social deregulation can favor their interests with respect to more organized, traditional interests. In part, the Right offers a distorted, yet strongly appealing prospective of identity. Today, the different European Rights have a strong nationalist/localist character, which is, at times, distorted. Nevertheless, they present themselves as having a strong identity, with a strong call to roots, to membership, to community, to the land, to blood ties. These are all strong values, with respect to which, the Left's values -- good administration, social equilibrium, and social peace -- appear weak. I believe this is probably a more serious problem.

When you hosted the conference on the Third Way, and had as your guest, among others, President Clinton, in your remarks you mentioned what the progressive leaders from around the world could learn from each other. What do you think the United States can learn from Europe and the European experience and what do you think Europe can learn from America?

I think that the United States can learn from Europe that the international crisis of our times should be dealt with first through politics, and then, only if it is absolutely necessary, with the use of force. That is, today's world needs to find political solutions, and Europe has a great tradition of politics. Europe, on the other hand, must learn from the United States to be a little less Machiavellian, and to conduct its foreign policy on the basis of clearly defined principles. Europe tends to overprivilege diplomacy, even when it finds itself in front of a dictator negotiating human rights. By contrast, the United States tends to view politics as power politics. I think that globalization needs a mix between American firmness, when it is necessary, and the European tradition of political diplomacy.

Looking back on your philosophical training, what is the balance between theory and practice, as you lead your constituents into a new era?

First of all, there are theories that give practical application a high priority, and so it depends. I think one needs to choose the right theory. This is the problem. I consider philosophical thought as a kind of bag of tools, like a toolkit. The most important thing is to use the right tool -- the one that is most appropriate to the task at hand. Philosophical thought offers us instruments. The important thing is to know which instrument to choose for dealing with the concrete problem that you have in front of you.

As Europe and Italy embrace a common European solution to address globalization, it still will have to try to maintain the commitments to social justice, to democracy. Will new instruments develop, new political formulas, for making that possibility of globalization with democracy a reality?

I think that European unity can have a significant effect. A strong and united Europe is not sufficient, but it can contribute to molding globalization on the basis of shared values. I consider globalization to be a positive, rather than a negative development. I am not part of the "No Global" movement, but I do think that it brings with it great contradictions: it reduces the space for democracy, it calls to question diverse identities, and it produces inequality. We need to govern this process according to the objectives of justice and peace. Without a sense of justice, there is no security. And so our values -- the values of democracy, individual liberty, equal opportunity-- will not be able to survive if they remain confined to the Western world, because the logic of global competition will put them in crisis. We need to find a way to affirm these values throughout the world. The rights of European workers can be defended only if they become the rights of Asian and Latin American workers. Otherwise, we will lose these rights also in Europe. This is the problem. This really requires new ideas from the Left.

If you were trying to draw a picture of what the European voter is worried about these days, what would be in that picture, and what are the policy solutions to respond to it?

I think that the reasons for the Right's victory-- that is, the orientation of the European voters at the moment -- have to do, in my opinion, with the fact that voters are conditioned by a sense of fear -- fear in the face of immigration, which in Europe, is a big problem. Our society is a rather closed society; we fear petty crime and widespread crime that appears to be linked to immigration. In the face of immigration, there is also the fear of losing privileges, of losing security, also social security. It seems that at the moment, the Right knows how to take advantage of this sense of insecurity, which is also a product of globalization. Naturally, this is also a result of the fact that the Left has, unfortunately, not known how to put a positive face on globalization. It has not been able to portray this process as a possibility for growth, which globalization needs to be and can be. And so at the moment, the Right is prevailing because a feeling of fear and insecurity is prevailing in public opinion.

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