| Photo by Jane Scherr |
Robert Gallucci Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
| Photo by Jane Scherr |
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What I'm hearing is that bureaucratic politics, negotiating, making it up as you go along, have been key elements in these solutions or partial solutions that you've been involved in -- Sinai, Iraq, North Korea. I'm curious if there are any overall themes that emerge in these kinds of situations, where you have domestic clamor in the United States about a threat, you have to find solutions that aren't just unilateral -- that we do it alone, and at the same time work with multilateral institutions that actually may resist what needs to be done. Any overall lessons from this body of experience?
I'd throw Bosnia into that too, which also fits this characterization in which we have real scary interests, we have been at war, we might go to war if we see a vital interest, where other countries are involved, it can't be done unilaterally.
One of the things that's very difficult, and I haven't quite figured it out yet, and this [Bush] administration is not helping me figure it out, is how to bring the American people along to believe that negotiations can be a honorable way to deal with the national security issue. That, I think, sometimes can be put forth and defended and one can succeed at that. But there's enormous skepticism, it seems to me, to our ability -- American negotiators, diplomats -- to deal with national security issues. It's always struck me that it's like any matter of security, even if it be in your neighborhood. If you asked some Americans, "Do you want to spend the extra money on more policemen or keeping the gymnasium lights on longer at night?" a lot will pick the extra policemen, rather than a cooperative approach. Internationally, it seems to me we argue uphill for domestic support, and in these cases -- in the case of Bosnia, in the case of North Korea, in the case of Iraq -- I had to do some of the public diplomacy, the selling of our foreign policy on the Hill and with the press, and the degree of skepticism is enormous.
When I said this administration isn't helping, it think it is party because this administration shares that skepticism. When we ask a question like, "Why would the administration, why would the president, use a phrase like 'axis of evil'?'' I think it's because they are not as interested as perhaps others may have been in previous administrations in the negotiated resolution -- not if it involves a compromise of some kind. And I've been struck by this each time -- not only the complexity of dealing with an opponent, whether it's the Iraqis or whether it's Milosevic, or whether it's Kim Jong-Il, that's complicated enough in figuring out what the deal is going to be -- but winning support back here, back home, is an interesting challenge, in terms of American culture.
If negotiation is chosen as the way to go, what are the most important characteristics of successful negotiations? What do you, as a negotiator, have to bring to the table, other than deals? What are the skills involved in making this happen?
The first part of this answer is very clear to me. Afterwards it gets a little hard, but the first part is knowing what America's interests are. To have a good grip before one goes off to sit across the table, and know what really matters to us and what's important.
I remember one meeting of principals in the Situation Room, when we were nearing the end game with North Korea, and I had come back from Geneva, and I laid it out: "Look, there's all kinds of things we want from the North Koreans -- we want to stop the nuclear weapons program, their forward-deployed forces, their ballistic missile program, and their testing." A lot of people in the room had all kinds of things. I said, "We can't get all this. I need priorities, I need to know what our vital interest is here. What do we want most?" And my recollection is that Bill Perry, then Secretary of Defense, cut across all the conflicting ideas of what was important, and said, "We've been living with North Korea for almost a half a century. We never liked it. We could probably continue doing it for another half-century if we have to. The reason we're here is because of their nuclear weapons program. Stop the nuclear weapons program. Get the plutonium. Stop them from producing anymore." I mean, he cut to the chase. So the agreed framework in another month of negotiations was on that point. He defined in that meeting what the vital interest was. We had a lot of other interests, we really did, and we still do.
So the first word is get the priorities right, understand what the vital interest is, if there is one, understand what the objectives are. It's nice to know what your context is in the international system, who could be on your side, who not. That's the most important thing.
Then, of course, right after that is to understand what the other guy's perceived interests are. If you can, it's nice to just aggregate those and know what their bureaucratic situation is, and any arguments they may be having between the energy people and the military and all that. But understand your own interests, understand their perceived interests.
One final question requiring a brief answer: How should students prepare for the future? Of course, they should go to Georgetown, but beyond that, what would you suggest that they should do?
I think they should go to the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, but that's a brief answer. I think they should become as well-educated citizens of the country and of the world as they can, know the American political system and learn what they can about the international system and the way countries interact with one another. Understand the community we live in.
On that note, Dean Gallucci, thank you very much for joining us today. And thank you very much for joining us for this Conversation with History.
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