David Newsom Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
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What do you think are the key elements in making a skillful diplomat?
First of all, an understanding of politics, both our own and others -- the whole concept of power, how it's achieved and how it's exercised. And secondly, a capacity to listen. That means not just to listen to what people say, but what you think they really mean, because these are often two different things. And then to digest that sense of politics and what people are telling you into an assessment that you hope will be useful and influential in your government.
What do you think is the best preparation?
The experience I had in journalism was an excellent preparation, but one has to shift one's mindset from capturing the instant moment to the longer-term view of what it means. I think history is important. Languages are useful to the extent that they introduce you to a culture, and political science in a sense of understanding political currents and power. I would emphasize history and politics more than I would emphasize the study of cultures, although that's important.
We're going to talk a little about foreign policy and democracy and the media in a minute, but I can't help asking: in your long, distinguished career, who stands out among the people you've worked with or interacted with as being both skillful in politics and skillful in diplomacy, a notch above others?
Well, although he's a controversial figure and sometimes not always easy to get along with, I had great respect for Henry Kissinger. He is a man who had a capacity to see connections in the world in a remarkable way. You go in to see him with something about the Arabian Peninsula and, "Well, what is the impact on China?" or "What's the impact on Russia?"
There was an ambassador who is not terribly well known by the name of Raymond Hare, who was one of my mentors. He was ambassador in Egypt and in other Middle Eastern countries. He taught me how to manage one of the most delicate links in diplomacy, which is the communication between the diplomat and his or her own government. How to understand instructions. How to determine whether Washington really intends that you carry out an instruction or hopes that you don't. These are very real skills in the diplomatic art that require an understanding of Washington and its structure and its politics, and also a certain degree of courage in determining what you do and what you don't do as a diplomat abroad.
Diplomats are, obviously, on a leash; but can you be creative as you pull on the leash or move in subtle directions?
Yes. Having seen the practice both as an undersecretary dealing with our missions abroad, and as an ambassador, I know that sometimes Washington is very happy when an ambassador takes initiative. But taking initiative requires a skillful understanding of how much leeway you really have in Washington. One technique which I've often found useful, particularly if a crises erupts, is to say, "I propose that we do A, B, and C, and I've made an appointment with the Foreign Minister for 48 hours from now." That gives Washington an opportunity to decide, "Hey, back off," or "Good, he's got it in hand. Let's not pull him in." But with the telephone and now with the computer, ambassadors are on very tight leashes. But still, you're out there and you're ultimately responsible for how the relations go, and so you have to take initiative.
You've thought quite a bit about foreign policy and have been part of this process of making foreign policy in a democracy. And not any democracy, but the United States, with its history and culture. What are the main ideas that are important for understanding how foreign policy works?
I think the first thing to understand is how many players there are in our
democracy. I've often been critical of academic courses which seem to concentrate
on the relationship between the State Department and the NSC, maybe the Defense
Department, and maybe CIA. Ignoring, for example, the Treasury Department, which
has a big influence on foreign policy, and not fully appreciating the role of
Congress. 
And,
beyond Congress, the circles of the advocacy organizations, the lobbyists, the
media -- all of these go into a mix which, hopefully under effective Executive
leadership, crystallizes into policy. But it's a very complex system.
What are the biggest changes in that system that you have witnessed over time?
First, an acceleration of the process. When I first went overseas in 1947/48, the airplane was just coming in to being a factor, so that gradually you had secretaries of state flying to meet with their counterparts, and then heads of state meeting with their counterparts. So that sped up the communications. With the increase in the speed of communications, the media outran diplomatic communications in reporting events, and also in establishing a public view of events in this country, which the State Department or the U.S. government had to confront and sometimes try to correct, as more information came in and more analysis.
Who do you think, of our leaders or our Secretaries of State, has been most effective in adapting the organization of our diplomatic corps to these changes?
I think Dean Rusk, in the Kennedy and later in the Johnson administrations,
having come out of the foundation where we all had an understanding of many
of these aspects. Henry Kissinger, by the force of his personality and by his
skill in dealing with the media, brought the process together. In the Carter
administration, Cyrus Vance, more than any other secretary of state that I worked
with, understood the need to bring the Foreign Service into the modern age in
matters of gender, race, and benefits. He was the principal architect of the
Foreign Service Act of 1980, which modernized the culture of the service. Vance
was also good with the media, and he had a very effective spokesman in Hodding
Carter, who was able to, I won't say manipulate, but manage the process. I can't
speak for later administrations, 
but
that public face of our diplomacy has been increasingly important, and to the
extent that presidents and secretaries of state can deal with that face, and
create an image and a point of view, they can be effective.
What about presidents? Does one stand out in your mind as a shining light with regard to leading America in the world?
Certainly, it was a thrill to work, even then, at a lower level, in the Kennedy administration. In the developing world that I dealt with mostly, Kennedy had an understanding that few of his predecessors had had of the attitudes and the sensitivities of this developing, independent world.
Reagan was interesting in that, while he was an ideologue, he had an intuitive sense of politics and when to shift and adapt, and he had the public support to do that.
Carter was very sincere and, I think, came across effectively with a lot of people, but he was hampered by the Iran hostage crises and others, so that his effectiveness was diminished.
You've mentioned power a lot and understanding power as being important. But one of the other issues that must come up again and again is values, what emerges out of the culture. I wonder if you would address the dilemmas of being a U.S. diplomat, where sometimes what national interest requires in the actual operation of diplomacy is inconsistent with the values that we espouse, whether they're democracy, human rights, freedom, or whatever.
It is certainly one of the most difficult problems of America diplomacy, because particularly during the Cold War, but now in an age of terrorism where you have similar problems, there are those we have to work with who are the antithesis of everything we believe in. I have seen a number of revolutions where our close identification with an unpopular and oppressive ruler has resulted in the overthrow of the regime. When that ruler is overthrown, our interests are overthrown with it. The most important thing in our diplomacy is to work with such people where our national interests require it, but to do everything we can to avoid such a close identity that the people in the country see our interest and our identity identical with that of an unpopular ruler. It's not easy, but one can do it. An ambassador can do it by gestures, by statements which don't necessarily contradict what Washington is saying, but would say to people in a culture that you understand: "I understand you. This is what we face, but it's in your interest to understand us and work with us." It's a nice path to follow.
I think President Johnson would call this having your "ear to the ground."
Well, "ear to the ground," I think is right.
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