| Photo by Jane Scherr |
Jennifer Sims Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
| Photo by Jane Scherr |
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Going back to your background and what you told us about your growing-up experiences and then your experiences of the sixties, I'm curious how you think through these conflicts, the ones you just described? On the one hand, a respect for our domestic institutions, our civil liberties and so on, and on the other hand, an understanding and a respect for our national security interests? Share with us a little about how your mind and emotions work in that process, because you seem to be on the horns of a dilemma, and you have both an understanding and sympathy of both sides.
I teach a course now at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on the art and practice of intelligence. I told my students the most important thing when you're dealing in the world of intelligence is integrity. Because while there is accountability built into the world of intelligence in the U.S. government, it isn't the kind of accountability you have in the very open aspects of public policy. A lot depends on a very deep and well-anchored sense of integrity and respect for the institutions and the taxpayers' interests. And then you have to make the call. We go to war on occasion because the American people feel threatened. The World Trade Center disaster is an example of the terrible pain that can be inflicted on this country if we don't do national security well. So national security can be extraordinarily important, and it makes you, on occasion, have to sit back.
I wasn't sure I could ever be comfortable with covert action before I got involved in the intelligence business. One of my jobs as coordinator of intelligence in the State Department was to be very involved in decisions related to covert action. I constantly had to try to make the very best decision I could, based on the fact that if I made a mistake, we could end up with a disaster hitting this country, if I tied the hands of the community too much. On the other hand, remembering my father's experience during the McCarthy era, and the Vietnam and Watergate period, how abuses of power can happen. To try and find my own center -- to constantly listen, to constantly be open-minded, but try to balance those two competing ideas. An enormous amount of pressure can be brought to bear for you to approve something.
I was sitting in a position where my signature was required for some things to happen, and I remember making some decisions about what my view was on those particular decisions. The pressure that was brought to bear on me to change my position was extraordinary. Until the point that the president decides, or in my case, the secretary of state decides, I realized that I had a choice for my career. If I wanted to make nice to a lot of people, I could bend my views and go with the flow, and just sort of grit my teeth and squint my eyes, and say, "Okay, this is awful, but I'm going to go ahead with it because everybody wants to do it, and it will cost me if I stand up and say no." But I came out of it with an enormous sense of self-confidence because I was able to hold my own -- I like to think that the majority of time -- with grace, even in the face of considerable fury. What happens when the president decides and it doesn't go your way? It's happened both [ways], in my case -- it's gone my way and it hasn't gone my way. In both cases you hope that the leadership structure will turn to you and say thank you, either way it turns out. It doesn't always come back and say thank you. And whether you can do it the second time is equally important as to whether you can do it the first time.
So integrity, a sense of who you are, who you're working for, and what's important is very important. That's why I really hope that good people go into the intelligence business. It really needs good people.
Before, when you were talking about the struggle between our institutions, you talked about a moving balance with regard to what was acceptable for the country to do. Is there a moving balance in an individual? In other words, do you think -- I'm sure you would retain your integrity if you were serving now in government after 9/11 -- but do you think that there has been a shift in the situation which wouldn't compromise your integrity, but would have you leaning more towards security than you were in the previous era?
Absolutely. I think that's an important part of integrity. It's not just that because you always thought this way in the past, you're going to continue to believe that and take the same position on into the future, just so that you can remain consistent. That's a false integrity. I believe integrity needs to be about living in the present instance, and restriking that balance every day, even it means saying, "You know, I was wrong a year ago. Now, I'm looking at it .... " Or, "I was right a year ago, but things have changed now, so I'm going to take an entirely new position." Don't force me to be consistent, because for me to be smart, I need to be constantly learning.
The "lessons learned" process is very important, not only for governmental institutions, but for the individuals that work in those institutions. They need to constantly be evaluating how they did in the last go-round, and come back and say, "Well, you know, I could have done that better." Or, "I did really well then, but things have changed, and more facts have rolled in, and that makes Joe's position over there a better position than the one I had at the last meeting." Sometimes it's hard to find people who are able to do that in government, because you make your reputation out of positions that you stake out at certain times. But the really good people, the really good people, are the ones that can do that.
That's why I thoroughly hope, as we move into this next period -- you know, we're going to be having intelligence hearings on 9/11, and was there a failure or not. There's a great debate over whether the timing of this is right, since we're still at war against the terrorists, and whether or not it should be a very deep study of what went wrong. I certainly hope that it's a thorough and careful look, not just, by the way, at the intelligence community or the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence], but at the entire process, including the appropriations process, the budget process, how resource decisions are made. Because I think lessons learned for individuals as well as for institutions is very, very important.
An important phase of your career was earlier before you served in the Clinton administration, when you worked for Senator Danforth and worked with the Senate Intelligence Committee. How did that congressional experience affect you and your understanding of embedding foreign policy in democratic structures like the legislature?
I spent, let's see, four years on the Hill. As I mentioned earlier, it confirmed for me a profound respect for our institutions. I was a political appointee in the Clinton administration and Jack Danforth is a Republican senator, I was a Republican staffer when I was on the Hill, and I grew up in a family that was very Democratic, as I mentioned earlier. I was very comfortable working for Jack Danforth because he never once asked me what my political views were when he hired me. He said, "I'm just looking for smart people, because I want the best advice possible." There are some senators like that, there are other senators and staff that are very politicized. But I learned a lot about, as they say, "how sausage is made" -- what goes into making our laws. I was both astonished and pleased at the complexity and the rigor, and my respect for the institution grew. But I was also shocked by how appropriations sometimes happen, the log-rolling -- "Well, if you fund my project, I'll fund somebody else's project." I sincerely hoped that didn't happen too much in the intelligence, because you don't want politics infecting the intelligence process too much. In fact, it didn't. I was pleased to see that. The staff director at the time was George Tenant, who is now Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and he ran a very careful ship. It wasn't that the politics was absent from the process of intelligence oversight, but it was rather that politics was recognized and that everybody was asked to rise above it. I think that's what you're still seeing with George Tenant. He's managed to survive in the Clinton administration and the Bush administration partly as a result.
I think that the process of appropriating money on the Hill and authorizing funds on the Hill needs to be revamped for the modern age. I think that Congress could do better at how it funds the Executive Branch. And I think the Executive Branch could do better at treating Congress as a partner in foreign policy and national security policy. The intelligence community and the Defense Department actually are way out ahead of the other Executive Branch agencies in the fluency with which they have dialogues with Congress. The State Department has dug its own hole, to a certain extent, it isn't so good at congressional relations. I'd like to see many more people who have had experience on the Hill come into the Executive Branch and vice versa, so that there is less of a confrontation between the branches and more of a working partnership, like the post-World War II period that we had in matters of national security policy. It's harder in domestic politics, but certainly when we're in the national security arena, there's a lot to be said for politics stopping at the water's edge.
As we find this moving balance, the term you used before, it would seem that as we find ourselves in a new situation, that, really, leadership and political education become vital elements in reconciling our past with where we are and where we have to go in the future.
That's true. The skills of leadership -- before I left government, actually before Bush was even elected, I got a briefing sheet that had been prepared by the current Secretary Colin Powell. As you know, he was working in the private sector. I think he was on the board of AOL and a number of other endeavors. In any case, he came up with a briefing on what makes for sound leadership. I made copies of it and distributed it to all of my staff because I thought it was so very important. It isn't just that you personally get it right, and that you personally hit that moving balance, it's how you help other people come along and reward them for their struggle to hit that balance, too. And that goes for whether you're secretary of state and you're looking down into the trenches, and how do you inspire your people to bring you bad news, to bring you the information you need to make the tough decisions. The last thing a true leader wants is for people to have figured out what he or she wants to hear, and then just bring them that. A good leader wants a multifaceted input. And it's hard. That is the mentoring that needs to go on in government among managers.
One final question requiring a brief answer. How should students prepare for the future, if they're interested in the kind of work you have done?
Learn to write. Learn to write concisely, convincingly, and coherently. It's extremely important. I've had a very good career, and it was based in large part on getting noticed for the memos that I wrote. Also, learn to speak effectively, and see if you can experiment with finding that center to establish what you think about issues and develop your integrity.
Jennifer, on that note, thank you very much for being with us today and talking about both your life and your interest and understanding of the world of intelligence.
Thank you for having me.
And thank you very much for joining us for this Conversation with History.
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