Franklin Pierce Huddle Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
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Before we talk about your role now as ambassador, when you first started in the Foreign Service you were a policy analyst, and the countries that you focused on were Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan -- quite a trio, given the turn of events in the world, especially most recently.
When I came in, I was getting my doctor's degree, and they offered me a job in Washington so I could finish my doctor's degree. It was a very good job. It was much more senior than I was, and Iran in those days was the big country. We had oil. We had a large, commercial relationship. We had a troubled relationship, in the sense that the shah was both our friend and a difficult ally. In Afghanistan, during the time I was there, we had a coup -- a series of coups. In Pakistan, we had a [coup against] Bhutto, who was convicted and hanged, eventually. So it was a rough ride. But I always think the most defining moment for me was [when] I was fairly green and I was an academic.
And this would have been what year? This would have been?
1975 to '77.
Okay.
I always remember, when I came in, my very first six-page paper up to Kissinger came back from one of his Assistant Secretaries, and he had a red pen, and he went like this: up and down for four-and-a-half pages and then drew a block arrow and said, "Start here." What they had done was taken out all of my explanation as to why Iran was going to fall apart.
I see. And this would have been several years before the shah actually fell, right?
Yeah, two years, yeah. I got a nasty letter from Richard Helms once, and the same thing.
Who was then the director of the CIA?
No, he was Ambassador to Iran.
Oh, okay.
But he had been, of course, director of CIA.
That's right.
He sent me a nasty letter: "Dear Dr. Huddle: I do not want to nitpick you as author of report 412. But I would like to know why you think Iran is unstable and likely to fall apart in 1978?" Unfortunately, the letter is classified confidential, so I can't show it to you on camera. But you can think of this as a virtual letter.
I see, I see. So what did you tell him? Can you tell us?
Well, I had a sense of humor in those days. I wrote out an answer: "Dear Ambassador Helms: Some idiot has written to me in your name and I thought you ought to know about it."
I see!
But then, I think it was Hal Saunders, who was the then Director of INR, sent back a note saying: "Very funny. Now, write the real answer."
What sorts of things were policymakers not understanding that you, as someone who was knowledgeable about the area, could see?
Let me start from now and work back. Right now, by and large, in the State Department, I find it very easy to work there, even as a former academic, because the decisions are reasonably, honestly arrived at, and people look at the facts and make a calculus as to which one will fit U.S. interest.
Iran was a real disappointment for someone at that time. I strongly felt that we, who were the analysts, were being told, "This is the answer you're supposed to get. Now work backwards and find facts that will shape that." A friend of mine who had been a Cambodia analyst had a similar thing. They would be told, "This is the final result. Now you have to cook up the reasons that will justify it." In Iran, that was the case, and we paid for it, because we made decisions based on bad intelligence.
Is that to say that today, presumably as a result of Vietnam and as a result of Iran, people who make policy in Washington are more open to academic and other kinds of insights, although they might not follow those insights to where they lead?
Yes, in some cases. For example, there are plenty of burning issues now that are controversial, from Iraq to whatever. But the fact of the matter is that the State Department, especially at senior level, listen to the different rationales for them, and they don't just turn off and say, "Don't bother me. The facts have already been made up in my mind." They actually do listen.
More importantly, in terms of something like Iran, we have built into our system a lot of provisions for dissent. Suppose I have a junior officer who says, "Ambassador Huddle, you've got it all wrong. This is what's really going to happen." He has the right to send a cable directly to the Secretary of State in the so-called "dissent channel," offering up his views. It's a bureaucratic thing. He starts by saying, "Ambassador, I disagree with you, and I'd like to send out this cable." If I don't want him to send it, he can then send it directly and it goes right to the Secretary of State.
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