| Jane Scherr photo |
Vitaly Naumkin Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
| Jane Scherr photo |
Page 4 of 5
Let's talk now a little about Iraq. You have studied Iraq; you've been there. You were, I believe, involved in negotiations at the time of the first Persian Gulf War and so on. What is the nature of that regime? What is the most important thing for an American audience that might not have all the facts before it to understand that regime?
I think it's a very specific regime, but if we go a little back, we can see that somewhere in the fifties and sixties, there were several movements in the Arab world that were supported by the majority of the Arabs. They were secular nationalists. The first one was Nasser, Nasserism. This ideology was supported by many people. And then there was Ba'athism, the Ba'athist doctrine, which was born in the end of the forties, maybe the first Arab real nationalist movement which was born [in Syria]. It was the second one. And then was the so-called Movement of Arab Nationalists. So these three movements were transnational Arab movements that were calling people to support the idea of the Arab state, Arab nation, and liberation.
Nasserism died, practically, and cannot be considered as a political force, but Ba'athists remained. Two Ba'athist regimes remained. The first one is the Iraqi regime; the second one is the Syrian regime, which is a Ba'athist regime, a secular regime.
We can hardly imagine that this regime can have good relations with radical Islamists, or even terrorist groups. So for me, the arguments for these connections are very flimsy, because Ba'athist and all Arab nationalists have been always considered by terrorists and radical extremist Islamic groups as the main enemies, because they were not allowing them to gain supporters, to win support of the Arabs within these countries.
The main war was between these two factions -- secular Arab nationalists and Islamists -- all over this history. [The Iraqi regime] was this sort of regime. Of course, it's a brutal regime. Of course, it's oppressing people. This regime deserves to be criticized, but at the same time, Saddam Hussein, when he started the war against Iran, was supported by many states, including the United States.
We have to recognize that Iraq was supported against Iran. You can say that it was the lesser of two evils in those days, as some people say. But still, many of my American colleagues who served in the administration say, "Yes, it was a mistake to support Saddam at the end of 1980s." But who knows, Saddam Hussein and this regime [may have] had some hints and illusions that they would be supported even if they invaded Kuwait.
The Iraqis -- at least the people, at least the intellectuals, not only Ba'athist -- think that they have legal rights to find ways to solve the conflict with Iran, because of the access to the Persian Gulf. They think the [Irani] regime, with the access through the river Shatt al Arab, is not fair to the Iraqis. They have the same scores with the Kuwaitis, whatever the government is. And Iraq will even if there is a new government. It will start by trying to [gain access], hopefully through negotiations, but it has legitimate security interests in solving the problem of the access to the Persian Gulf. It exists and it's acknowledged by all specialists and experts here and there.
In the sixties and seventies, the Iraqi regime made some positive changes in the country. There was some development, so a lot of people were satisfied with their position. I have met Iraqis traveling all over the world, like [low-level] officials and even schoolteachers who were having their vacations in Europe, buying cars, and just spending a couple of months traveling all over these countries. So we cannot say that everything was bad and everyone was oppressed.
Of course, almost all these regimes have a very bad record of human rights. Who has a good record on human rights in the Middle East? Who has a better record of democracy, for instance? If we are speaking about connections with this or that regime and extremists, look at, for instance, Pakistan. The Taliban are there. A lot of people from al Qaeda are in Pakistan. Pakistan illegally produced nuclear weapons. The government is not controlling a part of its territory. There are a lot of supporters of terrorist organizations within the government or governmental organizations, within the armed forces, and especially in intelligence, who have been involved in supporting the Taliban for many years. Many Pakistanis could be [involved].
I think it's very important for all of us to concentrate, because we're all partners in an anti-terrorist coalition and this global war against terror. The main target is international terrorism, and in this target, there are places where still the terrorists can find a safe haven. I heard from some of the commentators from the TV channels here that there are still al Qaeda supporters in the United States! I don't think that in Iraq we can see a fertile ground for supporting international terrorists. It's a secular regime. It has a bad score, very bad from the point of view of human rights. But this regime wants to survive, to stay in power, and there is still some very slim opportunity to engage it and to reckon with it, on the basis of complying with all the resolutions of the United Nations.
So you would argue that the arguments about the danger of weapons of mass destruction, the dangers of links to terrorism, need to be weighed in the context of what else is going on in the region. I would guess that the administration would argue that Iraq has crossed the line. I mean, sure, there are [other] human rights violators in the region, but no one has used chemical weapons against its own population as the Iraqis did against the Kurds. And no one, -- Pakistan aside, because I think your point is well taken there -- has apparently as aggressively moved to obtain weapons of mass destruction.
India.
India, yeah. Not an Arab country, but okay.
I guess the thrust of your argument calls into question the notion that it's necessary to intervene in Iraq, as opposed to somewhere else; but also embedded in the [Bush] administration's policy is the notion that Iraq can become a platform from which the whole region can be democratized. You don't believe that, do you?
Hopefully, it can happen and we'll be all glad if everybody is democratized in this world. But the question is whether you are able to do it by military force, and what is the cost of this behavior, of this action? The results can be contrary to what you are expecting. Your agenda is democratization, but it might lead to chaos in this country and all over the Islamic world. There is also a score-settling risk, because the country is highly fragmented. It's inhabited by Arabs, Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, everybody, and a lot of factions that have hated each other for many years.
The country is ruled by a Sunni minority; the country is ruled by a Ba'athist party. But it is a mistake to imagine that there is only a regime of one dictator. There is a deep-rooted regime with many people who are supporting this guy, who are members of his party, who are officers of the army and the security apparatus. What are you going to do with all these people? There will be a lot of revenge. A lot of people will be ready to have the same privileges as their people had. And there will be a lot of blood in this country. So are you going to engage these people? What is your agenda? Until now, I haven't heard anything. I'm not sure whether anybody has any clear vision about who the new people are going to be. Now, there will be very old scores settled in this country.
Also, the change in the very fragile balance of power in this country can lead into some very severe conflicts between Turks and Iraqis or Turks and Kurds. The involvement of Turkey is very dangerous, not a very easy way. Without Turkey, you cannot do anything, but with Turkey, it also creates new risks. I think the measure of the level of threat, of course, is exaggerated. Saddam Hussein cannot represent a major threat to anyone, even if he has several missiles that exceed the six-mile range which has been proscribed by the [Security Council] resolution.
For the last eleven years, Saddam hasn't done anything as a terrorist. The Iraqis were not resorting to terrorism. It's also surprising. He is doing a lot of bad things, but he is not an international terrorist. And he has, in my view, no clear links with anybody else. Even if there are remnants of weaponry, is it easier for the Islamic terrorists to have access to these remnants [than to] to the Pakistani weapons, for instance? Or chemical weapons that are available in many, many states of the region?
We know that a lot of states were experimenting in the field of chemical weapons and biological weapons. Simply, we don't know what companies from Europe helped Iraq. There are rumors that, maybe, in Egypt, they tried to do that. Maybe in some North African states, maybe in some South Asian states -- we don't know. There are a lot of opportunities to trade a dirty bomb, to use nuclear waste, which is buried even in Central Asia. So who knows where the terrorists are going to be?
We have to concentrate on this target, not to allow them to do whatever they can do. But the Bolshevik-type idea of creating Iraq into a platform of democratization by imposing internal conflict is not a very good idea.
Next page: Conclusion
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