| Photo by Jane Scherr |
Ruan Zongze Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
| Photo by Jane Scherr |
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The world was changed by 9/11. It affected the U.S., obviously, very greatly, because it was an attack on our homeland. How have those events affected U.S. - China relations?
Well, it has affected the relations. When Bush took office in the White House, it seemed that he pursued a policy called ABC -- that's "Anything but Clinton." He wanted to distance himself from what the previous government had done with China. So he looked at China as a strategic competitor rather than strategic partner. Of course, this was very irritating for China. Later on, there were a couple of things that happened to put Sino-U.S. relations into a real low -- that is, airplanes and the Taiwan sales and large quantities of weapons to Taiwan.
But the September 11 incident made the United States realize that the real threat to the security of the United States is from those terrorist groups, which are globalized. This new form of terror, a new form of a security threat, is quite different. In the past, you might have a designated country which could be a security threat, but now, you cannot say a certain country is a threat, but [instead] a terrorist group is. Individuals can make a huge attack, such as September 11th.
The impact [on Sino-U.S. relations] is rather positive, I would say, because the threat perception has somewhat changed. Both America and China realize they can cooperate to fight this terrorism; China and the United States have a common interest to fight it. So September 11, on one hand, united Americans, and on the other, it united other countries with the Americans to stand shoulder-to-shoulder to fight this terrorism threat.
Did those events and the resulting changes in American policy affect the dynamic in the debate in China about its relations with the United States?
A very interesting question, and a very important one, actually. There is a debate, as I said before, in China [about] how China would cope with the change of American foreign policy. Basically, there are two views. One is that the positive change in the current Sino-U.S. relations will last for years to come, because the terrorism threat as an enemy, a common enemy, you cannot just rule out it overnight. It may take years to tackle that issue. The other view is that probably once America changed its policy towards China or [made] any adjustment in its policy towards China, it may be tactical to hold that view because it seems America has a more immediate threat: that is, a terrorism threat. Once the terrorism threat is done, they may someday turn on China. So, you can see the difference. This is the debate in China.
I find it's also very interesting here in the States, you have a debate [about] its policy towards China as well. Basically, I can put the debate into two schools: One is that the United States does share a vast, vast common interest with China -- terrorism, and how to deal with the nuclear crises on the Korean peninsula. But on the other hand, there are still some people who say, "Well, China may pose a real threat in the long term." This is something they call "offensive realism." They uphold this view.
John Mearsheimer.
Yes, the "tragedy of great power politics." So this is another view to look at. But my point of view is that now we have a chance to work together, and this chance [...unintelligible...] away in the last couple of years. But we should not take it for granted. We must work very hard to grab the chance, to realize this chance. That is to say, we have many other issues to [encourage us to] cooperate. Cooperation can increase the mutual chance between our two countries. Cooperation in fighting terrorism, cooperation to tackle those issues on globalization, environment, and, more immediately, cooperation on the Korean peninsula, how to solve the issue there. So this provides good opportunities for us to work together. Along this process, we can build up or cultivate our mutual trust. That is very important.
So if parties on both sides -- that is, on the Chinese side and the American side -- want to further the cooperative way of engaging with the other party, then the key is success in particular issues. That if we work together on Issue A, then there is a hope that a body of trust will be built up, so that on Issue B the opportunities for resolving the issue increase.
Of course, hopefully, we can be successful in every instance. But in reality, sometimes you can't just stick with that. But I think the process of cooperation is equally important.
We know in the United States that ideological perceptions of the other can limit the openness to change. This is a comment about the United States that I presume is an issue that one finds in other countries, even your country. That, in other words, this debate of ideas is the key to moving beyond whatever ideological blinders keep us from defining a new way of approaching each other.
Well, probably I look at it in different ways. In China, Deng Xiaoping has a saying, called the "cat theory": no matter if it's a white cat or a black cat, as long as it can catch a mouse, that is very important. So we no longer have to debate so much about ideology or something like that. We try to be sure of that. We've become more realistic. Debating on those sorts of things, from Deng Xiaoping's perspective, is time-consuming, and through this process, you're just debating. So we could lose a chance. That is a problem. We can debate it later, but first of all, we should concentrate our energy and mind to do this work [of cooperating where we can].
Now the big problem after 9/11 -- the big mouse, but it wasn't a mouse, it's a rat -- is what you were talking about earlier, mainly that terrorist groups that are not states will get a hold of weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration has made the argument that that requires preemption on our part, as a way to deal with the issue, whether or not we get the cooperation of the international community through the UN. What is your analysis of the pluses and the minuses -- and maybe there are no pluses -- to the doctrine of preemption? What are the costs for the international system?
It is a very important issue. Currently, you can see to some extent, it dominates international politics, particularly with the Iraq war. In my point of view, there is some rationale behind the preemption doctrine. I can understand, because the threat is no longer the same as it used to be. You can't just fight back as they attack you. So there is lots of rationale. But the problem is, who can make the judgment? And how about the mandate? And, also, if presumably such a doctrine is also applied by other countries, how will this world system, this world order, be? Shall we return back to the state of people as "everybody fights everybody"? We should attach great importance to how it may trigger a chain reaction from other sides.
So what you're saying is that you can understand the thinking behind the doctrine, but you fault it for its [lack of] understanding of the long-term implications, the chain reaction of other states adopting a similar policy.
It also puts pressure on the current international system. Because using preemption, ultimately, means you can use force to attack somebody else. That is a huge problem. I mean, a very, very big problem. There are some boundaries, according to the United Nations and according to international relations, the principal norms, and so on. So it is a very big issue to tackle.
What I want to say is that though there is some rationale behind it, I don't think it will be a good idea to pursue it, because the long-term chain reaction and the probable chaos it can cause to the international system might cost much more than it pays.
When one brings all of this together, a major case study both for Chinese-American cooperation for dealing with rogue states, for dealing with the issue of terrorism, is North Korea. There are no quick fixes that one can see on the horizon. How can we build on our discussion and ask what a process of dealing with the North Korean issue looks like, where both the United States and China are participating? One has a competition of ideas within China, within the United States, and then a dialogue between the two countries. What are your thoughts on what progress would look like in Chinese-American cooperation in dealing with the problem of North Korea?
It's very important, in my point of view. As you know, early this year, China hosted the three-party talks between China, the United States, and the DPRK, and last month, in August, we had the six-party talk. Many observers of Chinese foreign policy noted that China took a very real initiative with these matters. China just cannot afford to see any conflicts in the Korean peninsula. We want to say that we have close relations with, on the one hand, America, South Korea, and Japan. On the other hand, we also have good relations with the DPRK. To solve this problem -- I agree with you -- there's no quick fix on the horizon. But we must do something.
The six-party talk concluded by signed agreements that are very, very important for the future. For example, the first agreement is: There should be a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. That's strongly endorsed by every [party to the agreement], including DPRK themselves. Secondly, such a process, a non-nuclearization process, must be handled through dialogue and negotiation. Thirdly, these two processes must be pursued simultaneously or in a synchronized way. I think the problem between DPRK and the United States is that they don't have even a minimum of mutual trust. They don't have any trust. DPRK never trusted the United States, and the United States never trusted DPRK.
So I think the synchronized way of taking a step can build up the mutual trust, which is necessary if you want to have a tangible result in the future. So it is a very firm issue, very daunting issue, but we have to work hard for it. Happily, they also reached an agreement, in principle, that these six-party talks will resume in about two months. Probably in October they will hold another round of talks. As long as we can talk, as long as we can negotiate, I'm confident that we can finally find a way out.
One of the Bush administration concerns is not giving aid, or resources -- I'm not talking about military resources -- to a [one-]party state like North Korea before they have actually acted positively [to move toward democracy]. So there's a chicken and egg problem, in the sense of, "Who moves first?" -- in order to indicate that you're moving down that road of building trust. North Korea, if one believes what one reads about that country, has a particular style and way of operating that is beyond ideology and is one in which the leadership's rationality and its relations with its own people must be questioned. This is overwhelming; how do you act in that context? It strikes me as a very difficult situation where these words about building up trust and so on are hard to pin down.
Yes, it is very difficult; it's a hard nut to crack. But I think what we have done already gives us some signal that we can be more creative to tackle the issue. Let me give you an example. Before the six-party talk or three-party talk, the American view was that they wanted a multilateral talk and that the DPRK didn't want the bilateral. But from the DPRK's perspective, they didn't want the multilateral talk, they just wanted to talk to the United States. But what happened? We have the three-party talk and a six-party talk, and it seems it's a framework, a multilateral framework. But under this multilateral framework, the United States and the DPRK did have their bilateral talk, for about thirty-five or forty minutes. So that was a creative arrangement.
It refers back to your question about who moves first. One of the important points in the agreements reached in the six-party talk last month in Beijing is that they should move in a synchronized way -- I mean, simultaneously. You cannot just say, "You move first, then I will do this. You do that; I do this." So probably it will be better for them to take, at the beginning, very small steps, and simultaneously, in order to show that they have to build up their political or mutual trust, because DPRK and America didn't have any mutual trust. That is a big obstacle to solving the issue. In order to solve the issue, they need to build up some trust, so they can move a little bit simultaneously.
The other parties, I mean the other four, can play a role to monitor this process somewhat.
Ultimately, the Korean peninsula issue must be solved between the United States and the DPRK. The other parts, including China, will do whatever we can to be helpful in any settlements for this. But both DPRK and America, they are the ultimate two sides to solve this issue.
As you were speaking, I thought back to what we were talking earlier about Iraq. It seems that what is emerging here is the idea that the bilateral context has to interface with the multilateral context. It may not be one or the other. It may be finding the appropriate moment in diplomatic time for using one or the other, but they have to interface. They have to connect; the bilateral part cannot reject the multilateral part. It just struck me that there seemed to be a similarity in those two ways.
Another issue that is very important for U.S. - China relations is the issue of Taiwan, and I want to approach it from a different perspective -- more from a theoretical notion of international relations, because the issue of Taiwan and of Hong Kong, and even of Palestine, may have similarities. We need to think of new forms and new formulas for dealing with a problem which recognize the interest of the parties concerned, but which protect all the interests. The solution to Hong Kong is one example of a case where Chinese sovereignty was restored but with some respect for the way Hong Kong had evolved over time. Would you comment on that? Or am I throwing too much at you at one time?
Well, for Hong Kong, we practice "one-country two systems." Actually, these principles were first proposed by Deng Xiaoping to solve the Taiwan issue. Hong Kong became the first [test case]. For the Taiwan issue ... I have never been to Taiwan. What I know is the inter-actor sources and information from that. The two sides really need more interactions, more understanding. That's very important.
That is, China and Taiwan and ...
Taiwan and the United States, now China and [the United States]. Both sides across the straits. A large number of Taiwanese now are doing business in China, and a limited number of people from the mainland can visit Taiwan. These are very conducive to their mutual understanding. In the future, the Taiwan issue ... Well, I don't know how long [it will take to] solve the issue. But from my point of view, as long as we can increase the mutual understanding, that's very important. Both the people on both sides can contribute to the final solution of this issue. A people-to-people exchange context plays an extremely important role for that.
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