Pierre Schori Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
Page 3 of 9
Talk a little about this relationship with Europe, because Sweden did become a member of the European Union, and its tradition seemed to be so distinctive, working with others, but carving out a unique role. Was that a difficult choice for Sweden to join the Union?
Yes, it was.
The reason why you heard of Sweden in international affairs during the Cold War was that we were nonaligned, militarily nonaligned. Not ideologically; we were part of the Western civilization. But military nonaligned. And that, in combination with a person like Palme, who used the word and the tribune to get his ideas out at home and aboard, gave Sweden a certain [place] in the spotlight, because we spoke out more than others did. We were not confined by NATO solidarity, the lowest common denominator. We could speak out against human rights violations. We could speak out against the Franco dictatorship and Salazar dictatorship, when it was not appropriate to do it in the European setting. Everything was geared towards the communists. But we could speak out against the communists, too, against the war in Vietnam, against the war in Afghanistan, and so on. That is very important.
The European Union, when the debate came, we felt a bit out of it, because the EC, before the European Union, when it was the EC, was so much linked to NATO. So there was a reluctance to join in. But Palme saw that there was a new time coming up, and he was prepared to join Europe, and take a risk. But Swedish public opinion, especially women, I would say, most women who work (and 85 percent of them do in Sweden), work in the public sector. There's a feeling that if you join Catholic Europe -- which is not true, but this was the perception -- then that would hit your social welfare system. You would have to harmonize taxation, and then cut down taxes and so on. So there was this reluctance.
Palme was for joining the European Union, the EC at the time, to be a member of a wider Europe; it was a matter of solidarity and for the future. We joined in 1995, but there was an opinion against up to very last month, and it was turned around and we got 51 percent for joining in the referendum, only because of an active leadership role by Palme's successor, Ingvar Carlsson.
For a brief period you were a legislator in the European Parliament. How did that differ from your role as a parliamentarian within Sweden? Was there a difference?
It's on a different level. We still believe in Europe that national parliaments have the basic role, but some of the issues we coordinate and harmonize. The European Parliament is unique in the sense that they had fifteen nations, 626 representatives from fifteen nations, with 626 different temperaments, I tell you. We were talking and debating the future of Europe every day, which makes Brussels a unique place. It's the only place where you actually discuss Europe's future every day in this international context. So you create a common citizenship, although, it's based on parties: You have one socialist group, with Social Democrats and socialists from all over Europe, fifteen and now there will be twenty-five the first of May; and you have a conservative block, including Christian Democrats.
It's the embryo to European parties, really. The difference is in national parliaments you create real law. In the European Parliament, you are the democratic watchdog over the Commission and the European Council, the ministers. You have two prime responsibilities and duties there: you are the body that accepts or rejects new members (important for Turkey, for instance); and you're also the one who in the end approves the whole budget. There are times when the Parliament can block the whole function of the European Union and the Commission by not accepting a budget, or wanting to negotiate a shift or redistribution.
Is there a case where the European consensus and being part of the European Union has led to a change in Swedish foreign policy, or have you been able to maintain this tradition that we've been talking about?
Not changing our basic tenets, but of course, it's a shift. A shift in the sense that we are not so visible individually anymore, we are part of a club, of a union, where you try to get a common foreign security policy, which has been rather successful up to Iraq. Iraq split us. But on the questions like the Middle East, on foreign aid, environment, and so on, you have developed a European common position on the issues. Within that, you argue, of course, before you come to a common position. You can say that a country like Sweden, which has been very active and vociferous before, and articulate, its specific weight [has been] lowered, so to say. But it became stronger and heavier, anyway, because it then spoke on behalf, or together, with now the fifteen and [soon] the twenty-five.
When I used to travel around the world before Sweden joined the Union, I noticed that we were very appreciated, because we have a big foreign aid budget. But they always said, "Thank you very much, and let's do this and that together. But could you please also talk to your European friends in Brussels?" When I was a minister for the International Development Corporation, and came down, also, as part of the European Union, Sweden carried a lot of weight. You were always received by presidents and so on. So Sweden's profile gets lower, but Sweden carries more weight [within the larger entity].
Next page: The Post - 9/11 World
© Copyright 2004, Regents of the University of California