Pierre Schori Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
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How do you evaluate the UN's performance in the buildup to the Iraq War? It seems to have done its job very well, in the sense of moving on weapons of mass destruction, bringing in your fellow Swede, Hans Blix, to run the operation. But in the end, the UN lost out in terms of leading the way to a peaceful resolution, not because of a fault of its own. There seems to have been a vigorous debate, a vigorous mechanism for continuing the process so there wouldn't be war, but then it all fell apart. Give us your analysis.
I followed it very closely all the time, because although we were not members of the Security Council, at the weekly EU ambassadorial meeting we analyzed it in full, and the other EU members who are on the Security Council are obliged by EU rules to inform and consult with us.
We had not exhausted the peaceful, diplomatic way. The inspections went on, they started to destroy some rocket missiles, as you remember. They couldn't find the real things, but put very concrete questions to the Iraqis all the time. Blix, in his last statement there, asked for another three months, and he didn't get it. Instead, we got a show at the UN, saying there is this and that, and mobile laboratories and whatever, which was misleading.
I'm not sure what would have happened after three more months. If Blix had said there are weapons of mass destruction, that's one thing. If he said, "We haven't found it; give us more time...." These were very effective, and the previous mission, UNSCOM, had destroyed a lot, a lot more than was destroyed during the Gulf War. So we don't know what would have happened with the UN, but the Security Council, the majority, did absolutely the right thing to resist giving authorization to a war when there was no need for it, at the time when we had not exhausted all other methods, when there was no imminent threat.
It was a setback for the UN, as such, of course, but it was not a defeat. It was, I think, others who should take that blame.
As a person who must have thought a lot in your various roles in Sweden about the U.S. and the world, what do you make of the "High Noon," go-it-alone strategy of this administration? When and how do you think the U.S. will, if it will, move back into working with the international community, which has been the tradition of all administrations since the end of World War II?
I came in 2000 to the UN as ambassador, my first ambassadorial post, almost at the age of 60, because this is the only place where I would want to be an ambassador. I love New York, and for me, the United States, ever since I was a young sailor here at the age of fourteen -- I came to Oakland, by the way, and San Diego --
Fourteen?!
Fourteen, to San Diego. A mess-boy. I was [captivated] by jazz, by comics, by Steinbeck, Holden Caulfield, whatever, and films. So this was [true] for so many Europeans, and Sweden was the most Americanized society in Europe, they used to say. American companies tested all their new products there for the European market.
Coming here was, of course, the same feeling. I have this in my bones, like so many Europeans have. [Since] the Vietnam War, okay, we have the contrast. These were under specific circumstances. Coming here now, [I have] a lot of enthusiasm.
Iraq has changed so much, and we wonder in Europe, is this an aberration? Will it happen again, or is this just a one-time thing? The politics of today seem to be a mélange, a mixture of political conservatism and religious conservatism, which have come together. We haven't seen that before, and it's something we look at with apprehension because we don't recognize it. It's not the United States that we used to know, so to say. This does not mean that we're anti-American; we are very pro-American, and we want to be partners for all the global challenges we have. We need a United States inside the United Nations, and we need to work together.
Do you see forces in the United States that might tilt us back to this working with the UN that existed in the past?
Yes, I'm sure, but of course, 9/11 is such a unique thing, such a dramatic thing. A lot of people support the Iraq policy out of goodwill, or rather, [because] they think it's the [right] thing. But the debate is very strong here, very lively, and the other America is still there.
How does this European caucus within the UN contribute to a common understanding of the United States, and a common understanding of where Europe wants to go in the UN?
Here at the UN, there's a pretty good understanding, because we live here, we mingle with, interact with, our American colleagues. But what struck me when I was in the European Parliament, and also in the Swedish Parliament, is the lack of contact, and so many prejudices and lack of knowledge about the United States. I found that also in Washington, perhaps even more, prejudices, lack of knowledge and information and context. I took the initiative two years ago to set up a seminar in Brussels with American opinion-makers to meet with the European Parliament, and that was very, very good. But then the Iraq War came.
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