Galia Golan Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
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Let's talk now about the U.S. - Israeli relationship, because at several times in this interview you have commented on aspects of that relationship that have had consequences for what Israel is and the way it acts in the world. You mentioned globalization. Globalization is an American phenomenon. You mentioned negotiations with principals in the region that Israel been has prevented from doing -- because it seems that the Middle East is very fragmented and for a small country like Israel, there's great strength in being able to play local actors against each other. And you suggested that maybe we should move towards Syria, but the U.S. is preventing it. What is your overall view? It sounds to me like you're saying that there are real negative aspects -- obviously there are positive aspects, but there are real negative aspects to this relationship as it affects Israel.
We needed the United States, I am convinced, during the Cold War. The restraining factor -- and I mentioned before, the Soviets were restraining the Arab states because of American support for Israel. I do believe it was vital to Israel during the Cold War. I think American support is important, very important for Israel, but I'd prefer to see it in the form that we saw during the Clinton administration, as support that was designed to bring about a settlement, to become involved, to try to bring the sides together. In that sense, I think it was extremely positive, even under the first Bush administration, when James Baker got angry and said, "You guys want to continue to build settlements, then do it without our aid," so to speak. In that sense, from my point of view, it was positive. It's not that I want to see a boycott on Israel but there was a positive role because Israel is dependent upon the United States.
But because Israel is dependent upon the United States, when you get a president like Bush then you're not exactly using American pressure in the right direction, and I think it can be very negative. The truth is that today the United States is the only superpower, and while the Europeans are very helpful and they pour a good deal of money into the region and they have good will, they're not a force, they're not a power. It's the Americans, and the Americans could, if they wanted to, bring us together. They could. They could bring Israel and the Palestinians together, they could force us to talk to each other again. They could force us. And certainly, they could release us to talk with the Syrians.
It's not all black and white. It depends on who's in the White House and how they want to use that power. This is true of all countries, and certainly the little countries. It's not just Israel that's dependent upon the United States. But again, it's a question of how the United States uses that power. Today we have a very weak prime minister, a very weak prime minister, and so he's all the more dependent upon the United States. I can understand that situation, but I would certainly prefer to see what I said earlier, some kind of package deal where maybe even somebody like Bush could say for pragmatic reasons to try to do a "Libya" with Syria, make an agreement between the United States and Syria that could be used by this administration, which of course would be in our interest. I don't see Bush going in that direction, but that's the direction I would want him to go. So part of our task is to try to influence Washington in the direction of ...
You mean Israel's [task] ...
A peace movement -- [the task] of a peace movement with a very strong counterpart in the United States -- Americans for Peace Now -- whose major task is to try to persuade Washington to press for peace, not to permit Israel to continue building settlements. How you do that can be very subtle, but it's in Israel's interest to reach peace, and therefore we feel it's clearly a pro-Israeli policy to push for peace. America could do that, but instead what it's doing is unfortunately just the opposite.
As you know, Professor Mearsheimer from Chicago and Professor Walt from Harvard have provoked a debate about the influence of the Israeli lobby on U.S. foreign policy. How does that debate and the direction it may or may not take affect relations with Israel and the peace movement in Israel?
AIPAC, the Israeli lobby in Washington, is very strong. In that article they exaggerate; I don't think that all of American policy, even all of American policy in the Middle East, is controlled by the Israel lobby. Certainly the involvement with Iraq is an American-determined policy, and we can go back in history where America had interests in Egypt, Jordan certainly, and Iraq for many years, that were not easily accommodated by its relationship with Israel, and there were times when it was very rough. The Israeli - American relationship was rough as the United States was pursuing its own interests in Egypt or in Saudi Arabia, or what have you, so that I don't think that the interest in Israel or the Jewish lobby determined American policy. I think that basically what it tried to do was to make sure that whatever America was doing on this other level with the Arab states would not be harmful to Israel.
Having said that, I do think that American policy regarding the Arab - Israeli conflict is very much influenced by AIPAC, very much so, and at times even at odds with the Israeli government. When Rabin was prime minister, both times but certainly the second time and the whole Oslo process, AIPAC was out of step. AIPAC was still supporting a right-wing position and basically a position that was not in Israel's interests and was not in the interest of the government of Israel at that time.
They have a good deal of influence. Their influence, of course, is mainly in Congress, less so the White House, in my opinion, because you have well-to-do Jewish constituents, important Jewish constituents and that's how AIPAC works. Other groups such as Americans for Peace Now, the Israel Policy Forum, these other peace-oriented American Jewish organizations, have greater influence, I would think, amongst Democrats in America, the progressive public in America, but they're not the establishment. They're not your elected or selected Jewish professionals, as they're called, and so their influence is less.
But I think bottom line, it's an exaggeration, and unfair to say that American policy towards Iran, or American policy towards Iraq, or the war in Iraq, and all of this, is because of America's support for Israel. I do not think that's the case at all. America (and Bush apparently) has its own interests. Some of them coincide with Israel's interest and some of them clearly do not.
What is on the horizon for Israel with regard to Iran? How much of a threat is Iran, and do the U.S. and Israel have common interests in meeting that threat?
I find that a very hard question to answer. Until the present leadership in Iran, until Ahmadinejad was elected, I did not think Iran was a threat. I thought Iran was going in the direction of greater and greater pragmatism, the thinking was that Rafsanjani would be re-elected, had been president before, that he might come back, and that his was a policy that was moving, in fact, towards reconciliation. Their stated position prior to Ahmadinejad had been that any agreement worked out between Israel and the Palestinians would be acceptable to them, which was fine. That meant Iran was not a threat to us.
I always felt that Iran was a threat mainly to the Gulf states, wanting to be a power in the Gulf. Ahmadinejad is a different ball game and he is scary, he really is. He makes statements that are unbelievable about destroying Israel, Israel should be taken off the map, and so forth. There's no denying these statements, and so it is a scary phenomenon, and I can frankly only hope that he won't stay in power too long. He's not alone. Clearly, he has the support of the mullahs, this is how it works, but nonetheless they are permitting him to say these things and he's clearly set the country on a course of conflict rather than conciliation.
In this area are the U.S. and Israel's interests such that they can take a common path toward dealing with Iran?
I don't know. I'm somebody who's always believed that the way to go with enemies is engagement and not confrontation. I believed that with the Soviet Union, I think it's the case with Hamas, for example, and I think it's the case with Iran. I think that engagement would be a lot smarter than confrontation but I don't see anybody taking that path. I certainly am hopeful that the United States doesn't decide to take a crazy position, that is, to attack Iran, which I think would be absurd. We would be the victims, because any response to the United States would be on us. I can only hope that the Americans will not go in that direction.
I don't think Israel wants it to go in that direction. I'm not sure exactly what the government thinks America or the international community should do. The hope is that it can somehow stop the nuclear development there. So, I'd say yes, these is a mutual interest, but the way in which you pursue that might be very different. I'm not sure today there's anything Israel can do about Iran. That's my feeling. If it were possible to open a dialogue -- which is totally impossible, the Iranians are not interested and if Americans aren't permitting dialogue with Syria they're certainly not going to permit it with Iran. So, it isn't even an option at the moment, but that would be the way to go.
Galia, on that note I want to thank you very much for being here today and taking the time to give us your perspectives on Israel, Israel's relations with the United States, and its strategic position. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
And thank you very much for joining us for this Conversation with History.
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