Escaping the "War on Terror" Trap

You in this work are helping us understand the trap we're in. What are the key ingredients of getting out of the trap? Obviously, seeing that you're in a trap.

That's the first thing. Know your enemy. It's natural for readers to think that I myself am part of this vast War on Terror. "Isn't he getting a book published as a result of the War on Terror?" The answer is yes. The only justification for this work is if it exposes the limits of it.

Just as a hurricane or cyclone has a starting point, so it also doesn't last forever. Tornados dissipate and so will the War on Terror, eventually. But meanwhile there are major, major problems. For example, we have heard talk about a war in Iran, and even [the] mention of tactical nuclear weapons. We are told neither terrorists nor a terrorist state may be allowed to get hold of [such weapons]. In this way War on Terror rhetoric is joined to the Axis of Evil. This combination is occurring at a time when a new war may be the only hope this administration has of saving itself politically. In that context, one can say that the War on Terror is protecting itself, because it can see it needs an enemy and it does not have one. How striking it is! We're supposedly fighting a war to protect the homeland and the enemy hasn't fired a shot inside the United States.

After 9/11.

After 9/11. But if we attack Iran -- and the same people who ramped up to the war in Iraq are ramping up for the war in Iran. Reuel Marc Gerecht, a member of the cabal, writing in the Weekly Standard [said], "Not only do we have to bomb Iran to stop the nukes, we're going to have to invade afterward." Well, that is going to produce a real wave of terrorism against the United States, because unlike Iraq, Iran really is capable and ready, and demonstrably ready, in league with Hezbollah, to attack American targets. So, if we do get that wave of attacks, the War on Terror could [continue] for decades.

I'm still at a loss to understand the mechanism that might turn this around. In the book, you point out that, for example, in the bureaucracy people get caught up in this vortex not only because it becomes part of the mission of the agency but also to cover themselves, to not be the one who can be seen to be responsible for an attack like 9/11.

Well, you used the metaphor of the emperor has no clothes, and that's a perfectly valid metaphor. If everyone were describing the gorgeous gowns the emperor was wearing, and then the emperor himself says. "Well, as a matter of fact, I'm not wearing any pants," one part of the costume is acknowledged to be not there, [so] the rest may be able to be said to be not there.

When the United States changes leadership and the Iraq war is named officially as what it actually is, which is a gigantic catastrophe that needs to be ended as soon as possible, and as responsibly as possible, but it was a catastrophe, a misconception from the get-go, once that is said, other people will be able to say, "And as a matter of fact, the entire War on Terror as it was portrayed in order to justify it is also false." If it can be politically possible to say that, that's going to be crucial in turning this around, in shortening the time that it'll take for this to exhaust itself.

I have in the book a quote from a leading official in charge of helping the community of scientists to become involved in the War on Terror, and to change their research, and to apply for grants. I asked this person in front of an audience in 2004 to place the War on Terror on a continuum of seriousness. "If the Manhattan Project were a 10 on a scale of 1 to 10, in which the government knew the Nazis were trying to get a bomb and we wanted to give the scientific community all the resources it needed to solve that problem. That's a 10 -- a super-serious, absolutely real problem and treated seriously by the government as such. On on the other side of the continuum is a 1, where the problem said to exist doesn't exist at all, though it's politically super-convenient to say so -- in other words, 'wag the dog.' In that case there is a war said to be going on when there really is no war." So I asked, on this continuum, where is the War on Terror?" This is a person responsible for helping get people involved in it. "On a scale of 1 to 10, is it near the Manhattan Project or Wag the Dog?" He said, "I can't answer that in public." I asked him in private and he said, "Somewhere between 1 and 1.5." So, it's not as if inside the government what I'm saying is not known, it is just that no one in the bureaucracy can say that publicly. Fighting the War on Terror is now the criterion by which every department has to get more funds, by saying it's important for the War on Terror. And we saw with Katrina, and we saw with the Iraq war, how the top echelons can cook evidence and twist organizations and bureaucracies so that even professionals who have their hearts and their heads in the right places cannot push the country in the right direction.

One part of the War on Terror has been the fear that weapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of terrorists. Talk about that, because that is a problem but it is magnified all out of proportion.

Right. In the book I said, "Let's look straight at the worst possible fear, which is terrorists get hold of nuclear weapons." Immediately the thought is, we have to protect our shores. Well, protecting our shores is almost impossible. It just gives the War on Terror fodder by being able to portray any policy as stupid. If you want to smuggle a nuclear weapon in the United States, do it in a bale of marijuana. I mean, there are just so many ways to get it in. Plus, you don't even have to get it in. Just explode it in a ship off shore.

But there are ways to prevent that. The bottlenecks in that process are not making or delivering the weapon -- it's getting hold of the ingredients, making sure that the people who could put it together don't get the enriched fuel. And at that, in a variety of ways, our government is doing a good job -- undercover, law enforcement, and intelligence -- preventing that from happening. But let's say that there is an attack, and I would say there will be terrorist attacks. Whether they'll be nuclear or not, I certainly hope not, but if they are, probably the first ones will be duds, Or] it'll be small radiological bomb, something like that.

The main problem will, again, not be the damage done. Studies done by the Department of Homeland Security [examine] what such a weapon do to the country. Certainly a nuclear device, as opposed to a radiological device, would kill or blind tens of thousands of people, make a very large area for a while unusable, but the country would survive and we would go on. The difficulty is what would we do in response, just as what really hurt us was not 9/11 but our response to 9/11. What would be our unthinking response? Would we retaliate in a way that would make the world uninhabitable for Americans for a century? What would we do? We need to think now about that, to make sure we have a discussion over what the appropriate responses are so that we don't allow whatever group is in power to capture the moment and harness it to its own nutty ambitions, which is what occurred with 9/11.

One final question. I think what you're saying is that you have to have insight, which your book is offering, and you're also, suggesting that there is a possibility for turning the tide as the catastrophe in Iraq becomes apparent ...

Essentially you have to have a change of administration.

But also, implicit in what you're saying is the political courage of the opposition to embrace ideas like yours and to go to the bully pulpit.

Right. But unfortunately, according to my argument, we should not find very many people with that kind of courage. The entire American political system militates against that kind of thing. Instead we should see Democrats rallying around slogans that say, "We will fight the War on Terror even better! Look at the stupid things the Republicans have done to make our borders, or oil refineries, or nuclear plants, or ports, susceptible to terrorism." I'm hoping that my argument will be understood well enough so that even if those things are said, the people who say them will know they are distortions and not let their rhetoric govern policy, and that people will step back and take a much more mature, realistic look at what's being done with all this money and the rationales that are being created -- what the culture of fighting terrorism is doing to the country.

As a student of comparative politics, of comparative history, I want to ask you for an element of hope that we can find in historical processes.

Well, let's stick with the United States. We mentioned Kennan and McCarthyism. People have criticized Eisenhower for not speaking out early enough at how much he despised McCarthy, for not defending George Marshall against the horrible attacks that McCarthy made on him, for being cowardly. Others who defend Eisenhower said that the political powers in the country were such that even he could not have stood up to them, and that instead he was wise to save his ammunition until the point when McCarthy had gone far enough that he could be labeled as a nut, and when Eisenhower labeled him thus, the tipping point would be reached to bring an end to McCarthyism. And that's what happened. Eisenhower did play an important role, albeit somewhat late in the game. book cover What I'm suggesting is the possibility that we could have a counter-tip under the right circumstances, specifically by naming a crucial step in the War on Terror for what it is, namely that the war in Iraq was a calculated ulterior-motive catastrophe. Then, by uncovering the dynamics that drive us all, we may be able to achieve mastery over ourselves, just as certain kinds of psychotherapy work because they uncover for the person what is driving him or her to do something that they know they don't want to do but can not seem to stop doing.

Ian, I want to thank you very much for coming here today, talking about your new book. I want to show your new book again to our audience, and I wish you the best, and I'm sure it will sell well. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Harry.

And thank you very much for joining us for this Conversation with History.

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