



Harry Kreisler: Welcome to a “Conversation With History.” I’m Harry Kreisler of the Institute of International Studies. Our guest today is Robert A. Scalapino. One of America’s leading Asian scholars, Professor Scalapino is the Robeson Professor of Government Emeritus and the Founding Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at UC Berkeley. He is the author of 553 articles and 39 books on Asian politics and U.S./Asian relations. Professor Scalapino, welcome to our program.

Robert Scalapino: Thank you.

HK: Where were you born and raised?

RS: I was born in the center of the United States, Leavenworth, Kansas, and I lived there until I was 10 years old. My father was a small town superintendent of schools, but then we moved to Santa Barbara, California, quite a change.

HK: And since then you’ve been looking east. Looking back, how do you think your parents shaped your thinking about the world?

RS: My father was a teacher, high school teacher in Santa Barbara, and so he introduced me to a number of academics, intellectuals, some of whom had international interests, and that’s the way I became involved.

HK: Was there discussion of politics and world affairs around the dinner table?

RS: Mostly not. That took place at school, and I went to Santa Barbara College before going to Harvard for graduate work, and at Santa Barbara College I became very much influenced by several of my teachers who were specialists in the international field.

HK: Was there any particular way, or any particular professor, who really shaped your – pointed you in the direction that you went?

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RS: Dr. Harry Gervetz [sp?], who taught international relations and whose interest was Europe, had a good deal of influence on me, and when I went east to Harvard for graduate work he had encouraged me and I took up an MA thesis on why the League of Nations had failed. That was sort of my opening introduction.

HK: And then you got your PhD at Harvard, also. Who did you work under and what did you focus on then?

RS: Actually in the government department at Harvard they didn't have professors at that time who were specialists on Asia, so I brought in, on my doctoral committee, Edwin Reischauer, who was a specialist on Japan in the foreign language department, and I became very closely associated, also, with Fairbank, who was a China specialist. So, those two individuals had some influence on me.

HK: What did you do your dissertation on?

RS: My PhD dissertation, after the war – I was at Harvard twice, before Pearl Harbor, and then later I went into the service and came back to Harvard after the war. By that time, Asia was my field and I wrote my dissertation on the failure of democracy in pre-war Japan.

HK: And what did you find? Do you recall, still, what you found at that time? What was decisive in Japan's development?

RS: Mostly I looked into why the military were so powerful in the Japan of the 1930s and why they pushed parliamentarism aside, and also the role of the emperor in uniting the people under nationalist flags. Those were two factors of importance.

HK: Now let's talk about this detour into the military because that was important for you. What did you do in the military, and where were you stationed?

RS: In October of 1941, two months before Pearl Harbor, a tutee of mine came to me and said, "I'm going to study Japanese," and I said, "What do you want to do that for? Esoteric language, it won't do you any good." "Oh, yes," he said, "the Navy has a language school and if you get an A or a B here in Japanese, you can get into that program." Well, after Pearl Harbor I remembered what he had said [laughs], and I went to see the old White Russian, Eli Sayov [sp?], who taught Japanese, and he said yes, "If you get an A or a B in my course, you can probably get in. You write to Commodore Hindmarsh [sp?] in Washington. Tell him, at the end of the semester, you want to be considered." I wrote him a letter. One week later I got an answer saying, report to Washington. I was amazed. I went down, Hindmarsh was quite officious, and he barely said hello, and he said, "These are the papers you signed." I said, "Well, I haven't been in this course very long." He said, "How long?" I said, "One week." He said, "How have you done?" Well, I said, "I've done all right." He said, "Sign up. We're desperate for language." So, off I went to Boulder, Colorado, the Navy language school was at Boulder, 15 months of nothing but language study, four hours a day,

two-hour exam every Saturday, and Monday night we had to watch a Japanese movie. And so, at the end of that time we were relatively proficient, not totally, in written and spoken Japanese, and I went out to the Pacific at that point.

HK: So, one can really see how that military experience really gave you a focus that would come in handy later.

RS: Oh, yes. Yes, I was in Pearl Harbor at first, and then I was on the Okinawa campaign. When the war ended, I was in the Philippines and went up to Osaka just a couple of weeks after the surrender, and we were put in charge of monitoring Japanese communications in the region.

HK: Do you recall anything from that, what passed before your eyes of import?

RS: I think one of the most interesting things took place in November, two months after the surrender. Tokyo asked us to take a poll of Japanese and American troops and ask each of them, what three things do you like about the other and what three things do you not like. Well, the Japanese said the things they like were: first, Americans were generous, they gave food and clothing, and other things; two, they were hardworking; and three, they were friendly, they would talk with you and interact. The three things they didn't like were: first, Americans were wasteful, they threw food and other things away that should have been used; secondly, they didn't have very good discipline, they were noisy and boisterous; and third, some of them had racial prejudices. Now the three things the Americans liked about the Japanese were: first, they were hardworking; second, they were neat and tidy; and thirdly, they obeyed when you gave them instructions, they did it. The three things they didn't like were: first, they had an hierarchical attitude toward people, it depended on your sex, your age and your position, how they treated you; secondly, they were not always straightforward, sometimes they were devious; and thirdly – and this was the black soldiers, particularly – many of them had racial prejudices. Now that evaluation, just two months after the occupation started, was very interesting.

HK: Yeah, and insightful, in a way.

RS: Yes, it was.

HK: So, after you got your degree, is that when you came to Berkeley? What year was that?

RS: I taught one year at Harvard and then came to Berkeley in the summer of 1949.

HK: What was it like here then?

RS: Well, very different. At the time, there was a controversy over a new loyalty oath. The Berkeley state had asked the professors here at the University to sign an oath that they were not Communists or supported the Communist cause, and there was resentment of this because it was a special oath,

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apart from the regular one. I didn't realize this was a controversy when I came, I just saw it after I got here. That was resolved, more or less, in a year or two, and Berkeley in the fifties was relatively quiet. The problems, of course, emerged with the loyalty oath at the end of that decade, and then moved into the Vietnam War issue so that the sixties and early seventies were quite cantankerous.

HK: What was the state of Asian studies when you came here? I guess there was a presence already, but is it correct to say that Berkeley's an attraction as a center of Asian studies reached a new level in the fifties and sixties?

RS: Particularly in the sixties and seventies. In the fifties there were only a few here, and they were mainly in history, who were Asia specialists, and some invitees. But we built gradually up in the sixties and seventies.

HK: What was distinctive about the way Berkeley focused on Asia? It must have reflected the intellectual community here, which was theoretical, which was comparative, which was focused on global politics.

RS: Well, I think one helpful factor was that this region had a large Asian population, and therefore we had a number of graduate students of Asian background. Some of them were second generation, third generation, but there was this sort of interest in Asia on the part of the student body and some of the community. Now also, of course, many people of my generation came out of the war as interested in Asia and Asian specialists, and that's why it was easier to recruit people in the Asian field, in economics, in political science, in sociology, as well as in the earlier fields.

HK: This critical mass that gathered wound up – and with you playing an important leadership – training and educating, really, the coming generations of leaders in Asia. Talk about that, because I know in one particular case, Sadako Ogata was here as an IR student, and then of course, in the nineties she became UN commissioner for refugees. There must have been many like that.

RS: There were. I was very proud of my graduate students, especially those of Asian background. Sada got her PhD with me, also Hansung Jiu [sp?], who was foreign minister in Korea, South Korea, and later ambassador to the U.S. , he got his PhD with me. I could go on. There were many who went into government, who went into prominent positions in their own countries' politics. And as one gets older, one takes increasing pride in one's students.

HK: And interestingly enough, these students were committed to going back, actually, to build their countries in that period.

RS: Many were. Some stayed, for example George Yu, who was actually born here, became a prominent professor at Illinois, Chong-sik Lee, who was born in Korea, a prominent professor at the University of Pennsylvania. Some stayed but many went back.

HK: Now you were the Founding Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies. Explain to us how that came about and how it took things to a new level.

RS: Well, it's a rather interesting story. I had become very interested in policy making in the early seventies and I felt that some reforms needed to be made. Earlier I had been asked to write the northeast Asia section of the so-called **Conlan** [?] Report, which had been commissioned by Senator Fulbright, then head of the Foreign Relations Committee.

HK: This would have been what year?

RS: That was '59. And from that point on, since I had written about our policies toward China, toward Japan and Korea, I became increasingly interested in seeing something happen here. So, I organized a conference in the early seventies, '74 actually, on the question of U.S. policies in Asia, and subsequently a friend of mine, who was head of the Quakers' foreign relations committee in San Francisco – we organized together a conference in Washington. One day in 1978, he came to me and said, "Bob, I'd like to talk to you about an idea I have," and I said, "Fine, but I'm not going to take on anything new." And he said, "Well, let me talk to you." So, he said, "I think we should organize a national committee on U.S./China relations to explore new approaches to China." Well, after about an hour I said, "Well, look, I'll call several colleagues and see what they think," and I called Doak Barnett [sp?], and Lucien Pai [?], and they both said it's worth considering. So, we held a meeting. Well, the upshot of all this was that in 1979 we organized the National Committee on U.S./China Relations, and that committee was asked later to sponsor –'69, I'm sorry – was asked to sponsor the ping-pong players when they came in 1971. So, the Chinese government felt they should invite our board of directors and we made our first trip to China, to Communist China, in 1972, in December of 1971. So, we began a series of contacts at the non-official or quasi-official level with China at that time.

HK: And so, it became important to have an institute here that could manage all of these interactions.

RS: Absolutely. And we branched out. For example, we brought the first Mongolian delegation to the U.S., and we had close interaction with Japan, as well as with South Korea.

HK: I'm personally familiar with the work that you did vis a vis U.S./Russia relations, which is a counterpart to what you've just described. And here you and the University faculty here became very critical in the mid to last phase of the Cold War in having conversations, dialoguing, to move the relationship to a more peaceful track.

RS: Yes. I made an arrangement with Evgenii Primakov, who was then the head of the Institute of Asian Studies in Moscow, that we, just Americans and Russians, would meet once a year, alternating between the Soviet Union and the U.S., to talk about Asia and our respective policies. This started in 1979 and went on through the 1980s. And Evgenii always felt that when we were in the Soviet

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Union we should meet in Soviet Asia because he wanted to have us know that the Soviet Union extended into central Asia. So, we were able to see much of central Asia during that period, meeting in places like Baku, **Ahmata** [?], and similar places. As a matter of fact, I remember one occasion in which we went up to a Korean collective farm, because there were quite a large number of Koreans in central Asia, they had been moved away from Vladivostok and vicinity by Stalin, who feared attack by the Japanese and didn't know what the affiliation of the Koreans there would be. So, he had moved many to central Asia. And at this collective farm we had lunch. I was served sheep's head and told to cut the ears into slices and give a slice to each member of my delegation. Those who had misbehaved got the biggest slices. [laughs]

HK: [laughs] And you know, we should make note – I think Primakov became foreign minister at one...

RS: He did, later.

HK: Yeah, later, and that, of course, central Asia is now critical to the jockeying for power in the 21st century. I'm curious – because I want to touch on something before we get on to U.S. policy toward Asia – and that is, what do you see are the skills required? Because as a scholar you're grounded in many facets of what is important, and as you just described, it becomes useful for pushing the dialogue along as our adversaries become friends, and so on. So, what does it take? I mean, obviously language skill, but you're also suggesting a knowledge of international politics, culture – talk a little about that.

RS: Well, clearly language is of major importance, and as I think everyone will tell you, Japanese and Chinese are not easy languages for the American to learn. They require a great deal of work. In addition, I think it's very important to have, over time, made contact with key people, both in official life and in academic or business worlds, because they become conduits for serious discussions on policy and views. And I think in addition, because Asia's changing so rapidly it's important to make repeated trips to the areas where one is especially involved because things can change very dramatically over a short period of time. So, these are some of the factors that I think are important in building up expertise.

HK: And you live by what you say, I see, because if I could just read this: "Traveling extensively in Asia, Professor Scalapino has made fifty-nine trips to the People's Republic of China, on four occasions, serving as a visiting professor at Beijing University; he has had two separate one-year residencies in Japan, having been a Japanese language officer in the U.S. Navy in World War II; he has made numerous trips to the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and all parts of south and southeast Asia, as well as four trips to North Korea, serving as head of Asia Society delegations with a similar role in Mongolia on three occasions." So, you've been there.

RS: I have. [laughs] Most recently – I've now made six trips to North Korea. My most recent one was last month.

HK: And we'll talk about that in a minute. Talk about this connection between policy makers and scholars, because you helped us see the role that they can play, but also, you have had the opportunity to interact with American leaders, with presidents, President Johnson, Nixon, and so on. What is it that scholars can bring to the table?

RS: I think that scholars who specialize on a contemporary scene can be helpful in giving their thoughts and advice to presidents who, after all, have to have a much wider perspective and cannot be specialists in any given field. I, and several others, did brief President Johnson on matters relating to China, and I met, again, with several others before President Reagan's trip to China. I talked with President Kennedy for about half an hour on the situation in Korea, and we can, in this kind of way, give our views, our perspectives, when a president is trying to reach out and understand issues. And incidentally, I found all three of those individuals very receptive, very interested, and asked good questions. Now in addition, I served on a non-official advisory committee for the State Department for many years – it was organized in the Johnson era and went down through the Nixon period – on matters relating to Asia, and we frequently met with secretaries of state.

HK: During this period of your career the pressures on the presidents have evolved over time. You were here at Berkeley, the protest movements were going [on], as you were talking about a few minutes ago, and all the way to the present where one sees religion, not on the campuses necessarily but in the heartland of America, having an impact on, or being a pressure on, presidents. I wonder what your assessment is, grouping all of these together, about these pressures, how our leaders have handled them and how they have affected policy for good or ill.

RS: Well, that's a very important and a very difficult question. I think if you look back, President Johnson finally became so upset, and so uncertain, as to how to handle the Vietnam problem that he simply gave up and didn't run again. When President Nixon came in, he came in on the slogan "peace with honor." We got peace but I'm not sure we got honor in the way we withdrew, and the million refugees that followed, and the horrendous events in Cambodia. But there can be no doubt that in the sixties and seventies, early seventies, the issue of Vietnam was uppermost in the minds of our leadership. Now more recently, as we all know, the Iraq war has been of increasing concern and has plagued President Bush and the Bush administration with no end in sight. So, these issues do become very powerful in influencing the popularity or unpopularity of a leader, in influencing attitudes of the American people, and I think that in the future we will probably reduce unilateralism and increase multilateralism in the making of our foreign policy, that is, more cooperative actions with other powers and less going-it-alone. That, I think, will be the trend, at least in the coming years.

HK: And do you think that is a result of the decline of American power and the rise of other powers in making it a more multipolar world?

RS: Partly, but it's also a result of the enormous costs, economic and political, of going it alone. And we've already seen that the Bush administration made a significant shift in its policy toward North Korea. It began with very tough, hard line positions. More recently it has engaged in bilateral, as well as multilateral, dialogues and some degree of commitment to new, partially concessionary policies. And I think that's a reflection of the fact that we don't want to get involved in another high cost, high risk, unilateral policy in northeast Asia.

HK: For somebody who traveled a lot to North Korea when no one was traveling to North Korea, were you somewhat frustrated by – as you talk, so to speak, at this academic and influential level – the inability of the top levels of our government to talk?

RS: I feel that dialogue is always critically important, even with those with whom we have serious disagreements. Now in my discussions in North Korea, while the North Koreans were invariably polite, they did not vary from the official line, but at least you got the official line, and you could communicate your reservations, your doubts, your desires, and these were noted. There was no agreement on fundamentals, but by dialogue you can open up issues, and I think that's very important.

HK: And at a certain point, I guess, the international politics becomes pregnant with opportunity which can then build on these dialogues.

RS: Absolutely, because at certain stages a country, even North Korea, has such strong economic problems that it has an increasing desire to interact with external parties for its own interests.

HK: You just reflected that the pendulum will swing away from unilateralism. What accounts for the extreme swing of the pendulum to unilateralism – let me put some things on the table and you can pick and choose – a kind of decline in the quality of our leadership, or was it really the fact that with the fall of the Soviet Union there was no one to balance the excesses of our power and it could have happened, no matter who were our leaders?

RS: Well, I think several factors are involved. The last factor, which you mentioned, was certainly important. We were the sole global superpower, and therefore in meeting situations of deep concern, whether they represented a nuclear threat, or were extremely authoritarian and were violating human rights on a large basis, it was the United States that was in a position to involve itself with certain willing partners, shall we say, who were prepared. But organizations like the UN had limited capacity. The veto power in the UN precluded most interventions, if these were desirable. I think, also, there was a certain, shall I say, ideological reason. United States leadership, rightly or wrongly, wanted to save the world for democracy. Now I have some questions about that, frankly, because I think that certain states at lower levels of development, with different cultures, are not prepared to operate democracy, and what we have seen in the case of South Korea and of Taiwan is that after authoritarian leaders pursued pragmatic economic policies that resulted in more rapid development, and the creation of a new middle class, then political change began to develop in

a democratic direction. But before that, this is not likely. Even in China now you see some political opening, not democracy as we would define it, but a great deal more freedom to talk, to write, to act, than was characteristic of the China of Mao. And so, I think we should be cautious about trying to push our system on every society. We must live with different political orders.

HK: Interestingly enough, as I listen to you talk, I think of courses that you taught in the political science department on modernization, and courses that others taught in the department, that looked at these things in comparative perspective throughout history.

RS: That's true.

HK: And I had the sense sometimes that you wish the leaders in this recent period had taken those courses. [laughs] Let me ask you one other thing about foreign policy, and then we'll talk about Asia, and that is, it seems that in this recent period we moved toward a much greater focus, maybe to the extreme, on the Middle East. We emphasized the military instruments of power and paid less attention to soft power. Talk about that.

RS: Well, I think there's no doubt that the situation in the Middle East, and particularly the decision to enter Iraq, and the tremendous commitments that have been made by the U.S., political and economic, have caused attention to focus there with increasing divisions, as I said earlier, at home on the viability of those policies. But the Palestinian/Israeli problem, the uncertainty surrounding Iran, as well as the Iraq situation, have contributed to this. And as a result, there has been some lessening of commitment, one might say, to most other regions. However, I would state that we have, by no means, given up our interest in Asia. Our commitment to a strategic alliance with Japan and South Korea holds. We also have extraordinary economic interrelations with China. It is our leading trading partner today. Now we have many problems, the question of intellectual property protection, imbalances in our trade, our deficit in exports, and the Chinese reluctance to allow their currency to fluctuate – these are all issues. But we have, both in northeast Asia and in southeast Asia, a great many commitments and interests, and I think that will continue.

HK: When we talk about U.S. and Asia, are we becoming increasingly irrelevant as they rise? In other words, is Asia's rise coming with America's decline, or are we the indispensable party to the region still?

RS: I think that the United States is regarded by virtually every Asian country, irrespective of our bilateral relations, as of great importance. If I may say so, I think U.S. policy will continue to be guided by two fundamentals: one, a concert of powers, and two, a balance of power. By concert of powers I mean cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally on a number of issues, and we're going to enter a period where the issues of human security, of global warming, of pollution, of environmental degradation, and of aging of society – these issues are becoming more and more important to the future of all of us, and they have to be attacked both at a non-official, a quasi official, and an official level. Now alongside that, I think most Asian countries see the rise of China as a troublesome

matter, having advantages and disadvantages, and they want to balance, and that's why they want a continuing American presence. And I think those two fundamentals will underwrite American policy in the future.

HK: And it would seem that so long as we maintain our vigorous democracy here at home, that the contribution we can make on that first set of issues, environment, problems of dealing with aging, that we will remain at the cutting edge even if we fall behind in technologies.

RS: I think that it's very important. I think the U.S. will continue to represent a kind of pioneer in some of these fields, and we're not perfect. We, too, have disagreements on certain matters, but I think that we will be of great importance.

HK: In the recent article in *Asian Survey*, where you survey the terrain of Asia, you see this as one of the most peaceful times ever, in Asia, since World War II. Tell us about that.

RS: Well, I think that while this is a time when separatists, when certain terrorists, having access to modern weaponry, represent a problem in some societies. The fact is that today wars between nations, and particularly between major nations, cannot be won. All sides suffer hugely, and I think that's increasingly recognized by the leaders of our countries. We're trying to work out problems through dialogue. Now there are several issues in east Asia that have not been totally resolved that create tension. One is the North Korean nuclear issue. Another is the cross strait relation between Taiwan and China. But at the present both of those issues are being subject to dialogue by the critically concerned parties, and we will have to see what kind of progress can be made, but there is certainly an effort now to reduce the tensions, to talk together, and that, I think, is hopeful.

HK: If you look at the U.S./China relation, which is pivotal in the second category of power balancing that you describe, there's a tension here in the sense that China and the U.S. have become very interdependent economically, partly because of the way we have managed our internal fiscal house, but on the other hand, we still have this interventionist bent that takes the notion of humanitarian intervention, not necessarily militarily, but getting involved in things like China's relations with what it calls its province, Taipei.

RS: I have said that I think one word defines the U.S./China relationship, and that word is "complex," and it will continue to be a complex relation. There will be areas of mutual interest where we have a great stake in working together, both in the economic and in the political security field, there will be areas where we have differences, and where we have got to have dialogue to try to reduce or contain those differences. There are certain Americans who emphasize the China threat thesis, and there are Chinese who emphasize the America threat thesis, but as I said earlier, the general trend is trying to work out or contain problems because leaders on both sides know that the U.S./China relationship is critical to the peace and prosperity of the region.

HK: So, should we feel threatened by something like the Shanghai protocols or should we look at it as part of this complexity?

RS: I think we should look at it as part of the complexity, but let me put it this way. In both China and the United States nationalism has been rising. In China nationalism is a substitute for ideology which has been going down in an effort to unify the people. Now how a nation uses its nationalism is very critical, both to its relations with neighbors and with the world in general. In the United States, also, nationalism has been rising, the emphasis on save the world for democracy is a kind of expression of American nationalism. And once again, I think it's very important that we contain the nationalist surge so that it doesn't alienate other countries.

HK: You emphasize in your article in Asian Survey the importance of a kind of cultural internationalism that really cuts the other way in terms of – that is, it reduces the tensions that might appear on some issues.

RS: Yes. There are no pure civilizations today. Every country's culture, as well as its economy and polity, have been influenced by external sources, and you see this particularly in generational differences. Young people in Asia, as well as in the United States, have a considerably different lifestyle, and set of goals, ambitions and views, from some of the older generations. This is inevitable in an era of rising internationalism.

HK: Talk a little about this China/Japan/U.S. triangle, because you see this culture of internationalism that you're talking [of], on the one hand, but you also see the rise of nationalism in relations to subsets of this triangle, and then finally, you see the balancing of power that you were talking about, the U.S. thinking about Japan as somebody to help balance China.

RS: Yes. This is a relationship that is undergoing change. Japan/China relations until very recently were quite negative and minimal, despite the economic interaction which was growing. Most recently Japanese leaders, starting with Abe and continuing with the present prime minister, Fukuda, have made an effort to reach out, trips to China, and inviting Chinese leaders to come to Japan, not visiting Yasukuni Shrine, which was a matter of great concern in Beijing. There is now an effort to move this relationship, this bilateral relation, forward into a more compatible atmosphere, and I think that probably will continue, and the United States will certainly support it. That does not mean, however, that the U.S./Japan alliance will be terminated or greatly reduced. I think the Japanese, as well as the Americans, want this balance, especially since Japan has no desire at present to go into nuclear weapons, to try to achieve nuclear status. Now there may well be some amendment to the Japanese constitution to allow regular, standard military practices to have full legality and operational possibilities, but Japan will continue to be, in strategic terms, a lesser power. Also, Japan is facing the problem of aging. It is the first society in east Asia where the population has actually been reduced since 2005, and that's an issue which Japan has got to handle, but it's soon going to be an issue over a much broader area of Asia, and in this country, the issue of rise of

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population of 65 years of age or older, and its implications. So, on these issues we have some reason to cooperate.

HK: You've just described in this brief tour of Asia the complexity, which is the word you use. Are you saying that our politics and our foreign policy will be able to accept this complexity and act accordingly?

RS: I hope so. [laughs] I don't think one can guarantee it, but I think that's the challenge before leaders.

HK: And if students out there watch this interview and they want to make Asia a central piece of their personal agenda, how would you advise them to prepare for the future?

RS: Well, as I said earlier, I think if you want to understand Asia you have to mix with Asians in Asia. I think you have to, at some point, go into the regions where you have a special interest, hopefully with language training, and begin to interact both with the ordinary citizenry and with the elites. I think, also, it's important to talk with different generations, to talk with some of the more senior people but also to interact with some of the younger generations, because there are differences, and that may help you forecast the future.

HK: In a way, Professor Scalapino, you can say that you were sort of present at the creation of this – what shall we call it – 21st century Asia, and occupied this perch at Berkeley, in American policy circles, and so on. What are your feelings about the changes that you have seen, and in an indirect way participated in by training leaders for that part of the world?

RS: Let me put it this way. I think Asia will continue to be a very vital part of the global revolution, and by revolution I mean rapid change, change economically, change politically and strategically. And there will be many challenges that are normal in this kind of atmosphere, but as I like to say, I am cautiously optimistic because I think dialogue rather than conflict can be, and will be, the only rational approach to problems. Now when I'm a little uncertain I say I'm cautiously optimistic on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, and on Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday I reconsider the problem. Sunday I rest. But in general I'm hopeful about the future.

HK: Well, I think of one final question, which is, here we are conducting this interview in April of 2008, and you just told me before the program that you're 88 now. And so, the question is, where are you going next in Asia?

RS: [laughs] Well, I have visited every country a number of times but I'm going to continue to travel. As a matter of fact, next month in May, I will be, again, in South Korea, in Taiwan and in China, and possibly Mongolia. So, I'm trying to keep abreast of change in the region.

HK: Any advice on longevity for our audience out there for maintaining the high energy level?

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RS: [laughs] Well, I tell my friends that I have three rules for good health in old age: first, you must choose your parents correctly – that's genes; secondly, you must enjoy the work you're doing; and third, you must have a vodka on ice before dinner at night. And that will keep you healthy, wealthy – not necessarily wise.

HK: [laughs] Professor Scalapino, thank you for joining us and sharing your reminiscences with us.

RS: It's very nice to be here.

HK: And thank you very much for joining us for this "Conversation With History."

[End of Interview]