Global Change: Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
he transformation of the earth by humanity is omnipresent, continuing, and imperfectly understood. It is the challenge facing this and all future generations. It is a phenomenon that requires unprecedented foresight, because choices today reach far and perhaps irrevocably into our future.
e face many barriers in this challenge. What Malthus described as the "perpetual tendency in the race of man to increase beyond the means of subsistence"* calls into question the capacity of humanity to alter fundamentally the way it envisions its relationship to the earth. Even if the capacity to change exists, the global decentralization of authority to nations makes international cooperation problematic. Even if the means of cooperation exists, it is not clear that we understand adequately what to do or what the consequences of our actions will be.
he chapters in this study have discussed aspects of this challenge of global change. In these concluding remarks, we comment briefly on what we identified at the outset as three issues confronting the formulation of wise policy.
ithin the University, disciplines supplant the world and the one becomes the many. This circumstance makes communication difficult not only between the University and society, but also between the disciplines themselves. A discipline exerts a powerful pull over its members. Members of a discipline are members of a community of shared effort. They write primarily for one another, developing vocabularies that provide an efficient shorthand but that simultaneously erect barriers to those outside the discipline. More importantly, the discipline comes to identify a set of questions central to the discipline's inquiry. Thus in our seminar it seemed that although it was the problem of global change that initially attracted the attention of the researcher, that problem often became twisted and refashioned into the discipline's image of what was interesting about global change. This insight is important. It is the basis of the frequent call for what is called problem-based, rather than disciplinary-based, research.
ifferent disciplines not only use different words and concepts, they often have entirely different ideas of what constitutes research and knowledge. A question suggesting wide implications in one discipline may appear quite irrelevant in another. Although the problem of climate change frames and shapes our inquiries generally, our particular way of focusing on an aspect of the problem is greatly influenced by our disciplines. Disciplines have their own priorities. Thus, a policymaker concerned with whether the carbon-sink aspect of soils is sensitive to social activities and whether society has the capacity to enhance the potential of that sink may be surprised to find that the soil scientist, from a disciplinary perspective, is interested in understanding a particular natural process of only marginal significance for the policy question involved. This is not to say that the disciplinary agendas developed over many years are incorrect or not of value, rather it is to stress that that agenda can be independent of other agendas, and that the disciplinary pull can be a barrier to communication when efforts at collaboration are made.
ollaboration requires that the rigor of the various disciplines be coordinated. We found this possible when the discussion between disciplines about how a research question should be formulated proceeded from a focus on the problem. Simultaneously, it must be recognized that such collaboration and focus is not for all.
hat does it mean, however, to say that research is problem-based? What is it that leads a group to regard one phenomenon but not another as a problem? The policymaker is concerned about stratospheric ozone depletion because it is thought to pose the threat of deleterious effects for humans. For the chemist, the problem may involve the design of a substitute for the chemicals that deplete stratospheric ozone. In the first case, the perception of impact raises concern; in the latter, the capacities and expertise of the discipline define the problem. Clearly, a relationship exists between the societal description of the problem and the particular task undertaken by the chemist. To the extent that the agenda for the chemist is a response to (and potentially a redefining of) the root problem, then the chemist's task stems from the root, and indeed, it is at the root -- the problem as understood by society -- that all disciplines meet.
ll of this could be viewed as yet another indication that the University needs to be reconfigured for modern times. More modestly, the required response to the consequences of a world undergoing transformation requires a coordinated approach to research that challenges the way the Academy has divided its efforts until now.
everal chapters in this study discuss the need for, and outline the efforts to develop, an integrated model of global change. Climate impact and policy assessment models have already proceeded through several iterations of integration and sophistication. But the integration of the evolution of social systems into physical system models involves an effort of tremendous proportions. On the micro-level, the Academy has been able to model numerous natural processes, e.g. the breakdown of ozone or the effect of increased UV radiation on cellular structures, but at this level the social dimension is not a factor. Efforts to extend our understanding of phenomena that occur at small scales to phenomena that occur at regional or global scales have been difficult. Questions arise regarding the homogeneity of process through a region and our ability to project data from a single point to a larger area. The reverse question is also difficult: how do we take modeling information on global scale processes and predict what will happen in a small region? We frequently lack the knowledge of regional sensitivity to global processes that would make this process possible.
n addition, when aggregate consequences are projected into the future, they require assumptions about how social systems and environmental values will change over time. Although a projection with no social inputs seems neutral in the sense that it makes no choice as to how society will change, it is not realistic if it assumes, for example, that rates of growth and depletion will remain constant. To understand what happens and to predict what will happen, a model requires both micro- and macro-level natural processes; an account of likely individual human responses to natural phenomena, summed as an aggregate social response; and the policy responses that governments may adopt in anticipating or responding to individual reactions (perhaps with the aim of aiding adaptation or avoiding negative social feedbacks to global change). A formidable task.
ome question the feasibility of such an effort; others question the wisdom of relying on the hubris of modeling the world. In providing numbers, models convey a sense of certainty despite the fact that difficult assumptions about the future of society will be required. Nevertheless, policy-making is about choices, about relative rather than absolute knowledge. In this sense, the danger of modeling is not that it is incomplete (because that incomplete knowledge is still more than the policymaker would otherwise have had); rather, the danger is that the model will appear to be more than it is.
ut this is not the place to resolve this debate. Rather, we wish to emphasize the need to integrate our appreciation of the social and ecological dimensions. Even if a predictive model is not possible, the broad outlines of how the social and ecological dimensions relate to one another can provide a coat rack on which our thoughts can be placed and thus better considered.
f the division of the University into disciplines creates threshold costs between disciplines, such costs are even greater for those outside the Academy. But the luxury the University has enjoyed of having its insights only slowly trickle down to society grows perhaps too costly when problems such as climate change require great foresight in policy-making. Either the organization of universities must change (an unlikely prospect for the near future) or different institutions at the interface between the Academy and lawmakers must be established to facilitate communication. And when communication occurs, other dangers arise. First, politicians need pieces of information that can be communicated effectively and persuasively -- a scientific sound-bite -- so that the policy can move through the political process. Thus metaphors such as "greenhouse effect," stripped of subtleties and uncertainties, are used and then take on a life of their own -- what we call the "folklore effect." Second, it can be politically difficult to carry forward a policy that all the while points to the uncertainties underlying the recommendation. Thus there is a tendency for policymakers to try to force scientists not only to address certain issues, but to come up with clean answers.
or the scientist, the question is one of what one knows in an absolute sense. For the policymaker, the issue is one of making a choice, and the question consequently is one of relative knowledge. For the politician in many societies, politics is the art of the possible, and knowledge becomes one more tool toward that end. These sorts of differences can lead to misunderstandings, frustration, and mistrust. These differences suggest that policymakers must appreciate better the gaps and uncertainties in scientific knowledge and must learn how to deal with those gaps. These differences suggest that scientists need to understand how to respond better to the needs and mentality of policymakers by presenting results that will relay the uncertainties they have, yet also convey clearly what is understood so that the understandings of the Academy may appropriately influence the choices that need to be made.
* Footnote: Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, Section 17, 6th edition (London: J. Murray, 1826).
See also the Notes on Contributors
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